Do you know it when you see it? A study on the judicial legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights by Dahlberg, Maija
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
isbn 978-952-61-1770-6
issn 1798-5757
Maija Dahlberg
Do You Know It When 
You See It?
A Study on the Judicial Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has been criticised on the 
basis of its far-reaching interpretations 
of the provisions of the Convention, 
and serious doubts have also been 
expressed as to the effects of its 
caseload crisis. This study focuses 
on criticism of the far-reaching 
interpretations of the Convention to 
be found in judgments delivered by 
the ECtHR. This thesis consists of four 
peer-reviewed articles, and judicial 
legitimacy lies at the heart of each. 
The underlying questions are: (1) what 
is the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy 
based on, and (2) how can its judicial 
legitimacy be accomplished?
d
isser
tatio
n
s | N
o
 10
6 | M
a
ija D
a
h
lb
erg
 | D
o
 Y
o
u
 K
n
o
w
 It W
h
en
 Y
o
u
 S
ee It?
Maija Dahlberg
Do You Know It When 
You See It?
A Study on the Judicial 
Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Human Rights
Do You Know It When You See It?
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies No 106
MAIJA DAHLBERG
Do You Know It 
When You See It?
A Study on the Judicial Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies
No 106 
Itä-Suomen yliopisto
Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja kauppatieteiden tiedekunta
Joensuu
2015
Grano Oy
Jyväskylä, 2015
Vastaava toimittaja Prof. Kimmo Katajala
Toimittaja Eija Fabritius
Myynti: Itä-Suomen yliopiston kirjasto
Kannen kuva: Fotolia
ISBN (nid): 978-952-61-1769-0
ISSN (nid): 1798-5749
ISSN-L: 1798-5749
ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-1770-6
ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757
Dahlberg, Maija
Do You Know It When You See It? A Study on the Judicial Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 103 pages
University of Eastern Finland
Faculty of Social Sciences and Business Studies, 2015
Publications of the University of Eastern Finland, 
Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies, no 106
ISBN (bind): 978-952-61-1769-0
ISSN (bind): 1798-5749
ISSN-L: 1798-5749
ISBN (PDF): 978-952-61-1770-6
ISSN (PDF): 1798-5757
Dissertation
ABSTRACT
There has been much discussion of the fundamental problems affecting the 
European Convention on Human Rights system among the Contracting States. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been criticised on the basis of its 
far-reaching interpretations of the provisions of the Convention, and serious doubts 
have also been expressed as to the effects of its caseload crisis. Furthermore, there 
has been debate on related issues, such as the separation of powers, parliamentary 
democracy, national sovereignty and the protection of minorities – more often than 
not, criticism of the ECtHR is merely part of a wider debate about the legitimacy of 
the whole Convention system. This study focuses on criticism of the far-reaching 
interpretations of the Convention to be found in judgments delivered by the ECtHR. 
In this study, the term ‘legitimacy’ refers to judicial legitimacy, which means focus-
ing on the judiciary’s point of view in relation to legitimacy. Judicial legitimacy can 
be divided into formal legitimacy and substance legitimacy. Formal legitimacy is 
gained by respecting procedural rules and the subsidiarity principle in its differ-
ent forms; while substance legitimacy means paying attention to the content of the 
judgment and whether it can be seen as justified and acceptable. The argumentation 
used by the ECtHR can be analysed in terms of its justifiability and acceptability. 
This thesis consists of four peer-reviewed articles, and judicial legitimacy lies at 
the heart of each. The underlying questions are: (1) what is the ECtHR’s judicial 
legitimacy based on, and (2) how can its judicial legitimacy be accomplished? The 
starting-point is that it either gains or loses judicial legitimacy through the rea-
soning used in its judgments. The legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments has been 
evaluated by reference to the requirements developed in the rational argumenta-
tion theory. The stories outline the key conclusion of the study, which is that the 
ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy comprises four requirements: (1) form; (2) sources of 
law; (3) methods of interpretation; and (4) the nature of the reasoning used.
Keywords: the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights, judicial legitimacy, legal argumentation, rational argumentation 
theory
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Väitöskirja
ABSTRAKTI
Euroopan neuvoston alaiseen ihmisoikeusjärjestelmään kohdistuvat perusta-
vanlaatuiset ongelmat ovat olleet viime aikoina useasti esillä sopimusvaltioissa. 
Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuimeen (EIT) on kohdistunut kritiikkiä muun 
muassa sen ihmisoikeussopimuksen säännösten kauaskantoisten ja sopimuksen 
sanamuodosta irtaantuvien tulkintojen vuoksi. Lisäksi tapausten määrän huomat-
tava kasvu EIT:ssä on aiheuttanut huolta tuomioistuimen kyvystä selvitä asian-
mukaisesti työtaakastaan.  Kriittisesti on suhtauduttu myös niihin vaikutuksiin, 
joita ihmisoikeussopimusjärjestelmällä on ollut vallanjakoon, edustukselliseen 
demokratiaan, kansalliseen suvereniteettiin ja vähemmistöjen suojeluun. Kritiikki 
on johtanut laajempaan keskusteluun EIT:n ja koko ihmisoikeusjärjestelmän legiti-
imisyydestä. Tämä tutkimus keskittyy EIT:n tulkintametodeista aiheutuviin legiti-
imisyyskysymyksiin. Tässä tutkimuksessa legitiimisyydellä tarkoitetaan oikeudel-
lista lainkäyttöön liittyvää legitimiteettiä (judicial legitimacy). Legitiimisyys jaetaan 
muodolliseen ja sisällölliseen legitimiteettiin, josta sisällöllinen legitiimisyys on 
keskiössä kun arvioidaan perustelujen hyväksyttävyyttä. Muodollinen legiti-
imisyys saavutetaan noudattamalla prosessuaalisia sääntöjä ja subsidiariteettipe-
riaatetta sen eri muodoissa, kun taas sisällöllisessä legitiimisyydessä keskitytään 
ratkaisun sisällön oikeuttamis- ja hyväksyttävyysvaatimuksiin. Oikeuttamista ja 
hyväksyttävyyttä ei voi arvioida ilman, että tarkastelee tuomioistuimen oikeudel-
lista argumentaatiota. Väitöskirja koostuu neljästä vertaisarvioidusta artikkelista, 
joiden keskiössä on kysymys EIT:n legitiimisyydestä. Väitöskirjan tutkimuskysy-
mykset ovat: (1) mihin EIT:n juridinen legitiimisyys perustuu; ja (2) miten sen ju-
ridinen legitiimisyys saavutetaan? Lähtökohtana on, että EIT joko saavuttaa tai 
menettää legitiimisyyden antamiensa perustelujen kautta. Keskeisenä tutkimustu-
loksena esitetään EIT:n juridisen legitiimisyyden koostuvan seuraavista osa-alueis-
ta: (1) muoto; (2) oikeuslähteet; (3) tulkintametodit; ja (4) perustelujen luonne.
Asiasanat: Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus, Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuin, 
juridinen legitiimisyys, oikeudellinen argumentaatio, rationaalinen argumen-
taatioteoria
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‘. . . even if law can effectually regulate its own creation, it can never completely 
regulate its own interpretation.’
  
(Neil MacCormick, ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’, 1995)
‘. . . [t]his is something that affects the whole question of what is legitimate by 
way of the interpretation of an international treaty. . . the convention should not 
be construed as providing for more than it contains, or than is necessarily to be 
inferred from what it contains.’
 (Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in Golder v. The United Kingdom, 1975)

1 Introduction
‘Within a system which denies the existence of basic human rights, fear tends to be 
the order of the day. Fear of imprisonment, fear of torture, fear of death, fear of losing 
friends, family, property or means of livelihood, fear of poverty, fear of isolation, fear 
of failure. A most insidious form of fear is that which masquerades as common sense 
or even wisdom, condemning as foolish, reckless, insignificant or futile the small, 
daily acts of courage which help to preserve man’s self-respect and inherent human 
dignity.’
  
(Aung Sang Suu Kyi, a Burmese opposition politician, 1990)1
‘I think that what we’ve got is a situation where the European Court of Human Rights 
has lost its legitimacy in the UK by doing things that frankly, the people of this coun-
try and their elected representatives do not want.’
(Chris Grayling, a senior British Conservative minister, 2013)2 
Many have criticised the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ‘ECtHR’) 
on the basis of its increasingly far-reaching interpretations of provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ‘the Convention’)3. The 
ECtHR’s caseload is one well-known and much discussed area of contention. In 
2013, close to 66,000 applications were allocated, some 100,000 were pending at 
the same time, and nearly 94,000 were decided (by decision or judgment).4 There 
is a clear historical trend: applications have been received at a considerably higher 
rate than they have been decided. The trend is luckily slowly turning but, in prac-
tice, it may still take the ECtHR 10 years or more to deliver a judgment.5 This inef-
ficiency has led to questioning of the legitimacy of the whole Convention system.
1  Aung Sang Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear Speech, 1990.
2  Chris Grayling, at http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/30/grayling-european-court-human-
rights-legitimacy (visited on 15 October 2014).
3  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No. 005, came 
into force on 3 September 1953.
4  European Court of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights in Facts and Figures 2013, 
at 3–6. All final rulings of the ECtHR on the merits of the case are hereinafter referred to as ‘judg-
ments’ (Article 44 ECHR), whereas ‘decisions’ refer to declarations of admissibility (Article 29 ECHR). 
References to the ECtHR’s ‘case law’ or ‘cases’ includes both judgments and decisions.
5  Wildhaber 2013, at 14; McKaskle 2005, at 24–26, 58–72; Mowbray 2002, at 129.
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The ECtHR’s extensive and dynamic interpretations of Convention provisions 
is a second area of serious concern.6 There must be limits on how far the ECtHR’s 
legitimacy can carry it into the field of dynamic interpretation.7 For example, the 
extension of the applicability of Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment) to the living conditions of asylum seekers 
has been criticised.8 It has been claimed that in several asylum cases the ECtHR 
has transformed a civil right (Article 3) that must be respected regardless of the 
available resources, into a social right (the right to certain living conditions) re-
quiring considerable expenditure.9 Furthermore, there is a general concern that 
the ECtHR does not recognise cultural and national sensitivities. This was clear-
ly on display after the prisoners’ voting rights judgments10 and religious sym-
bols judgments.11 There has been much criticism in the United Kingdom of the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy and withdrawal from the Convention has been seen as a se-
rious option.12 While the wording of the Convention is regarded as sensible, the 
way in which it is interpreted is problematic. Furthermore, the ECtHR has rigor-
ously expanded states’ positive obligations, leading to concern over whether such 
obligations will shortly become too onerous. In brief, its stretching of interpreta-
tive boundaries risks irritating Contracting States and jeopardising their faith in 
the Convention system.
The aim of the thesis is to concretise this critique in four stories focusing on 
the tension between the ECtHR’s methods of interpretation and the need to main-
tain its legitimacy. The thesis consists of four peer-reviewed articles all of which 
discuss the Convention and the way in which the ECtHR interprets it. While 
legitimacy is a complex notion that lacks an unequivocal definition, its essence 
is that the ECtHR’s authority must be justified and acceptable. Legitimacy offers 
a meaningful tool for analysing the ECtHR’s role and functioning. The ECtHR 
6  See e.g. Wildhaber – Greer 2010; Myjer 2011, at 428. On the argumentation against the wide interpreta-
tions of the ECtHR, see e.g. van der Schyff 2013, at 79–81.
7  Christoffersen 2011, at 189; see also Lübbe-Wolff 2012, at 14–15 where she introduces the concept of 
substantive subsidiarity, which basically means that the Convention system is subsidiary not only in a 
procedural sense but also in a substantive sense, since it creates only minimum human rights standards.
8  Bossuyt 2013, at 31–33; Bossuyt 2012.
9  Bossuyt 2013, at 32; M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece (2011); Rahimi v. Greece (2011); Sufi and Elmi v. The 
United Kingdom (2011). 
10  Hirst v. The United Kingdom (No. 2) (2005); see discussion on that http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/home-news/european-court-says-uk-ban-on-prisoners-voting-breaches-their-human-rights-
-but-wont-grant-them-compensation-9664350.html (visited on 1 October 2014).
11  Lautsi v. Italy (2009).
12  http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/30/grayling-european-court-human-rights-legiti-
macy (visited on 1 October 2014); http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11132446/
Strasbourg-court-undermines-democracy-says-former-Lord-Chief-Justice.html (visited on 1 October 
2014); http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/10342403/Britain-may-need-to-
withdraw-from-European-Convention-on-Human-Rights-says-Cameron.html (visited on 1 October 
2014); http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/22/britain-european-court-human-rights (visited 
on 1 October 2014). See also Hale 2012; Spano 2014, at 1–3. This criticism cannot be over-generalised, 
nor can it be viewed separately from other debates on related issues such as the separation of powers, 
parliamentary democracy, national sovereignty and the protection of minorities – more often than not 
criticism of the ECtHR only forms part of this wider debate. For more on traditional constitutional 
questions related to the ECtHR, see e.g. Greer – Wildhaber 2012. 
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has built up a role as the most workable international human rights court, but 
this success story is in crisis: the functionality, credibility and legitimacy of the 
Convention system will be measured in forthcoming years and the ECtHR itself 
holds the keys to maintaining its position (or make it worse).13
National authorities and constitutional courts have traditionally complied 
with the ECtHR’s judgments almost without reservation. In more recent times, 
however, execution has become more frequently delayed or faulty. This is part-
ly due to legal, political and budgetary difficulties in some Contracting States. 
However, lack of compliance is also increasingly based on grounds of principle; 
that is, on a rejection of the superiority and binding character of the ECtHR’s in-
terpretations of the Convention. This has occurred in several Contracting States, 
including Finland14, Germany15, the United Kingdom16, Russia17 and Italy18. Hence, 
there are signs that not all of the ECtHR’s interpretations are accepted and that 
the supremacy of supranational law over national law is not unreservedly recog-
nised. Indeed, it is increasingly accepted by constitutional lawyers that there is 
no single institution that can really claim to have the final word on the interpreta-
tion and application of supranational law. Consequently, the ECtHR needs to do 
something to secure states’ compliance.19 In this respect, I argue that it must pay 
attention to the argumentative and interpretative methods used in its judgments 
in order to ensure that states will comply with them.
Study of the ECtHR is obviously crucial for the 47 Council of Europe Member 
States,20 as well as being of considerable relevance for individuals and legal prac-
titioners in other countries. International human rights courts are a rare phenom-
enon, and the ECtHR is probably the best functioning example – or, at the very 
least, the most experienced one.21
Research questions
Judicial legitimacy is at the core of all four articles of this study. The underlying 
questions are: (1) what is the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy based on?; and (2) how can 
its judicial legitimacy be accomplished? The question of its legitimacy is examined 
particularly in the context of the ECtHR’s constantly expanding interpretations 
of Convention provisions, using the starting-point that it either gains or loses its 
judicial legitimacy through the reasoning used in its judgments. Furthermore, 
all four articles tackle certain aspects of the ECtHR’s legitimacy, although I do 
13  The Contracting States, of course, impact on the ECtHR’s legitimacy by amending the Convention 
or adding new Protocols.
14  See the judgment of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court KHO 2012:75.
15  See e.g. Papier 2006, at 2.
16  See e.g. Hale 2012, Hillebrecht 2013, at 98–112.
17  See e.g. Hillebrecht 2013, at 114–121.
18  See e.g. ibid., at 121–125. 
19  Gerards 2013, at 73–77.
20  There will be 48 Contracting Parties after the European Union accedes to the Convention.
21  The ECtHR has been described in the literature as the most effective supervisory machine for human 
rights in Europe, see Steiner – Alston 2000, at 801, 807; Helfer – Slaughter 1997, at 296; Helfer 2008, at 
125.
16
not offer a blueprint as to how it may be rescued. On the contrary, the thesis asks 
how judicial legitimacy is gained in certain contexts, such as in respect of positive 
obligations or social rights interpretations. The aim is to tell four stories about the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy. These are, however, not fictitious but are based on case law, 
and show how a success story has been gradually undermined by diminishing 
legitimacy.22
Although legitimacy is understood in different ways, it is commonly accepted 
that it refers to a belief in the rightness of the system.23 In this study legitimacy 
is basically divided into formal legitimacy and substance legitimacy, and my fo-
cus is more on substance. In addition to legitimacy issues, the ECtHR’s legal ar-
gumentation is analysed in each of the articles. Argumentation can be done in 
speculative or in practical contexts. In respect of the former, one argues for or 
against whether something is the case or not. In respect of the latter, one argues 
for or against doing something; or for or against what ought to be, may be or can 
be done. By this definition, judicial reasoning is essentially practical reasoning. 
While it is supported by certain value judgments and norms, these are continu-
ally created by the person interpreting the law. Legal reasoning thus transforms 
established law into something else; that is, interpreted law.24
One of the main theses to be defended is that through its legal argumentation 
the ECtHR either acquires or loses its judicial legitimacy. This will be tested by refer-
ence to positive obligations, comparative reasoning, social rights argumentation 
and the fourth instance doctrine. Legitimacy and legal argumentation are closely 
intertwined because legitimacy is evaluated through the ECtHR’s legal argumen-
tation.
The study has many cohesive side-themes, including the ECtHR’s role in 
general, which is somewhere between an international court and a constitu-
tional court. It is neither an appellate court, nor is it a pure constitutional court. 
However, to understand its position in the European legal order properly, one 
needs to realise that it has some of the functions of both. The study also addresses 
the familiar debate over judicial activism and judicial self-restraint.
The research project started with the aim of answering the question of when 
the ECtHR can legitimately enlarge its interpretation of the text of the Convention 
and when not? What is such legitimacy based on? The aim was to evaluate the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy questions in certain restricted contexts. Even though each 
article represents an individual work, each pursues the same inquiry into the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy. The articles trace the course of this inquiry, starting with 
questions relating to a certain specific method of interpretation (positive obliga-
tions) and ending with issues of formal legitimacy (the fourth instance doctrine).
22  See likewise on the small stories, Wilhelmsson 1999.
23  Franck 1990, at 24; Koskenniemi 2003, at 353; Hurrelmann – Schneider – Steffek 2007b, at 1; Kulovesi 
2011, at 42.
24  Peczenik 2009, at 37.
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The first article (‘Fair and Balanced Positive Obligations – Do They Exist?’25) 
asks whether the ECtHR takes the principle of proportionality into account when 
determining positive obligations. The burden imposed on the states would be 
unbearable if this principle was ignored. The argument is that the obligations im-
posed on the states must be fair and balanced in order for these obligations, and 
in fact the whole system, to be legitimate. Consequently, the imposition of dispro-
portionate obligations on states eventually leads to the credibility of the entire 
Convention system being questioned. With regard to the ECtHR’s legitimacy, the 
principle of proportionality determines whether and to what extent positive obli-
gations exist, and whether the state has complied with them.
The second article (‘“The Lack of Such a Common Approach” – Comparative 
Argumentation by the European Court of Human Rights’26) analyses compara-
tive argumentation by the ECtHR, and asks whether it offers means of enhancing 
the legitimacy of its judgments and, consequently, its legitimacy. Is any kind of 
comparative reasoning tool to enhance the legitimacy of the ECtHR?
The third article (‘Should Social Rights Be Included in Interpretations of the 
Convention by the European Court of Human Rights?’27) analyses the arguments 
concerning the inclusion of social rights in the ECtHR’s interpretation of the pro-
visions of the Convention. The question is whether it is legitimate for the ECtHR 
to include social rights within the Convention when it is clear that the Convention 
does not cover social rights. Will the ECtHR risk losing its legitimacy by inter-
preting the Convention as including social rights?  
The fourth article (‘“…It is not its task to Act as a Court of Fourth Instance” 
– The Case of the European Court of Human Rights’28) focuses on the tensions 
and problems involved in balancing the fourth instance doctrine against an ex-
pansive approach to the interpretation of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the 
Convention). This article has two aims. Firstly, it seeks to summarise the role 
of the fourth instance doctrine in fair trial cases. Secondly, it includes a critical 
evaluation of the justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine in such cases. The 
article asks whether it is legitimate that the applications of a strict fourth instance 
doctrine prevail over effective and dynamic interpretations of the fair trial provi-
sion. The legitimacy questions appear differently as between the fourth instance 
doctrine and effective and dynamic interpretations points of view: the fourth in-
stance doctrine supports the formal legitimacy perspective, while the effective-
ness of the fair trial provision is linked to substance legitimacy.
25  ‘Fair and Balanced Positive Obligations – Do They Exist?’, 5 European Human Rights Law Review 
(2012), 538–550; hereinafter, this article will be referred to as the ‘positive obligations’ article.
26  ‘”The Lack of Such a Common Approach” – Comparative Argumentation by the European Court 
of Human Rights’ forthcoming in 23 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 2012-2013 (2015); hereinafter, 
this article will be referred to as the ‘comparative argumentation’ article.
27  ‘Should Social Rights Be Included in Interpretations of the Convention by the European Court of 
Human Rights?’, 16:3 European Journal of Social Security (2014), 252–276; hereinafter, this article will be 
referred to as the ‘social rights’ article.
28  “‘… It is not its task to Act as a Court of Fourth Instance”  –  The Case of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, 7:2 European Journal of Legal Studies (2015), 84–118; hereinafter, this article will be re-
ferred to as the ‘fourth instance’ article.
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Explaining the approach taken
When discussing the research methods one uses, the aim should be not simply 
to name the methods used, but to describe how the research has been done.29 One 
must distinguish the general framework of the study from the approach taken in 
respect of it. Firstly, this thesis is based on a theoretical framework: it focuses on the 
ECtHR’s legal argumentation.30 Secondly, the approach taken to the study utilised 
methods of empirical research: use was made of the instruments created in the 
empirical legal research. 
The general framework of the study belongs to the tradition of the legal the-
ory of the justification of the legal interpretative decision. An approach derived 
from the field of empirical legal research has been taken. This is not, however, an 
empirical study, but I would rather describe it as a study of legal cases. Empirical 
research methods are more frequently associated with the social sciences and hu-
manities than with the discipline of law per se.31 However, it has been stated that 
many common law practitioners are unaware that they undertake qualitative em-
pirical legal research on a regular basis – the case law method of establishing the 
law through analysis of precedent is in fact a form of qualitative research using 
documents as source material.32 It has also been said that ‘[e]mpirical research 
means collecting and analysing data about law’.33
The approach taken in this study shares certain features of the case-law meth-
od which is well-known in the Anglo-American tradition. The common law legal 
culture is based on distinguishing cases.34 Therefore, it is rather obvious that the 
case-law method should be familiar to common law lawyers.35 Continental legal 
research also involves case analysis but the choice of cases is rather unorganised: a 
legal scholar investigating a certain legal issue or phenomenon and refer to a couple 
of randomly chosen cases to provide evidence for, or illustration of, a point.
The data analysed in this study was collected from the ECtHR’s official 
HUDOC database using different search terms, and in some cases, certain time 
limits. I have attempted to analyse the different ways in which, for example, the 
following are used: comparative arguments, arguments as regards social rights 
and arguments concerning the balance of fourth instance doctrine and effective 
interpretation of the fair trial provision.
29  On the methodologies in legal research, see e.g. Cryer et al. 2012, at 5–6.
30  It has been stated that one of the central tasks of legal theory is to develop a theory concerning the 
justification of the interpretation of legal norms (Aarnio 1987, at 7).
31  The empirical legal research of the early 20th century was largely quantitative in character. This might 
be why mentioning the empirical method is avoided when analysing certain case law data from the 
qualitative perspective (Kritzer 2010, at 883).
32  Webley 2010, at 927.
33  Galligan 2010, at 979.
34  On distinguishing, see e.g. Eisenberg 2007, at 93–96.
35  Walton 2002, at 324; Gagnon 2010. For works based on qualitative legal analysis, see Arold 2007 which 
is based on interviews, field study and case law study; on the methodology used, see ibid. at 16–18, and 
for the empirical part of the study, see ibid. at 85–154; see also Arold Lorenz – Groussot – Petursson 
2013, see on methodology ibid. at 4–7 (the book defines as one of its methods a qualitative analysis of 
the ECtHR’s legal doctrines). For studies based on interviews, see e.g. Bruinsma 2006; McKaskle 2005. 
Studies based on specific case law data, see e.g. Voeten 2007, at 684–685.
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Data analysis and the drawing of conclusions from it are among the more con-
tentious aspects of qualitative research.36 The most serious difficulty in the use of 
qualitative data is that methods of analysis are not well formulated.37 The analyst 
faced with a mass of qualitative data has very few guidelines to protect himself 
or herself against self-delusion, let alone presenting unreliable or invalid conclu-
sions to the public. How can we be sure that a finding is not, in fact, wrong?38 
This research has analysed the ECtHR’s argumentation in certain contexts and it 
seems clear that conclusions on justifiability and legitimacy may well be drawn 
from it. It is, naturally, inevitable that the author’s individual thumbprint will be 
detectable both within the analysis and the conclusions drawn from it.
Categorisation is an aspect of case law analysis, and involves, among other 
things, marking the appearances of cases in searches relating to certain themes 
or phrases. Researchers employing content analysis must take care to ensure that 
they have drawn upon a representative sample of documents. This thesis draws 
on 198 ECtHR cases: the ‘comparative argumentation’ article refers to 67 cases; 
the ‘social rights’ article to 87; and the ‘fourth instance’ article to 44. Researchers 
usually develop an index using labels in order to categorise the data. In this case, 
the marking has been done using pen and paper and all searched arguments (e.g. 
social rights arguments or comparative arguments) used in the cases have been 
marked in the categories to which they belong.
The question that emerges is: how many cases is enough? While there are no 
set rules, at some point data saturation sets in. This means that there is a point at 
which no new information or themes are observed in the data.39 This has proven 
to be true for this study, since after a certain number of cases, the data started to 
repeat itself so that collecting more data would have added nothing significant 
to the picture.
Besides using the study of legal cases approach, the more detailed ‘analysis of 
argumentation’ approach has been used in the articles in order to examine argu-
ments with the help of different argumentation theories. Here the ‘rational ar-
gumentation’ theory has been in the background for the analysis of the ECtHR’s 
argumentation. Legal arguments have been categorised from at least from the 
beginning of the 1800s. Since then, many reclassifications have been introduced 
and the scope of the content has been extended, but the principle of categorisation 
has remained.40 In this study, the ECtHR’s legal arguments have been categorised 
36  May 2001, at 158–163; Webley 2010, at 939.
37  Miles 1979, at 591.
38  Ibid.
39  For more on data saturation, see e.g. Richards 2009, at 144–145.
40  von Savigny (von Savigny 1840) has categorised legal arguments as text, precedent and legal science. 
In respect of temporary legal theory, see Huhn 2002; Huhn categorises legal arguments into text, intent, 
precedent, tradition and policy (Huhn 2008). Bobbit, on the other hand, speaks of modalities, which 
are historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical and prudential arguments (Bobbit 1991, at 12–13). 
MacCormick and Summers speak of linguistic, systemic, teleological, evaluative and trans-categorical 
arguments (MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 512–516). See also MacCormick who identifies three main 
categories of interpretative arguments (linguistic, systemic and teleological/deontological arguments 
(MacCormick 1995, at 472–477). 
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by reference to contexts, such as, for example, the fourth instance doctrine. Thus, 
general categorisations of legal arguments have not been examined directly in 
this research, since the context in which legal arguments were identified and cat-
egorised and the aim of doing so was different in respect of each article.
All the articles were based on analysis of argumentation, which can be based 
on different argumentation theories, including theories of practical argumenta-
tion, logical legal argumentation41 or rational argumentation. Since the focus of 
the study is the justifiability and acceptability of the ECtHR’s judgments, rational 
argumentation theory is rather an obvious basis for the analysis.42 Rational ar-
gumentation theory is based on the idea that legal justification is a discursive 
procedure that follows the principles of rational discourse.43 It emphasises the 
justifiability of legal judgments in terms of both internal and external justifica-
tion.44 The evaluation of justifiability focuses on legal reasoning.45 
Rational argumentation theory offers appropriate concepts and tools to analyse 
the legal argumentation of the ECtHR, and I have used it as a starting-point for 
that purpose. However, the initial aim of the study was not to develop this theory 
further in the field of human rights reasoning or create a new legal theory of 
judicial legitimacy, but rather to use it as a basis for analysis of the ECtHR’s argu-
mentation.
The framework of this research consists of several important elements. The hy-
potheses used in the articles were separately formulated and provide a starting-
point for each. This is followed by description of the study of legal cases approach 
and an analysis of the data gathered, using rational argumentation theory. This 
analysis provides the basis for conclusions at a more general level.
Lawyers are prisoners of language, which is the medium of statutes and le-
gal decisions and of their interpretation. Judicial legitimacy is also acquired by 
means of legal argumentation, which is again conducted through the medium of 
language.46
The argument analysis used in the ‘positive obligations’ article was used to eval-
uate whether the ECtHR’s argumentation pays serious attention to the principle of 
proportionality in relation to positive obligations under Article 2 (right to life). 
The ECtHR’s arguments were categorised in the next three articles, based 
on close reading of the cases. Categories were identified in order to summarise 
the use of comparative arguments (the ‘comparative argumentation’ article), the 
variety of social rights arguments (the ‘social rights’ article) and the role of the 
fourth instance doctrine under Article 6 of the Convention (the ‘fourth instance’ 
41  For more on logical legal argumentation, see Feteris 1999, at 26–39.
42  Paso 2014, at 238 where she stresses that the essence of rational argumentation theory is the need 
to convince (and to be convinced) in a rational way and this is possible only by means of justification.
43  Aarnio 1987, at 108.
44  On internal justification, see Alexy 1989, at 220–230; Peczenik 2009, at 158–159; and on external jus-
tification, see Alexy 1989, at 228–230; Peczenik 2009, at 158–160; Wróblewski 1974.
45  On rational argumentation theory, see Wróblewski 1974; Alexy 1989; Peczenik 2009; Aarnio 1987; 
Aarnio 2011; MacCormick 1994; Wróblewski 1992.
46  Aarnio 2011, at 131; see also more generally Austin 1962.
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article). This summarisation was carried out by applying the methods of rational 
argumentation theory, which provides a means of gaining deeper insight into the 
substantive reasons given by the ECtHR.47
The ‘comparative argumentation’ article was based on argument analysis 
where comparative arguments were categorised by reference to their nature and 
function in the judgment. Case law involving comparative argumentation from 
2002, 2007 and 2012 was analysed. These years were chosen to demonstrate po-
tential change in the ECtHR’s reasoning as regards the emerging use of com-
parative arguments.48 The search term ‘comparative’ was used, and a total of 67 
judgments were analysed.49 Comparative reasoning was only used in four cases 
in 2002, as compared to 18 in 2007 and 45 in 2012. These cases were analysed from 
the comparative argumentation point of view in respect of the ECtHR.50
In the ‘social rights’ article, arguments concerning social rights were catego-
rised under the Convention provisions and their justifiability was closely ana-
lysed. The emphasis was on how the ECtHR justifies its extension of Convention 
provisions to the field of social rights by reference to 87 judgments searched 
through the HUDOC database. The arguments used in these cases with regard to 
social rights and their justifiability were analysed carefully. The ECtHR’s reason-
ing was carefully analysed, looking at how broadly social rights are taken into 
consideration and the sources or arguments relied upon by the ECtHR to justify 
its extensive interpretations. The question of what search terms should be used 
to find relevant cases was a difficult methodological issue. Since the interpre-
tation of positive obligations has been the ECtHR’s main method of extending 
the scope of Convention provisions, using the search term ‘obligations’ seemed 
a well-justified methodological choice.51 In addition, ‘social rights’ or ‘economic 
47  Paso 2014, at 240; Aarnio 1987. See also McKee 2003; on discursive analytic research, see Hepburn 
– Potter 2007; Wodak 2007. 
48  The first year (2002) was chosen to demonstrate the emerging trend of the ECtHR using comparative 
law in its reasoning (for the beginning of the use of comparative law before the courts, see e.g. Glenn 
2007, at 97; Glenn 2004, at 218–219). The five-year period is seen as an appropriate period to illustrate 
progress in the recognition of the use of comparative reasoning within the Convention system: in 
2007 such use increased (18 judgments). The final year (2012) demonstrates the progress of relatively 
established use of comparative reasoning by the ECtHR (45 judgments). Other years (e.g. 2001, 2006, 
2011 etc.) could have been chosen, but this choice is not decisive in this study. The research question 
concerns how comparative reasoning is used by the ECtHR. In order to properly answer this ques-
tion, it is necessary first to define the case law data to be analysed and then address the question by 
reference to it. 
49  In total, there were 23 irrelevant cases where the word ‘comparative’ had another meaning. The 
relevant cases consist of the following: four judgments in 2002, 18 judgments in 2007 and 45 judgments 
in 2012. Two cases conducted only in French had to be left out of the study for linguistic reasons. These 
were as follows: Affaire Flamenbaum et autres c. France (2012); Affaire Önal c. Turquie (2012).
50  Inevitably, the term ‘comparative’ used in the case search might have led to some relevant cases 
being left out and other irrelevant cases being included. This problem, however, inevitably dogs all 
empirical research: one can never be sure that the search covers all possible relevant cases. For 2012, 
there were 11 irrelevant cases out of 56 cases; for 2007 there were 8 out of 26; and for 2002 there were 
4 out of 8. In all of these cases, the word ‘comparative’ was used in a context other than as part of the 
ECtHR’s reasoning. However, the search term ‘comparative’ can be seen as appropriate and justified, 
because it crystallises what is really looked at in the judgments. 
51  The ECtHR frequently uses obligations arguments (not only including positive obligations, but also 
obligations more generally) when determining whether to extend interpretations, see e.g. Shany 2011, 
at 79.
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rights’ were indicated in the search field, and no time-limits were applied. All 87 
of the cases identified were analysed by highlighting the arguments as to inclu-
sion of social rights in the margins. The context came into focus in the course of 
reading the cases, since social rights were focused on in slightly different ways 
in respect of different Convention provisions. Under Article 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life) they were interpreted as safeguarding everyone’s right to 
a healthy environment, while social rights under Article 3 (prohibition of torture) 
concerned certain minimum living standards. The structure of social rights argu-
mentation was therefore closely linked to the Convention provisions.
In the ‘fourth instance’ article, argument analysis was applied to fourth in-
stance arguments which were categorised by reference to their role in the judg-
ments. Based on close reading of the cases, four categories were identified in or-
der to summarise the role of the fourth instance doctrine under Article 6. The 
first category is ‘clear fourth instance nature’. Here the ECtHR’s task is easy, since 
one can clearly see that questions brought before it are purely fourth-instance-
related and the ECtHR cannot say anything about them. The second category is 
‘length of proceedings’. Here the ECtHR has the relatively straightforward task 
of assessing whether the length of the proceedings at national level was unrea-
sonable. The third category is ‘balancing approach’. In these cases the ECtHR 
takes the view that it has no grounds to interfere because the assessment of the 
evidence or establishment of the facts made by the national courts is not mani-
festly unreasonable or in any other way arbitrary. The threshold for interference 
is relatively high, and the ECtHR’s emphasis is more on the fourth instance doc-
trine than on the right to a fair trial. The fourth category is ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’. In the cases in this category the ECtHR emphasised the fair 
trial provision over the fourth instance doctrine by finding positive obligations 
under Article 6. In these two latter categories one can find arguments both for and 
against the fourth instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. Using the search 
terms ‘fourth instance’ and ‘effective’ without applying any time limits a search 
of the HUDOC database produced a total of 44 cases52
Within these categories, the most representative examples were presented and 
further analysed. For example, the ‘social rights’ article showed the most repre-
sentative examples of each category in which the influence of social rights could 
be seen. Furthermore, in the ‘fourth instance’ article the most representative exam-
ples of each category of the fourth instance doctrine were presented. In qualitative 
analysis the researcher analyses a certain number of cases and, over the course of 
time, comes to recognise the most representative examples in respect of each cat-
egory. When there are many cases, the ideas and principles they illustrate reappear 
52  The search terms ‘fourth instance’ and ‘effective’ were chosen because they helped find the relevant 
cases. The word ‘effective’ is widely used by the ECtHR both in terms of its practical and effective 
interpretations and in other interpretations, such as in positive obligations and living instrument ar-
gumentation. See e.g. the dissenting opinion of Judge Kalaydjieva in Dimitar Shopov v. Bulgaria (2013), 
at p. 16. The search terms, however, clearly omit some relevant cases, since it would be impossible to 
apply search terms that would cover all potential relevant cases. The task of searching for cases was 
conducted from 1 August 2013 until 1 November 2013.
23
repeatedly. This repetition is called data saturation, and means that there comes a 
point where no new information or themes are observed in the data.53 
The position and effects of the Convention in the legal systems of the various 
member states of the Council of Europe is a matter of constitutional law. This 
study may be viewed from a public international law point of view because the 
ECtHR is first and foremost an international court.54 Therefore, interpretation of 
the Convention follows the general rules of treaty interpretation. Above all, this 
study inevitably belongs to the field of human rights research. It may also be 
viewed as belonging to the field of European law if that term is taken to mean 
not only the law of the European Union (EU) but also the legal system of the 
Council of Europe. The point of view adopted in the research has been rather 
critical when taking the legitimacy concerns as to the ECtHR as a starting-point. 
The study might also be described as European human rights law research.
The interpretative methods used by the ECtHR have been the subject of much 
research,55 as have cultural, political and historical issues in which it is involved.56 
The ECtHR has been the subject of critical studies,57 and its doctrines are also 
widely studied.58 Several recently published edited contributions have focused 
on its interpretative limits.59 Furthermore, the substance of Convention provi-
sions has been widely researched.60 However, no research has been done regard-
ing the ECtHR’s argumentation and legitimacy.  
This study consists of two main chapters. Following the introduction, the sec-
ond part (chapter 2) begins by summarising the ECtHR’s main methods of inter-
pretation and patterns of argumentation. The point of this is to show the field 
that has been focused on in each article, which is the practice followed by the 
ECtHR in interpreting the Convention and the creativity it has shown in so do-
ing. This also demonstrates why legitimacy is an increasingly relevant issue for 
the ECtHR. Furthermore, the pattern of argumentation used by the ECtHR illus-
trates its culture and traditions in terms of giving reasons. The chapter continues 
by outlining the current conception of judicial legitimacy. This is firstly done in 
general terms but the chapter concludes with a discussion of two key aspects of 
legitimacy, namely formal legitimacy and substance legitimacy, by reference to 
the ECtHR.61
53  On data saturation, see e.g. Richards 2009, at 144–145. On the credibility of qualitative research, see 
e.g. Gobo 2007. 
54  See e.g. Sicilianos 2012.
55  See e.g. Letsas 2009; van Dijk – van Hoof 1998.
56  Arold 2007; Christoffersen – Madsen 2011; Bates 2010.
57  See e.g. Greer 2006; Buyse – Hamilton 2011.
58  See e.g. Christoffersen 2009; Lautenbach 2013; Viljanen 2003; Mowbray 2004; Xenos 2012; Arai-
Takahashi 2001; Yourow 1996.
59  Brems – Gerards 2013; Flogaitis – Zwart – Fraser 2013; Brems 2008; Føllesdal – Peters – Ulfstein 2013.
60  Leach 2014; White – Ovey 2010; Loucaides 2007; Janis – Kay – Bradley 2008; Reid 2011.
61  There are some inconsistencies within the articles as regards this concept. In the ‘social rights’ article 
‘substantive legitimacy’ is mentioned instead of ‘substance legitimacy’. In the ‘fourth instance’ article 
‘substance legitimacy’ is used. The inconsistency is a result of different opinions of the appropriate 
concept by the journal’s language editors. The content of the concept is, however, the same.
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The third part (chapter 3) contains the main argument of this study, which 
involves the means of tying together legal reasoning and judicial legitimacy. The 
emphasis is on legal reasoning and acceptability requirements which, if satisfied, 
result in the judgments being legitimate. This chapter also tells four stories as to 
the ECtHR’s legitimacy, in respect of positive obligations, comparative reasoning, 
social rights interpretations and the fourth instance doctrine. The last part (chap-
ter 4) highlights the key conclusion of this study, stressing the need for the ECtHR 
to establish its legitimacy anew in each individual case and to fulfil the accepta-
bility requirements in its legal interpretations. By fulfilling the requirements of a 
rationally acceptable interpretation, the ECtHR gains substance legitimacy. This 
study concludes that the emphasis on the ECtHR’s legitimacy must be on sub-
stance, but that it must fulfil the minimum level of demand for formal legitimacy 
in order to achieve legitimacy. Lastly, I will suggest four elements of the judi-
cial legitimacy of the ECtHR. The question of whether supranational courts will 
maintain their legitimacy in 30 or 40 years’ time implicitly underlies the study.
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2 The Current Story of 
Legitimacy
2.1 REASONS FOR LEGITIMACY QUESTIONS: THE ECtHR’S 
METHODS OF INTERPRETATION AND ARGUMENTATION
The ECtHR has been criticised by many on account of its increasingly far-reach-
ing interpretations of Convention provisions. Some of these criticisms relate to 
issues of state sovereignty and moral or cultural sensitivities at the national level. 
The Convention system has also been criticised on the basis of the institutional 
aspects of the ECtHR.62 This study, however, focuses on criticism to which the 
ECtHR can itself react, in terms of the interpretation and argumentation used in 
its judgments. Institutional aspects, such as the amount of personnel and finan-
cial capacity, are in the hands of others. This section outlines the scope of criti-
cism directed towards the ECtHR’s methods of interpretation and argumentation, 
which are linked to discussion of its legitimacy. Consequently, current discussion 
of judicial legitimacy is introduced and discussed in relation to the ECtHR.
The main methods of interpretation used in relation to the Convention
Continental methods of interpretation are rather well-developed. The most well-
known and frequently used methods are as follows: grammatical/literal,63 histori-
cal, systematic, genetic, teleological, and interpretation based on analogy or a con-
trario. If a judge refers to the meaning of a term in everyday language or technical 
language, she uses grammatical (or literal) interpretation. If the judge refers to the 
history of the legal rule, she uses historical interpretation. In systematic interpre-
tation, the chosen interpretation is achieved by reference to the position of the le-
gal rule in the legal system and its relation to other norms, goals and principles. 
Genetic interpretation occurs when the judge refers to the intention of the legisla-
tor. Teleological interpretation involves referring to the goal or purpose of the legal 
rule. Interpretation by analogy involves deciding that that a particular rule which 
applies to situation A also applies to situation B because it resembles situation A in 
relevant respects. Using a contrario interpretation means that the judge decides the 
reverse, by holding that a certain rule does not apply to situation A, because it does 
62  Even though criticism has been provoked, the general stance has, however, been to laud the impor-
tance of the Convention and the bulk of the ECtHR’s decisions as of significant human rights value 
(see e.g. Williams 2013, at 1158).
63  Common law also recognises three traditional approaches to statutory interpretation: ‘literal rule’, 
‘golden rule’ and the ‘mischief rule’, see e.g. Zweigert – Kötz 1998, at 265–267; Cook et al. 2001.
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not resemble situation B for which the rule was intended.64
The ECtHR does not, however, use these techniques when interpreting the 
provisions of the Convention. Through its case law, it has developed several 
methods of interpretation to enhance the rights provided by the Convention.65 
These are as follows: (1) the ‘living-instrument’ approach; (2) the theory of ‘au-
tonomous concepts’; (3) the ‘practical and effective’ approach; and (4) the ‘com-
mon ground’ method. All these methods reject the idea that rights provided un-
der the Convention must be interpreted in the light of the meaning attributed to 
them back in the 1950s. Article 1 of the Convention has been the starting-point for 
the ECtHR’s interpretations. It provides as follows: ‘The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined 
in Section 1 of this Convention.’ This is supplemented by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which basically states that international treaties 
should be interpreted according to their object and purpose.66 It is worth noting 
that the ECtHR’s method of interpretation can overall be described as creative 
and dynamic. It long ago abandoned strict textual interpretation and has adopted 
special methods of interpretation.67
Certain underlying principles permeate the Convention and its case law. These 
principles are fundamental to substantive Convention law and include subsidi-
arity, democracy, legal certainty, proportionality and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine. They affect the interpretation by guiding it in a certain direction but are 
not interpretation methods in the strict sense.68
‘Living instrument’ interpretation is also known as ‘dynamic or evolutive’ in-
terpretation.69 The ECtHR stressed as long ago as the 1960s that the Convention 
must be interpreted in a ‘dynamic’ way, in the sense that interpretation must take 
account of developments in social and political attitudes and cannot limit itself to 
conceptions prevalent in the period when it was drafted or entered into force.70 
The ECtHR tends to stress that ‘the Convention is a living instrument which must 
be interpreted in the light of the present-day conditions’.71 This is in line with 
the object and purpose requirement derived from Article 31(1) of the VCLT. The 
Convention clearly lends itself to evolutive interpretation and there is no reason 
to think that it should not develop over time.72 
64  For more on this, see e.g. Feteris 1999, at 7–8; Wróblewski 1992, at 96–107; Aarnio 1987, at 101–107; 
Alexy 1989, at 234–250. On interpretation methods in common law, see Cook et al. 2001, at 206–270.
65  See more e.g. Letsas 2009; Letsas 2010; Gerards 2009, at 430; Gerards 2008, at 659–667; Matscher 1993; 
Bates 2010, at 319–358; Pitea 2014. Furthermore, the concept of interpretation having a rights-creating 
function has been mentioned by Helen Keller and Alec Stone Sweet (Keller – Stone Sweet 2008, at 6).
66  See Articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT (UN Doc A/CONF.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331). For more, see Villiger 
2005. 
67  Christoffersen 2009, at 49–50.
68  See Leach 2011, at 159–177. Cf. Harris et al. 2014, at 7–20, where the principle of proportionality, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine and the fourth instance doctrine are listed as interpretative methods 
in respect of the Convention. 
69  See Letsas 2013, at 108 fn. 4.
70  Wemhoff v. Germany (1968), para. 8; White – Ovey 2010, at 45–47.
71  Tyrer v. The United Kingdom (1978), para. 31.
72  Christoffersen 2009, at 54–55; Prebensen 2000, at 1124–1125.
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Golder is the leading case in respect of ‘object and purpose’ interpretation.73 
After framing the ‘object and purpose’ interpretation, the ECtHR took a step for-
ward in Tyrer by outlining ‘living instrument’ interpretation.74 It stated: ‘…the 
Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, 
must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions...’.75 It has gone even 
further than this by recognising rights that the drafters had not clearly intended 
to grant (e.g. right not to join a trade union).76
In the 1960s the Commission characterised autonomous concepts by stating 
that they: ‘…cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law of the 
High Contracting Party concerned but relate to an autonomous concept which 
must be interpreted independently, even though the general principles of the 
High Contracting Parties must necessarily be taken into consideration in any 
such interpretation.’77 This passage implies a certain tension with the concepts of 
the Convention and the meaning of these concepts in domestic law.
In Engel, the ECtHR had to decide whether military penalties which were 
strictly disciplinary, as opposed to criminal, offences could fall within the scope 
of Article 6 (which insists on the right to a fair and public hearing ‘in determina-
tion of his civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge against him...’).78 In 
this case the ECtHR developed the theory of ‘autonomous concepts’, maintaining 
that the meaning ascribed to the terms ‘criminal charge’ and ‘disciplinary charge’ 
in the law of the respondent state did not reflect the meaning given to those same 
terms under the Convention. Since Engel, the ECtHR has developed the theory 
of autonomous concepts to the point where it is now a significant doctrine.79 It 
has held that autonomous concepts are those whose ‘definition in national law 
has only relative value and constitutes no more than a starting point’.80 It has 
also characterised as autonomous a significant number of concepts that figure in 
the Convention. These include ‘criminal charge’,81 ‘civil rights and obligations’,82 
‘possessions’,83 ‘association’,84 ‘victim’,85 ‘civil servant’86 and ‘lawful detention’.87 
The ECtHR had referred on many occasions to the principle of effectiveness 
and the principle of consequences prior to adopting a rigid formulation of the 
73  Golder v. The United Kingdom (1975), para. 34.
74  Tyrer v. The United Kingdom (1978). 
75  Ibid., para. 31.
76  Young, James and Webster v. The United Kingdom (1981), paras. 51-52; Letsas 2009, at 65–67.
77  Twenty-One Detained Persons v. Germany (1968), para. 4.
78  Engel and Others v. The Netherlands (1976), para. 82.
79  Letsas 2009, at 42.
80  Chassagnou and Others v. France (1999), para. 100.
81  Engel and Others v. The Netherlands (1976); Campbell and Fell v. The United Kingdom (1984).
82  König v. Germany (1978); Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden (1982).
83  Gasus Dosier- und Fordertechnik GmbH v. The Netherlands (1995); Iatridis v. Greece (1999); Former King 
of Greece and Others v. Greece (2000).
84  Chassagnou and Others v. France (1999).
85  Asselbourg and 78 others and Greenpeace Association-Luxembourg v. Luxembourg (1999).
86  Pellegrin v. France (1999).
87  Eriksen v. Norway (1997); Witold Litwa v. Poland (2000).
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principle of effectiveness in Airey,88 in which it held that the Convention must 
unquestionably be interpreted in a manner guaranteeing rights that are ‘practi-
cal and effective, not theoretical or illusory’. The effectiveness principle is also 
sometimes referred to as the ‘practical and effective’ doctrine.89 Especially in this 
regard the ECtHR has derived positive obligations from Convention provisions.90 
It could be argued that the effectiveness principle is a useful tool in situations 
where textual interpretation or simply too restrictive an approach would prevent 
the effective protection of human rights.91 The most difficult issue is usually that 
of how to identify the substantive content of rights that call for effective protec-
tion.92 An effective means of interpretation takes the ECtHR rather far away from 
the textual meaning of the provision and imposes entirely new obligations on the 
states.
The ‘common ground’ method is also referred to as reliance upon European 
national law standards93 or the consensus method.94 The ECtHR usually uses con-
sensus to justify a dynamic interpretation. The margin of appreciation doctrine is 
linked to consensus argumentation in terms of whether there is a consensus be-
tween states or not.95 If there is a consensus, then the margin afforded to states is 
narrower; while if there is no consensus, the margin is wider.96 Consensus means 
that there is certain common understanding between the Contracting States that 
broadly accepted standards exist in Europe.
Consensus argumentation is a typical feature of the ECtHR’s mode of conduct. 
However, because the ECtHR has not defined ‘European consensus’ as a term 
in its judgments, what is actually meant by consensus is open to different inter-
pretations. In certain cases, the ECtHR has emphasised the need to find certain 
principles in use in the Contracting States in order to establish the existence of a 
consensus. However, sometimes a clear common tendency and trend has proved 
a sufficient basis to find that a consensus exists – even though national solutions 
and exceptions may differ.97 Furthermore, the ECtHR has used several terms to il-
lustrate the presence or absence of a common European approach. These include, 
88  For a case in which the effectiveness principle was invoked, see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (‘Vagrancy 
case’) v. Belgium (Article 50) (1972), para. 16. The first reference to the practical and effective formula 
appeared in Airey v. Ireland (1979), para. 24.
89  See Mowbray 2005, at 72.
90  van Dijk – van Hoof 1998, at 534–536.
91  Viljanen 2003, at 81.
92  Christoffersen 2009, at 56.
93  Harris et al. 2014, at 10–13.
94  Dzehtsiarou 2011.
95  Morawa correctly identifies the most common case of application of European consensus as media-
tion between dynamic interpretation and the margin of appreciation doctrine, see Morawa 2002. 
96  See Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article). The existence of consensus does not, however, 
automatically restrict the margin of appreciation of the state concerned. Much depends on the cir-
cumstances of the case and especially on the question of whether a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity is at stake. For more on this, see e.g. Myjer 2013, at 65; see also Harris 
et al. 2014, at 11.
97  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 21-23, 36. Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece 
(2012), GC, paras. 74-75 and compare the consensus findings to the Chamber judgment Sitaropoulos and 
Others v. Greece (2010), para. 46.
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for instance, ‘emerging international consensus amongst the Contracting States 
of the Council of Europe’,98 ‘any European consensus’,99 ‘any clear common stand-
ard amongst the member states of the Council of Europe’,100 ‘general trend’101 and 
also in negative terms ‘lack of a common European  approach’.102 In addition, 
determining when there is sufficient consensus appears to be problematic for the 
ECtHR.103
The ECtHR uses four different types of consensus in its reasoning: (1) con-
sensus identified through comparative analysis of the laws of Contracting States; 
(2) international consensus identified through international treaties; (3) inter-
nal consensus in the respondent Contracting Party; and (4) expert consensus.104 
Consequently, the ECtHR’s unclear definition of consensus has raised some criti-
cism.105 Furthermore, as concluded in the ‘comparative argumentation’ article, 
consensus argumentation is a rather typical feature of the ECtHR but there are 
different possibilities as to what consensus means.106 As I further concluded:
Considering the possible deficiencies and actual errors of the comparative law analysis 
provided to the Court, one should be careful not to put too much weight on the simi-
larities or differences of the principles or practices found in each Contracting State.107 
It may be more fruitful to search for common attitudes than put too much weight on 
the details in national legislative solutions.108
These creative methods of interpretation have triggered discussion as to whether 
limits should be placed on such interpretations.109 Substantive subsidiarity has 
been introduced to emphasise that the ECtHR should use the subsidiarity prin-
ciple as guidance when interpreting the substance of Convention provisions and 
not only in relation to procedural matters.110 On the other hand, it is emphasised 
that the ECtHR’s legitimacy is based on its creative methods of interpretation and 
in practice this means putting human rights protection before, for example, state 
consent.111 
98  Lee v. The United Kingdom (2001), para. 95.
99  Evans v. The United Kingdom (2007), para. 54.
100  T v. The United Kingdom (1999), para. 72.
101  Nataliya Mikhaylenko v. Ukraine (2013), para. 38.
102  I v. The United Kingdom (2002), para.65.
103  See e.g. Lee v. The United Kingdom (2001) para. 96: ‘However, the Court is not persuaded that the 
consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive any guidance as to the conduct or standards which 
Contracting States consider desirable in any particular situation.’
104  Dzehtsiarou 2011, at 548–553.
105  Murray 2008, at 52.
106  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 36.
107  See how the comparative law survey is provided for the ECtHR, e.g. Dzehtsiarou – Lukashevich 
2012, at 273–274.
108  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 36.
109  See e.g. Christoffersen 2011, at 189.
110  Lübbe-Wolff 2012, at 14–15.
111  Letsas 2013, at 126, 141; Letsas 2011, at 315–322.
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The ECtHR’s patterns of argumentation
It can be argued that methods of interpretation and patterns of argumentation are 
basically the same thing. Consequently, argumentation is closely linked to inter-
pretation, because the chosen method of interpretation directly affects the argu-
mentation style (e.g. teleological interpretation leads to teleological arguments). 
Interpretation and reasoning are thus closely intertwined and hardly separable 
in the judgment: interpretation is a particular form of practical argumentation in 
law, in which one argues for a particular understanding of authoritative texts or 
materials as a special kind of justifying reason for a legal decision. Hence legal 
interpretation should be understood within the framework of an account of ar-
gumentation; in particular, of practical argumentation.112 However, in terms of 
the actual processes of deciding a case, argumentation and interpretation can be 
distinguished on the basis that interpretation comes before argumentation. The 
close connection between argumentation and interpretation is revealed in their 
methods, which are basically the same and are used interchangeably.113 Patterns 
of argumentation vary greatly between courts and the ways in which reasons are 
given is closely related to the legal culture of the court in question. For example, 
French courts do not traditionally state many reasons whereas the argumentation 
style used by German courts is broader.114 Furthermore, it has been argued that 
the more politicised a legal issue becomes, the greater the need for courts to pro-
vide thorough and substantive argumentation in their judgments.115
The ECtHR does not follow the traditional Continental statute interpretation 
style, but instead has created its own style of argumentation which takes pre-
vious case law seriously into account.116 There is no formal doctrine of binding 
precedent by which the ECtHR is bound by its previous interpretations of the 
Convention.117 However, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and 
equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from prec-
edents laid down in previous case law.118 There are rather often disagreements 
between ECtHR judges as to whether an earlier precedent should be followed. 
This is not surprising in an international court which encapsulates so many dif-
ferent legal orders and traditions.119
As distinct from the doctrine of precedent in the common law tradition, no dis-
tinction can be made between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta in the practice of the 
ECtHR. Any statement the ECtHR makes by way of interpreting the Convention 
112  See MacCormick 1995, at 467.
113  See e.g. Gerards 2013, at 77–78, where both argumentative methods and interpretative methods are 
mentioned.
114  See e.g. Stone Sweet 2000, at 145–146.
115  Ibid., at 200.
116  On misconceptions held by English and Continental European lawyers as to the doctrine of prec-
edent, see Wildhaber 2000, at 1530.
117  See Mowbray 2009, at 179–201.
118  See Leach 2011, at 163; Harris et al. 2014, at 20–21; Beard v. The United Kingdom (2001), para. 81; 
Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) (2009), para. 104.
119  Wildhaber 2000, at 1531.
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is significant, although inevitably the level of generality at which it is expressed or 
its centrality to the decision on the material facts of the case will affect its weight 
and influence.120 The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in the Convention sys-
tem, and it follows that the doctrine of binding precedent (precedent de jure) must 
be rejected.121 There is, however, a broad consensus that significant rulings by the 
ECtHR on the interpretation and application of the Convention are generally fol-
lowed in subsequent cases.122
The rules concerning precedent have to be viewed in the light of the ECtHR’s 
structure. It is composed of five separate Chambers of equal standing and has 
a Grand Chamber to which certain cases may be referred by a Chamber for in-
itial decision on the merits or for a re-hearing of a case decided initially by a 
Chamber.123 The Grand Chamber’s findings are regarded as more binding than 
chamber judgments: a Grand Chamber ruling made by 17 judges is more authori-
tative than one made by a Court Chamber. Further, the ECtHR marks the im-
portance of its judgments using a scale of importance from level 1 to 3, in which 
importance level 1 indicates that the judgment has high importance.124
The style of argumentation used by the ECtHR is lengthy and relatively com-
plex, with pro and contra arguments in rather frequent use. Following previous 
case law and arguing with the help of the established case law praxis at first 
sight seems to resemble the common law tradition.125 Furthermore, the use of dis-
senting opinions ensures that alternative arguments are articulated.126 I regard 
their role as that of showing that the interpretation of the case could have taken 
another direction and resulted in a different outcome. Dissenting opinions dem-
onstrate that cases are not always easy to decide and that judges may very well 
end up with two opposite conclusions. Judgments frequently run to tens of pages 
because the facts of the case, and the domestic legislation and procedure, are 
described in detail. However, the ECtHR’s main reasoning may fill just a couple 
of paragraphs.
The ECtHR’s argumentation as regards the alleged violation of a certain 
Convention provision generally commences with a brief explanation of the sub-
ject-matter of the complaint, followed by an evaluation of the admissibility of the 
case.127 After coming to the conclusion that the complaint is admissible, the mer-
120  Feldman 1999, at 114–115.
121  Balcerzak 2004/2005, at 139.
122  Mowbray 2009, at 183.
123  See Articles 30 and 43 of the Convention.
124  The ECtHR’s official website states that importance level 1 means that the judgment makes a signifi-
cant contribution to the development, clarification or modification of its case law, either generally or in 
relation to particular state (http://www.echr.coe.int, visited on 5 November 2014).
125  In common law, the style of reasoning goes from details to generalities (inductive reasoning) and 
from facts to norms, while the logic applied by the ECtHR in its reasoning is somewhat different (and 
often goes from the general to the particular), see e.g. Cook et al. 2001, at 58–60; van Poppel 2009, at 
139; Eisenberg 2007.
126  On separate opinions of the ECtHR, see e.g. White – Boussiakou 2009; Roucounas 2011. Letsas 
has argued that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence is undoubtedly closer to the common law style than the 
Continental style and that this is illustrated especially in separate opinions (Letsas 2011, at 306–309).
127  On the admissibility criteria, see Article 35 of the Convention. 
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its of the case are assessed.128 This assessment begins with the parties’ submis-
sions, starting with the applicant’s submission and then turning to the national 
government’s answer. The ECtHR then often outlines and explains the general 
principles to be applied in the case at hand, noting the sources of law used in its 
interpretation. These include the ECtHR’s previous case-law, general principles 
of international law, international and comparative material.129 This section is the 
most significant part of the judgment, since it lays down the key principles for 
the later interpretation. The ECtHR frequently indicates conflicting aspects of the 
case (e.g. the principle of legal certainty on the one hand and dynamic interpreta-
tion on the other hand).130 After framing the general rules, these are applied to the 
facts and weight is given to decisive factors in the case. The ECtHR then decides 
whether there has been a violation of a Convention provision or not. The voting 
behaviour of the judges is shown in the next section of the judgment where the 
ECtHR declares its judgment. 
The ECtHR is a high-ranking institution and it unavoidably uses authorita-
tive arguments in its judgments. This so-called ‘institutional speech’ is a feature 
of its argumentation.131 It is typical of such institutional speech that the words 
‘the Court’ are repeated, followed by a statement unsupported by proper rea-
sons. For example, in fourth instance cases, the ECtHR might say that ‘the Court 
is not a court of fourth instance’ and not evaluate the complaint any further.132 
This type of institutional speech is an unavoidable result of the ECtHR and taken 
in isolation hardly bestows its judgments with justifiability and acceptability. 
Nonetheless, the voice of authority is an important element of acceptability, since 
it is the ECtHR rather than any lower court or person that is giving its reasons. 
In summary, both authority and content are required in order to achieve accept-
ability.  
As with all judges, those of the ECtHR are not guided merely by their legal 
ideas, but also by their political and ideological preferences.133 One critical as-
pect of the Nordic constitutionalism point of view is to regard the idea of judges 
acting as ‘policy seekers’ as being highly problematic on the basis that it dem-
onstrates that international human rights judges are trying to gain more power 
at the expense of national legislators.134 Husa has commented that ‘universalis-
ing and objectifying their ideological interests into a cloth of legal arguments is 
something that fits poorly with the traditional Nordic way of conceiving relations 
128  Naturally, if the case is declared inadmissible, the ECtHR does not continue to evaluate its merits.
129  See e.g. Hassan v. The United Kingdom (2014), paras. 96-107.
130  See e.g. Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey (2011), para. 58.
131  See also Harris et al. 2014, at 29, who refer to the ECtHR’s verdicts as ‘essentially declatory’, and 
Harpaz 2009, at 118 who characterises the ECtHR’s jurisprudence as ‘declatory, deferential and there-
fore abstract’.
132  See e.g. Zdravko v. Bulgaria (2011), para. 55.
133  Voeten 2007; Voeten 2011, at 61–63.
134  Husa 2010, at 122. Cf. opposite argument of the Nordic constitutionalism: ‘…the old idea of judges 
limiting themselves only to legal interpretation, and thus leaving all the political decision-making to 
the political, democratically elected bodies, has little to do with practical societal realities.’ (Nergelius 
2008, at 130).
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between judiciary and a democratically chosen legislator’.135 Camouflaging aims 
and ideologies by framing them as legal arguments is also a bad method of justi-
fying legal judgments. However, the legal system in which the ECtHR operates is 
chock-full of ideologies and policies. These ideologies can be driven by the judges 
within the judicial limits of the ECtHR: legal argumentation allows it to show that 
it has stayed within the limits of its legal discretion.
The ECtHR’s argumentation has been analysed from the Nordic constitution-
alism point of view.136 The critical findings are that there is a clear preference for 
human rights over constitutional structures: activist human rights decision-mak-
ing appears particularly blind to national constitutional and legal-cultural struc-
tures.137 Consequently, the problem is not so much the substance of human rights 
themselves emerging from the case law but, rather, the specific manner in which 
these human rights norms are created.138 Criticism can also be directed towards 
the manner in which dynamic human rights interpretations are reasoned by the 
ECtHR. Furthermore, its argumentation too often leaves room for improvement 
from the point of view of acceptability. This deficiency is illustrated in the stories 
that appear below.
We will now take a closer look at the general reasons for the increased inter-
est in legitimacy in the context of the supranational and international courts and 
tribunals. The following section provides an overview of the key definitions of ju-
dicial legitimacy and distinguishes the relevant ingredients used as a framework 
for analysing the ECtHR’s legitimacy.
2.2 LEGITIMACY OF THE JUDICIARY IN GENERAL
All the articles that form part of this study are built on the idea of the ECtHR’s ju-
dicial legitimacy, which therefore deserves to be explained here in greater detail. 
Much has been written about the different aspects and dimensions of legitimacy, 
and this study does not seek to engage in any a wider discussion of the theory 
of this topic.139 Instead, the focus is on the notion of legitimacy and its meaning 
and relevance in the context of the Convention. As the Council of Europe is an 
international organisation, and the ECtHR is one of its institutions, discussion of 
the legitimacy of international organisations seems hard to avoid.
The traditional view is that questions relating to the legitimacy of internation-
al organisations are of no significance because the member states are the source 
135  Husa 2010, at 122.
136  Some Nordic constitutionalists have praised the ECtHR’s approach to judicial review (see e.g. 
Scheinin 2008; Nergelius 2008; Viljanen 2007), while others have been more critical of it (see e.g. Husa 
2002, at 181–188; Husa 2010; Føllesdal 2007a; Rytter 2001).
137  Husa 2010, at 118.
138  Ibid., at 122.
139  On the theoretical and empirical approaches to legitimacy, see e.g. Hurrelmann – Schneider – Steffek 
2007a. 
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of legitimacy.140 Furthermore, it has been stated that the legitimacy of interna-
tional regimes resides in the legitimacy of national regimes.141 However, such no-
tions can no longer be taken for granted. It is difficult to justify the conventional 
logic that sovereign states are the only relevant constituencies for the legitimacy 
of international organisations, and that as long as government representatives 
are satisfied with their conduct, international organisations must be regarded as 
legitimate.142 This is very true of the Convention system: if its legitimacy was 
based entirely on states’ consent and their representatives were satisfied with it, 
the Convention system would long ago have been condemned as lacking legiti-
macy.143 Accordingly, this study argues that state consent is not the only tool for 
measuring or determining the ECtHR’s legitimacy.144    
The concept of legitimacy can be understood and defined in various ways: its 
content differs in philosophy, political science, sociology and in legal research, 
as well as within these disciplines. Political science scholars emphasise different 
issues from those that international lawyers or political philosophers focus on. 
Franck, an international law specialist, regards legitimacy as the generic label 
we have placed on factors that affect our willingness to comply voluntarily with 
commands.145 Although legitimacy can be understood in many ways, there is a 
consensus as to its common core, which is the belief in the rightness of the system 
or decision through authority is exercised.146 This research does not go into detail 
as to the rich debate surrounding the concept of legitimacy. Instead, the aim here 
is to identify a set of elements commonly associated with judicial legitimacy and 
analyse the ECtHR in light of these.
Legitimacy in law can be examined in relation to a particular norm, decision, 
institution, or legal system.147 In law, legitimacy and legality are closely related.148 
Legality has often been seen as a basis for legitimacy,149 but legitimacy also pro-
vides the justification for legality.150 Judicial legitimacy involves questions such 
as, why are laws obeyed? It has been stressed that legitimacy is relative in char-
140  Coicaud – Heiskanen 2001.
141  Franck 1997, at 84.
142  See e.g. Kulovesi 2011, at 14; Junne 2001, at 192.
143  It has been pointed out that though states have consented to the treaty as a framework for dealing 
with specified range of issues, once they have signed up, the specific rights and obligations are deter-
mined without their consent by these treaty-based bodies, see Kumm 2004, at 914.
144  See likewise, Kumm 2014, who argues that decisions are not legitimate merely because they were 
supported by democratically accountable institutions; Kulovesi 2011, at 35, 37. Cf. Dzehtsiarou 2011, 
at 536 where he connects state consent to persuasion and convincing the audience.
145  Franck 1990, at 150.
146  Ibid., at 24; see also Koskenniemi 2003, at 353; Kulovesi 2011, at 42.
147  Poole 2005, at 715, 719; Franck 1987, at 542. 
148  From the positivist point of view, however, legality is identical with legitimacy. For more on positiv-
ist legal theory, see Kelsen 1992. See also Shklar 1964. Shklar’s aim was not only to understand legalism 
but also to suggest other ways of thinking about law.
149  Çali 2011, at 11. However, many international lawyers emphasise that in international law an ac-
tion may be legal, but illegitimate, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo 
Report 2000, at 186.
150  Gribnau 2002, at 29.
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acter.151 The focus here is on the legitimacy of the judiciary, in respect of which 
the key questions are whether it enjoys the trust of the general public, and why 
should legal decisions be accepted and obeyed? The legitimacy of the judiciary 
necessarily involves the legitimacy of judicial decisions.
The legitimacy of the judiciary appears differently at national and interna-
tional levels. There are fundamental concerns at national level in respect of is-
sues such as lack of democratic control over courts’ decisions. Furthermore, the 
balance between democratic control and ensuring the independence of the courts 
is a particular challenge. Accepting the legal legitimacy of cassation court deci-
sions means accepting the court’s decisions as final and binding within the legal 
system itself. In terms of the rule of law at national level, this means that lower 
courts adhere to the decisions, that attorneys base their legal advice on them and 
that the doctrine accepts the decisions as providing guidance and as being ap-
propriate within the system.152 The lack of a system of checks and balances at 
the supranational level is a justifiable concern, but at the same time one must ask 
whether it is realistic to view the issue of legitimacy on the international level in 
the same manner as it is viewed in the context of the rule of law at national level.
Categories of legitimacy
Commentators have sketched three categories of legitimation.153 Firstly, process 
legitimacy concerns the way decisions are made,154 emphasising international 
institutions’ accountability and the coherence and consistency of the decisions 
made by them.155 In these terms, legitimacy and legality are viewed as being al-
most the same thing.156 Secondly, substance legitimacy revolves around the sub-
stantive output of international institutions, which means not only the process to 
be followed but also whether the rules made and decisions given have been con-
sidered in the light of all relevant data.157 The third category focuses entirely on 
outcomes and consequences. In this sense, legitimacy must be defensible in terms 
of equality, fairness and justice.158 This category, however, is a poor fit in relation 
to judicial decision-making, because it is very rarely the case that a substantively 
strong decision leads to a poor outcome and undermines the legitimacy of the 
original judgment. These outcomes seem to belong to the realm of political theory 
rather than genuine effect on legal reasoning. Kumm has rightly pointed out that, 
once a decision is adopted, it should be executed and if its legitimacy depends 
on outcomes this can lead to anarchy.159 Kumm also stresses that it is not the task 
of addressees of norms to re-evaluate decisions already established and legally 
151  Lasser 2004, chapter 10.
152  Huls 2009, at 15.
153  Franck 1987, at 542–543.
154  Weber 1968, at 31.
155  Franck 1988; Franck 1990, at 16, 19, 24; Barkhuysen – van Emmerik 2009.
156  Gribnau 2002, at 30. 
157  Franck 1987, at 543; Føllesdal – Peters – Ulfstein 2013, at 14.
158  Franck 1987, at 543.
159  Kumm 2004, at 927; Dzehtsiarou 2011, at 537–538.
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binding on them. Therefore, the legitimacy of a legal decision can never plausibly 
be the exclusive function of achieving a just result, as assessed by the address-
ee.160 In this respect, the outcome of the judgment cannot be analysed from a 
legitimacy point of view since fairness, justice and equality are hard to evaluate 
in respect of human rights issues.
The legitimacy of a court judgment is determined not only by the outcome, 
but also by the subtle manner in which court decisions are translated by others 
within the wider context in which they exist. The legitimacy of court decisions 
may refer to their acceptability in society. Institutional legitimacy involves such 
matters as means of recruitment, organisation and relationship with the wider 
community. Citizens must have general confidence in the honesty and independ-
ence of judges.161 Furthermore, the distinction between input and output legiti-
macy is a familiar aspect of discussions relating to legitimacy. Input legitimacy is 
the general confidence of people in the judiciary, which is separate from specific 
decisions. The recruitment of judges is a major aspect of input legitimacy. Output 
legitimacy has to do with the acceptability of specific decisions and the societal 
debate on this.
The sociological legitimacy of court decisions means that, in practice, the judg-
ment is also actually seen as a binding decision by the relevant public. Decisions 
are legitimate if they are accepted voluntarily; i.e. without fear of punishment or 
hope for reward.162 Other frameworks assess legitimacy from a social perspective, 
focusing on the compliance or otherwise of various actors participating in and 
affected by the exercise of authority by international institutions.163 The moral 
legitimacy of judicial decisions clearly comes to the forefront when courts rule 
on controversial questions of life and death, such as abortion, euthanasia, as well 
as with regard to the admission of aliens and the legal protection of terrorists. 
In the last two of these legal areas, there is often a difference of opinion between 
politicians and the executive power on the one hand, which claim sweeping au-
thority; and the courts on the other hand, which safeguard the legal protection 
of individuals.164
Connection to judicial activism vs. judicial self-restraint
Legitimacy questions are connected to the debate on judicial activism and judicial 
self-restraint. According to the standard theory of judicial activism, courts which 
are activist will lose their authority and legitimacy. Activism is then defined as 
‘going too far’, which means that the court removes itself from the apparent sense 
of constitutional conventions either in terms of constitutional provisions (written) 
or of constitutional principles (unwritten).165 
160  Kumm 2004, at 927.
161  Bell 2006.
162  Huls 2009, at 16.
163  Føllesdal 2007a; Hurd 1999, at 387–389.
164  Huls 2009, at 17.
165  de Lange 2009, at 464.
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The opposite theory to judicial activism is judicial self-restraint. This is con-
nected to originalist theories which criticise extending methods of interpretation. 
There are two differentiated groups of originalist theories. The first emphasises 
that a legal provision must mean what it was taken to mean at the time of its en-
actment. The second emphasises that a legal provision must apply to whatever 
cases the drafters had originally intended it to apply. Originalism, in its various 
forms, has been a very influential doctrine in American constitutional law.166 It 
is held by many constitutional theorists as well as judges and has always been 
very controversial. Among other things, it has become the favourite theory of 
advocates of judicial self-restraint.167 The originalist point of view has also been 
emphasised by the ECtHR’s judges. For example, in Golder, a dissenting opinion 
called for judicial restraint, contesting that it is unacceptable to read into the text 
a right which the Convention does not trouble to name, and at the most implies.168
A critical approach to the legitimacy debate regards talk of legitimacy as pure 
noise.169 Since legitimacy is a wide concept, it is always necessary to specify what 
one means by it. This is crystallised in the following comment: ‘“Legitimacy” is 
one of the most frequently used and misused concepts in political science.’170 This 
is inevitably true also in legal research.
2.3 THE LEGITIMACY DEBATE TARGETED TOWARDS THE 
ECtHR
The creation of the Convention was uncontroversial: after World War II an or-
ganisation to secure human rights in Europe was needed. The founding of the 
organisation of the Council of Europe and its main instrument, the Convention, 
was justified and barely anyone questioned the need for its creation and exist-
ence.171 In this sense, no serious evaluation of the legitimacy of the European hu-
man rights organisation and its institutions was required. Legitimacy questions 
arose later and criticism has, on the one hand, focused mainly on the extensive 
interpretation of the Convention by the ECtHR; and, on the other hand, on delays 
in processing cases and institutional concerns. 172 However, the conditions under 
which the Convention system was created in the 1950s and the world today, in the 
21st century, are hardly comparable.
166  For more on originalism and its counterpart, living constitutionalism, see Roosevelt 2006, at 47–59.
167  Scalia 1989; Lyons 1986; Letsas 2009, at 60–61.
168  Dissenting opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in Golder v. The United Kingdom (1975).
169  Koskenniemi 2003, at 367.
170  Schmitter says: ‘“Legitimacy” is one of the most frequently used and misused concepts in political 
science. It ranks up there with “power” in terms of how much it is needed, how difficult it is to define 
and how impossible it is to measure.’ (Schmitter 2001). 
171   Bates 2010; Spano 2014, at 1–3; McKaskle 2005, at 8–13. By contrast, the WTO dispute settlement 
system faced criticism at the time of its inception; see Kulovesi 2011, at 3.
172  Myjer 2012; O’Boyle 2011; Spano 2014, at 2–4.
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Reasons to follow the ECtHR’s jurisdiction
One of the interesting questions raised by the history of the ECtHR is how its 
decisions have come to be so fully respected and regarded as authoritative sourc-
es of law in the national constitutional orders of all of the state parties, to the 
point where national acceptance of the legitimacy of its decisions has succeeded 
in transforming this international treaty regime into a genuine system of posi-
tive law. There has been a great deal of focus on legitimacy questions relating to 
the ECtHR recently.173 Researchers have suggested that this transformation into 
a genuine system of positive law has a great deal to do with some of the qualities 
of supranational adjudication that have characterised the ECtHR. Accordingly, its 
commitment to incremental change and its engagement in dialogue with other 
judicial bodies has figured among the principal factors underlying its effective-
ness.174 Both of these practices are seen as being consistent with, and indeed en-
couraged by, the principle of subsidiarity.175 
There are fundamental questions in the background. Why should the gov-
ernment of a sovereign state consider that an international human rights regime 
influences or constrains its political discretion?176 With what competence can 
an international human rights institution exercise autonomous authority over 
the sovereign states that once created it? Legitimacy concerns in the context of 
the ECtHR have arisen from many perspectives. Firstly, they have predictably 
arisen following certain controversial judgments made in cases brought before 
the ECtHR. Secondly, there are legitimacy concerns over its workload, on the 
grounds that it does not manage to do enough. Under circumstances of disagree-
ment, a legitimate institution needs to strike a balance between what is desirable 
and what is feasible. As part of the world’s most workable human rights system 
the ECtHR offers a fruitful opportunity to examine and analyse in detail the le-
gitimacy challenges currently facing supranational jurisdictions. 
International organisations and international law do not, in general, have effec-
tive coercive mechanisms at their disposal. Even the formally binding decisions 
of such judicial bodies as the ECtHR have no coercive power. By comparison, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has more tools to implement its 
judgments. For instance, most of the CJEU’s rulings have ‘direct effect’ and can be 
enforced using financial sanctions.177 For that reason, the authority of the ECtHR’s 
judgments should be primarily based on models that confer legitimacy. In short, 
since states cannot be forced to obey the ECtHR’s judgments, they must be per-
suaded to consider them legitimate and worth following.178 Furthermore, while 
whether the ECtHR’s judgments are obeyed at national level is an important issue 
in itself, it also crystallises the debate over the legitimacy of the legal system cre-
ated by the Convention as a whole.
173  See e.g. Mahoney 1998; Mahoney 1990; Bellamy 2014; Føllesdal 2014; Føllesdal 2009.
174  Helfer – Slaughter 1997, at 314, 323.
175  Carozza 2003, at 74.
176  On the weaknesses of international human rights institutions generally, see e.g. Dai 2014, at 573.
177  Arold 2007, at 29.
178  See likewise, Dzehtsiarou 2011, at 535.
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Emphasis on dialogue
Dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts has been emphasised on the 
basis that greater involvement and direction from Contracting Parties would 
strengthen the legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court.179 Furthermore, failure by the 
ECtHR to recognise the need for dialogue could eventually call the legitimacy of 
its work into question and lead to a profound and damaging loss of confidence in 
it.180 Dialogue would also give the Contracting Parties and, more specifically, the 
highest national courts, a certain amount of responsibility for legal development 
at the supranational level. The involvement of national perspectives at the supra-
national level has also been pointed out.181
The ECtHR’s engagement in cross-judicial communication is a characteristic of 
effective supranational adjudication. This commitment to ‘solidarity’ over ‘insular-
ity’ strengthens its adjudication by implicitly acknowledging the commonality of 
the legal problems at issue and their (partial) independence from particular juris-
dictional limitations or culturally limited contexts.182 Subsidiarity has been seen to 
encourage the integration of national and supranational normative discourses.183
The preliminary ruling system is familiar in the context of the EU, and its 
adoption in the Strasbourg system has also been discussed. This would enable the 
national courts to direct legal developments at the supranational level. It has been 
argued that a procedure for making preliminary references to the ECtHR would 
contribute to the legitimacy of the process of implementing supranational law in 
the Contracting States, since it would offer more scope for judicial cooperation 
and dialogue.184 However, the system of preliminary ruling has been criticised 
in the EU context on the grounds that it blurs the line between the competence 
of the CJEU and that of national courts. The discretion left to national courts is 
sometimes rather narrow and illusory.185
Legitimacy dimensions of the ECtHR
Three dimensions to the ECtHR’s legitimacy have been identified. Firstly, there 
is a constitutive dimension which relates to concerns about whether there are 
good reasons for an institution to exist in the first place, and whether those rea-
sons demand deference to that institution’s decisions in the future. Furthermore, 
there are foundational arguments that justify the ECtHR’s right to take decisions 
against states in the field of human rights.
179  See e.g. Lübbe-Wolff 2012, at 12–13; Hennette-Vauchez 2011, at 161–162. On different methods of 
dialogue, see O’Boyle 2013, at 95–102.
180  O’Boyle 2013, at 103.
181  de Poorter 2013, at 209–210; O´Boyle 2013.
182  Helfer –Slaughter 1997, at 325–336.
183  Carozza 2003, at 75.
184  de Poorter 2013, at 211. For more on the advisory opinions in the context of the Convention, see 
Protocol No. 16 to the Convention (CETS No. 214, not yet in force); Gragl 2013; Lübbe-Wolff 2012, at 
12–14.
185  Rasmussen 1986, at 244–253; Galetta 2010; Jacob 2014; Lenaerts – Maselis – Gutman 2014, at 231–242. 
For criticism of the CJEU’s activist role, see e.g. Rasmussen 1986, especially at 8–17; Micklitz – De Witte 
2012; Horsley 2013; Dawson – De Witte – Muir 2013.
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Secondly, legitimacy has a performance dimension. The first element of this is 
normative performance, which focuses on the extent to which the ECtHR has ful-
filled the promise of its constitutive legitimacy through its decisions, and through 
the interpretive principles that guide its decision-making processes. The focus is 
on how well it is perceived to actually protect human rights. The second element 
of the performance dimension is managerial performance, which focuses on the 
ways in which the ECtHR, either overall or by reference to specific criteria, carries 
out its judicial activities. These managerial criteria include concerns about its ad-
ministrative efficiency (e.g. relating to such issues as length of the proceedings), 
its composition, micro-level quality (e.g. relating to such issues as knowledge of 
domestic facts and law) and enforcement of its judgments.
Thirdly, there is the dimension of social legitimacy, which refers to the em-
ployment of standards that are directly tied to other people’s views of an insti-
tution’s legitimacy. This aspect of legitimacy emphasises social acceptance (the 
degree to which the ECtHR is accepted as legitimate by the general public), social 
usage (the fact that people actually use it to seek redress for human rights viola-
tions) and social coverage, which simply means that the sheer number of people 
within the ECtHR’s jurisdiction adds to its legitimacy.186
The ECtHR is routinely criticised on the grounds that it lacks legitimacy. This 
criticism often concerns the performance dimension of legitimacy – and, more 
specifically, managerial performance.187 There has been criticism in particular as 
to the length of the ECtHR’s proceedings and its caseload, knowledge of domestic 
facts and law and the structure employed in the reasoning of the judgment.188 
Furthermore, when human rights courts are effective, the usual criticism levelled 
against them is that they are objectionably undemocratic and hence illegitimate. 
The argument goes like this: when the ECtHR interprets the Convention pro-
visions in a dynamic, rights-centred way, it goes beyond the intentions of the 
signatories to the Convention and is therefore unlawful.189 There are also logical 
counter-arguments as to why the text of the Convention should be regarded as 
binding and why the ECtHR should not depart from it.190 It has, however, been 
argued that the ECtHR has essentially derived its legitimacy from its role as a 
guardian of individual rights.191 This shows both that it is easy to criticise the 
ECtHR from the legitimacy point of view and that legitimacy can be seen and 
understood in different ways.
The concept of formal legitimacy has been introduced.192 By interpreting 
European law, judges play an important role in the political decision-making 
process. In particular, in its interpretation and application of the Convention as 
186  Çali 2011, at 8–10.
187  Føllesdal 2014, at 276.
188  See e.g. Dzehtsiarou – Greene 2011; Bratza 2011; Barkhuysen – van Emmerik 2009, at 442–443.
189  Føllesdal 2007a, at 104, 105; Føllesdal 2014, at 276.
190  The contract law principle of pacta sunt servanda is to the effect that what has been agreed is also 
binding.
191  Barkhuysen – van Emmerik 2003; Letsas 2013.
192  Thomassen 2009, at 402–403.
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‘a living instrument’ and the doctrine of positive obligations of states, the ECtHR 
could be considered as depriving governments and parliaments of their legisla-
tive powers in that context. What is the legitimacy of this growing judicial power 
from the point of view of the separation of powers? The legitimacy of this devel-
opment of international judicial standard-setting in human rights law is based on 
respect for the universal recognition of these rights, which urged European gov-
ernments and parliaments themselves to create this kind of system for the protec-
tion of human rights. Formal legitimacy, therefore, has already been achieved.
Ways in which the ECtHR can restore its legitimacy have been suggested. 
These include the use of fact-finding missions, sticking to precedents, and not 
prescribing to states how its judgments should be executed.193 Furthermore, in 
order to restore legitimacy the emphasis must be on the interpretation of the 
Convention. For example, dynamic interpretations should not serve as a justifica-
tion for creating new rights, especially when these were deliberately excluded 
from the Convention.194 It has been argued that the ECtHR lacks an objective 
standard to structure and guide its exercise of discretion, and that the lack of 
such a standard reduces its legitimacy.195 The ECtHR itself would argue, however, 
that the consensus approach serves as such a standard, although there are certain 
unresolved issues with this approach,  such as how to determine consensus.196 
One remarkably effective way of restoring the ECtHR’s legitimacy would be to 
reduce its workload.197
There has been much discussion as to whether the ECtHR is a constitutional 
court or one which dispenses justice in individual cases.198 It has been highlighted 
that if the ECtHR is a constitutional court, it is a remarkably narrow-minded one, 
because it does not seem to take constitutional arguments properly into account 
– with the exception of arguments focusing on rights.199 
I divide legitimacy into two types: formal legitimacy and substance legitimacy. 
The aspect that relates to the outcome or consequences of the judgments is prob-
lematic since it is impossible to evaluate the rightness of the outcome in human 
rights cases.200 Furthermore, evaluation of the consequences of the judgments is 
also beyond what legal research alone can accomplish. In this study, legitimacy 
basically refers to two things: formality (process) and substance (acceptability). 
However, this study focuses on the substance side of legitimacy and argues that 
substance legitimacy is of greater importance than formal legitimacy. Justifiability 
and acceptability are closely linked: in order for a judgment to be accepted, it must 
first be justified. Because legitimacy is linked to acceptability, it is also linked to 
193  Zwart 2013, at 82–87.  
194  Ibid., at 88.
195  Ibid., at 89.
196  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 22–23, 36.
197  Zwart 2013, at 93–95.
198  See, for example, Costa 2011; Kumm 2004; Myjer 2012; Bates 2010, at 436–472; Christoffersen 2011, 
at 187–190.
199  Husa 2010, at 118.
200  Dzehtsiarou 2011, at 537–538.
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legal reasoning. It has been argued that ‘legitimacy is obtained though substantial 
persuasiveness and procedural clarity’.201 This does not mean that there can only be 
one legitimate resolution of a problem before the ECtHR, since a legitimate decision 
is one within the realm of acceptable judicial behaviour.
2.4 FORMAL LEGITIMACY: PROCESS AND SUBSIDIARITY 
Formal legitimacy means paying attention to the procedural aspects. A judi-
cial decision is legitimate when it has been made in accordance with a legally 
prescribed procedure. When sufficient attention is paid to the requirements of 
process, then individuals can be willing to accept the outcome of the case.202 
Procedural requirements refer to the need to follow all the formal steps required 
by fair trial provisions. If, for example, the right to be heard or the right to remain 
silent are neglected, then the legal judgment is not legitimate.
The Convention system contains certain procedural rules, which can be found 
in particular in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention. Furthermore, Article 6 es-
tablishes certain principles relating to procedure which must be respected.203 The 
first criterion to be satisfied in order to make an application under the Convention 
is that domestic remedies must first be exhausted, following which an applica-
tion must be brought before the ECtHR within a period of six months. In addi-
tion, the rights to which the applicant’s claim relates must be protected under 
the Convention (ratione personae). Furthermore, the application will not be dealt 
with if it is anonymous or if it concerns subject-matter the substance of which 
the ECtHR has already examined, or which has already been submitted for in-
vestigation or settlement under other international procedures, and contains no 
relevant new information. The ECtHR will declare an application inadmissible 
if it is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or its Protocols, mani-
festly ill-founded or an abuse of the right of individual application, or if the ap-
plicant has not suffered significant disadvantage.204 The ECtHR is competent to 
examine complaints concerning only the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Convention and its Protocols (competences on ratione materiae). Furthermore, it 
has no competence to examine complaints concerning matters which took place 
before the entry into force of the Convention (competence ratione temporis). Lastly, 
the Convention does not apply to persons living or acting outside the legal terri-
tory of the Contracting States (competence ratione loci).205
The principle of subsidiarity supports the idea of formal legitimacy. In the 
context where the ECtHR operates, it is essential that subsidiarity is fully respect-
201  Ibid., at 553.
202  Brems – Lavrysen 2013, at 183–184.
203  For more on the procedural requirements derived from Article 6 of the Convention, see Dahlberg 
(‘fourth instance’ article), at 92–94 and the sources mentioned therein.
204  For more on the admissibility criteria, see e.g. Harris et al. 2014, at 43–102.  
205  The territorial limitation on the application of the Convention system is open to criticism; see e.g. 
Williams 2013, at 1167–1168.
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ed and followed. The ECtHR’s role should be secondary: the Contracting States 
and their administrative infrastructure and personnel are the primary actors. 
The ECtHR only steps in when national legal remedies have been exhausted. 
Subsidiarity is concretised not only in the admissibility criteria (e.g. exhaustion of 
domestic remedies), but also in the fact that the Convention must be interpreted 
on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. In terms of formal legitimacy, the sub-
sidiarity principle should be taken as one of the standard principles used in the 
interpretation of Convention provisions.206  
The fourth instance doctrine is one element of the principle of subsidiarity. It 
ensures that the role of the ECtHR is subsidiary to that of national authorities as re-
gards evaluation of the evidence or interpretation of applicable national legislation, 
and that it will not act as a court of appeal in relation to the decisions of national 
courts applying national law. The rule is that the ECtHR will not disagree with any 
decision made by a national court on the interpretation and application of its own 
national law.207 The fourth instance doctrine supports the idea that the ECtHR’s le-
gitimacy is achieved by safeguarding process: if the procedural requirements have 
been followed, the judgment is within the limits of what can be required and the 
ECtHR cannot interfere.208 By ensuring that the ECtHR keeps in mind the consti-
tutional limits of its competence, this doctrine acts as a brake on its interpreta-
tions of the Convention. From the fourth instance point of view, legitimacy is as-
sessed in formal terms, focusing on procedural steps as opposed to content. If all 
the required procedural steps have been taken at national level, there is nothing to 
criticise. Consequently, the ECtHR gains its legitimacy by maintaining the formal 
approach of paying attention only to procedural requirements.
The margin of appreciation doctrine is another element of the subsidiarity 
principle. This means that states are allowed a certain degree of discretion so that 
each state’s special circumstances may be taken into account. It has been urged 
that in order to maintain its institutional credibility, the ECtHR must refrain from 
interfering with the margin of appreciation granted to Contracting States.209 The 
difference between the fourth instance doctrine and the margin of appreciation 
doctrine is rather complex. In practice, it is often a matter of degree, since both 
doctrines give national authorities considerable discretion.210 The visible differ-
ence is that the argumentation used in relation to the margin of appreciation 
doctrine is more extensive than that used in relation to the fourth instance doc-
206  See also Lübbe-Wolff 2012, at 14–15 where she introduces the concept of substantive subsidiarity. 
This basically means that the Convention system is subsidiary not only in a procedural sense but also 
in a substantive sense, in order to create only minimum human rights standards.
207  Harris et al. 2014, at 18.
208  For more on formal legitimacy, see Thomassen 2009, at 402–403; Barkhuysen – van Emmerik 2009.
209  Forowicz 2010, at 3–4. Furthermore, the margin of appreciation doctrine has been seen as a method 
that hinders the reception of international law in the Convention system (ibid., at 7–9); for more on this, 
see e.g. Arai-Takahashi 2001.
210  Harris et al. 2014, at 16.
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trine.211 The margin of appreciation doctrine is more developed and more fre-
quently used in the ECtHR’s praxis than the fourth instance doctrine.212
The complexity of human rights issues and the difficulties involved in achiev-
ing the correct judgment can easily lead one to regard formal legitimacy as the 
only reasonable way of ensuring the ECtHR’s legitimacy. Since human rights 
cases are rarely a matter of right or wrong but more a matter of degree and of 
striking a balance, it may well be argued that the legitimacy of a judgment can 
only be achieved by maintaining a certain distance and focusing on procedural 
requirements which are more easily measurable. However, I regard it as being of 
crucial importance to note that formal legitimacy and formal structures offer a 
manifestly inadequate means of getting to grips with the position and powers of 
supranational courts like the ECtHR. Its influence at the national level, and yet 
more significantly to individual citizens, means that the ECtHR’s legitimacy must 
mean something more than simply the right form.213
2.5 SUBSTANCE LEGITIMACY: JUSTIFICATION AND 
ACCEPTABILITY
Substance legitimacy recognises that procedural rules and principles must be 
fulfilled, but legitimacy also requires that the content of the judgment must be 
justified and acceptable to the public. It has been stated that ‘[t]he legitimacy of 
a given judicial decision thus stands and falls in large measure on the logic and 
argumentation of the signed judgment, not the structural legitimacy of the entire 
judicial apparatus from which it hails’.214
In this sense, legitimacy stresses substance, which means that the ECtHR 
gains legitimacy by evaluating the merits of the case as opposed to purely proce-
dural aspects. It is not enough for the national authorities to take all the required 
procedural steps, since this approach focuses on the content of these procedures. 
The fulfilment of procedural requirements by the judiciary can achieve legiti-
macy only in so-called ‘easy cases’ where there is, for example, clear neglect of the 
right to remain silent or the right to legal representation. In so-called ‘hard cases’, 
however, where at least two different opposite interpretations are possible, pro-
cedural requirements are not enough to achieve legitimacy. Substance legitimacy 
does not, however, imply that a judgment may be either right or wrong in terms 
of its substance. It refers to the legal reasoning applied in the judgment. A judge 
211  See the ECtHR’s argumentation in respect of the margin of appreciation doctrine in e.g. S.A.S v. 
France (2014), paras. 123-59 and compare it with the argumentation used in respect of the fourth in-
stance doctrine in e.g. Tautkus v. Lithuania (2012), para. 57.
212  O’Boyle argues that the margin of appreciation doctrine and the fourth instance doctrine are separate 
doctrines, see O’Boyle 2013, at 93.
213  See likewise Feldman 2001, at 142 where he argues that ‘the legitimacy of human-rights procedures 
has to be considered against the background of the substantive legal rights which they support…
The legitimacy of the procedures is intimately linked to the substantive rights and values which they 
support.’
214  Lasser 2004, at 338.
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can use arguments based on general legal principles to justify the interpretation 
of a legal rule. These are fundamental starting-points underlying the law or a 
specific legal domain, such as the principles of fairness, good faith, equality, free-
dom, fair play and due process.215 Respect for general principles of law has been 
argued to be a necessary condition for the legitimacy of judicial decisions.216 Such 
general principles include consistency, coherence, legal certainty, proportionality, 
predictability, as well as justice and objectivity.217 
In order to be legitimate, a judicial decision must be based on moral princi-
ples that underpin human rights.218 This provides a counterpart to formal legiti-
macy: now it is the content that counts when determining whether the judgment 
is legitimate or not. Additionally, human rights are not criterial concepts whose 
meaning is exhausted by their common usage across Contracting States. They 
are meant to express a moral commitment to objective principles of liberal de-
mocracy. It follows that the ECtHR does not exercise its judicial discretion in an 
illegitimate manner when applying, for example, a ‘living instrument’ interpre-
tation because there are certain moral principles that underpin the Convention 
rights. Furthermore, these moral principles should govern the interpretation of 
the Convention as a whole.219
Justification
Theories of legal reasoning ask: when is a legal conclusion sufficiently justified? 
Must it be based on solid grounds which cannot be questioned? The ultimate 
basis of a conclusion is a relevant consideration in respect of all knowledge, not 
only in respect of moral or legal reasoning. Justification is an attempt to achieve 
comprehensive, general legitimacy for the judgment.220 It has also been empha-
sised that a judgment is justified and consequently legitimate on the basis of legal 
argumentation.221 I would, however, stress that justification refers to the process 
by which the judge justifies the judgment to herself, while acceptability refers to 
convincing the audience of the fact in relation to the judgment.222 The arguments 
given in order that the public accepts the judgment are slightly different to those 
the judge uses to justify it to herself.
215  Feteris 1999, at 8. Feteris also mentions that these general legal principles are laid down in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the European Convention on Human Rights (see Feteris 
1999, at 8, fn. 8). 
216  Gribnau 2002, at 32.
217  Ibid., at 26.
218  Letsas 2009, at 59; Greer 2006, at 195–213.
219  Letsas 2009, at 40.
220  Paso 2014, at 239. 
221  Dzehtsiarou 2011.
222  Virolainen – Martikainen 2010, at 25; Feteris 1999, at 1. Klami draws a rather similar distinction in 
respect of argumentation and justification: he views argumentation as amounting to the reasons given 
to convince the relevant audience of the acceptability of the decision, while justification is the reasoning 
that the decision-maker employs in order to convince herself of the correctness of the decision (Klami 
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When a judge resolves an interpretation problem in deciding a legal case, she 
can choose different types of arguments to justify the decision. Logical deduc-
tion has been seen the traditional model of justified legal argumentation. Forms 
of strict logic, however, play a minor part in the justification of international law 
decisions.223 It is not enough for the judges to solve legal problems properly or by 
reference solely to the authority of the court, since there is also an obligation to 
state reasons in respect of interpretative questions.224 It has been pointed out that, 
at times, judges do not state all that is necessary in order to justify the decision 
reached, while at other times the arguments stated are superfluous.225
Legal arguments can be regarded as falling into two categories: formal argu-
mentation and substance argumentation. Formal arguments consist of reasons 
whose weight or force depends on their authority. This category includes sys-
temic and linguistic arguments. Substance arguments, on the other hand, are not 
backed up by authority, but involve the direct invocation of moral, political, eco-
nomic, or other social considerations. It has been stated that in principle formal 
arguments provide more powerful justification than substantial arguments.226
Linguistic arguments are regarded as a providing a starting-point for a justi-
fied legal decision. Linguistic arguments support the legislature’s authority; and 
consequently, democracy, the separation of powers and rule of law are also re-
spected.227 It is sometimes possible to justify a legal decision by using deductive 
arguments whose premises are valid rules of law and propositions of proven 
fact. In so-called ‘easy cases’ the facts are straightforward and the applicable law 
is well established.228 However, justification by means of deductive argument be-
comes difficult when the rules are unclear or there is disagreement as to which 
rules are relevant (so-called ‘hard cases’). Consequently, another method must be 
used to justify such legal decisions. ‘Second-order justification’ involves justify-
ing choices, which means that the legal decision chosen must ‘make sense in the 
world’ – and particularly in the context of the legal system. An argument that 
allows one to establish whether a decision ‘makes sense in the world’ exhibits 
three characteristics. Firstly, it must be shown that the consequences that might 
spring from one decision are preferable to the consequences connected to an al-
ternative decision. Secondly, there is a requirement for consistency, which means 
that there must not be no logical contradictions between two (or more) general 
norms or between a decision made in a given concrete case and a general norm. 
Thirdly, there is a requirement for coherence, which means that that every legal 
223  Prott 1991, at 309.
224  Aarnio 1978, at 6.
225  Kloosterhuis 2008, at 496.
226  Ibid., at 497.
227  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 532–534.
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Rather, a jump is made from the facts to the decision.
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norm and judicial decision must be harmonised with the fundamental principles 
of the system.229
It has been argued that a legal decision is justified when commonly accepted 
values are openly expressed in the reasoning.230 Such underlying values include 
democracy, separation of powers, the rule of law and human rights. This might 
very well be true in general judicial decisions. For example, in a judgment con-
cerning, let’s say, an administrative dispute, justification is gained by leaning on 
commonly accepted values – which are, in practice, often human rights. But the 
picture becomes more complicated in supranational human rights adjudication: 
leaning on human rights is impossible when the subject-matter under interpreta-
tion comprises human rights per se. Furthermore, the separation of powers or rule 
of law is treated quite differently in several Contracting States.
Coherence is exhibited precisely in the interpretation and maintenance of the 
system so that it secures a relatively ordered and structured scheme of political, 
social and human values. Over and above this perhaps necessary reference to 
fundamental system-values in any discussion of coherence, it is also arguable 
that the justificatory power of law depends on the system’s commitment, as im-
plemented by the officials who administer it, to substantive human values funda-
mental in character.231
Basic human values both play a part in underpinning the commitment to im-
plementing statute law and, at the same time, place constraints on acceptable 
interpretations thereof. If there are statutes which cannot be, or simply are not, 
interpreted so as to exhibit consistency with values considered fundamental to 
law, its legitimacy and justificatory power are thereby weakened.232
The justificatory force of all the different types of argument types depends 
on fundamental legal-constitutional and political values. Therefore, criteria de-
signed to be applied to complex deployments of interpretative arguments must 
ensure a reflective equilibrium among fundamental values. An interpretative 
practice will be fully satisfactory only if it expresses such equilibrium.233
The justificatory force of the arguments used by the ECtHR in making its 
judgments is chiefly based on coherence and consistency with values that under-
pin the whole Convention system. Those values are human rights, in the broadest 
sense of the term; together with traditional constitutional values such as the su-
premacy of democracy in principle, separation of powers and national sovereign-
ty. Moreover, the general principles of law, such as the principle of proportional-
ity, legal certainty and the principle of subsidiarity are recognised as common 
values of the Convention system. It is noticeable that these values may sometimes 
conflict with each other.
229  MacCormick 1994, at 100–128.
230  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 532, 537–538; see likewise Peczenik 2009, at 129 (deep justification 
means that legal starting-points and argumentation can be defended by referring to general moral 
grounds).
231  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 536.
232  Ibid., at 537.
233  Ibid., at 538.
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Patterns of justification
One can identify certain patterns of justification in cases of statutory interpreta-
tion. In the simplest pattern, the court offers a single major argument as the only 
or primary reason for the decision, and either omits further arguments or views 
them largely as makeweights. In this simplest pattern, linguistic arguments are 
the basic type of argument in all systems that most often generates the single de-
cisive reason. Such arguments are based either on the standard ordinary mean-
ing of words, or, if applicable, their standard technical meaning, whether legal or 
non-legal in character, as they appear in the relevant statute. In this first catego-
ry, the argument may consist of no more than the citation of the statute itself.234 
Justification by reference to the single-argument form is rather rare and applica-
ble only in a very limited number of cases.235
Beyond this simplest argument pattern of justification, more complex patterns 
often appear in judicial decisions. The second pattern of justification is referred 
to as ‘cumulative’, in which several different arguments of significance figure in 
the court’s decision, but in the final analysis all of them point in varying degrees 
to the same interpretational conclusion. None of the arguments alone provide 
sufficient basis to justify the decision reached, but this is achieved cumulatively. 
Judicial use of cumulative argument is motivated by such factors as doubt about 
the justificatory force of any single argument, the social importance of the issue 
or issues being resolved, a desire to relieve possible concern that the court might 
be exceeding its proper role, a perceived need to provide justification commen-
surate with a substantial burden being imposed on the losing party, a perceived 
need to take account of arguments expressed in dissenting opinions or close off 
grounds of further appeal.
The cumulative pattern strives to construe all available materials so that it 
generates several arguments that converge to support one interpretation.236 It has 
been pointed out that the use of genuinely cumulative arguments enhances the 
weight of the case in terms of the chosen interpretation in a manner quite differ-
ent those cases in which arguments merely coincide. Even in cases where all the 
serious arguments available support the same conclusion, it may be advisable to 
state them all in full to show their cumulative strength, or to acknowledge that 
they merely coincide. This may be done for institutional reasons or for political or 
constitutional ones, where courts wish to make clear that their decisions are not 
based on partisan preference but on strong legal grounds.237 I would also add that 
cumulative argumentation must also consist of an explicit part of counter argu-
ments of the case, and not only the arguments pointing at the same outcome. By 
this way, the cumulative argumentation more likely justifies the outcome.
The third pattern of argumentation is called ‘conflict-settling’. It presupposes 
that conflicting arguments are accumulated on each side, discussed, and the con-
234  Summers –Taruffo 1991, at 479.
235  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 526.
236  Summers – Taruffo 1991, at 479–480.
237  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 527.
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flict is resolved in the decision. In settling the conflict, the court may use sev-
eral techniques, such as ‘weighing and balancing’. This means that when two 
or more arguments conflict, one argument may rationally prevail because, for 
example, the reasons behind that argument or the evidence in support of it are 
stronger than those behind a competing argument.238 What really carries weight 
may not be so much the arguments themselves as the values that underlie them. 
Furthermore, the transparency of stating the reasons for the preference given to 
one interpretation over another should be made clear.239 Stating arguments for 
one side only, without explicitly spelling out rival arguments, amounts to a tacit 
recognition that there were strong arguments to the contrary, even though the 
reason for considering them outweighed is left unstated.
Koskenniemi has stated that rights can hardly work as a criterion for the ac-
ceptability of judicial decisions. There are four reasons for this. Firstly, what as-
pect of social life is described in terms of rights-protection is a matter of political 
choice. That an interest or a benefit is labelled a ‘right’ is a matter of institutional 
policy. Secondly, rights often conflict. For every right to freedom, there is some-
one else’s right to security; and for every individual right, there is the right of the 
collective to regulate itself. Thirdly, rights always come with exceptions. Even a 
right to life covers the right not to be killed ‘arbitrarily’ (is e.g. abortion arbitrary?). 
Fourthly, rights of course come with rights-language. That language is open to 
interpretation, which subsumes the meaning of the right within its interpretation 
by the relevant authority.240
This raises a serious dilemma in the interpretation of the Convention. If the 
ECtHR cannot take human rights as the basic values on which to base the justi-
ficatory force of the judgments, what values can its judgments be based on? Can 
justificatory force be gained through general principles of law?
Acceptability
The idea of justification is first crystallised when a judge justifies a judgment to 
herself. The second phase of the process is to make the judgment acceptable to 
others.241 In this process legal arguments play the main role. Convincing is fre-
quently linked to legitimacy: a judicial decision should aim to convince as many 
potential members of the audience as possible of the validity of the ruling. This aim can 
be achieved if the arguments the ECtHR utilises are legitimate and increase the 
legitimacy of the judgment.242 If the audience is convinced by the judicial body, 
arguments offered by the judiciary will be regarded as acceptable, as will, by ex-
tension, the rulings made on the basis of these arguments.243
238  Summers – Taruffo 1991, at 480–481.
239  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 528.
240  Koskenniemi 2003, at 366–367.
241  Virolainen – Martikainen 2010, at 25; Feteris 1999, at 1.
242  Dzehtsiarou 2011, at 536.
243  Aarnio 1987, at 225; Aarnio 2011, at 143.
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I should stress that I do not link the convinced audience with majority public 
opinion. I follow the concept of ‘ideal situation’, which means that the members of 
the political community bind themselves to the rules of rational discourse. Such 
discourse is free from external influence, especially from coercion, manipulation 
and persuasion. Further, the members of the community share to some extent 
the same value code.244 The majority principle has been introduced, which means 
that if the majority of an ideal audience is ready to accept the solution in question, 
then it is the ‘best possible’ one for the moment. The majority gives the largest 
possible acceptance for the solution.245
This study focuses on the substance side of legitimacy questions, and argues 
that in terms of the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy it does not suffice that the ECtHR 
follows procedural requirements in making its judgments. The merits of the case 
are more critical in this regard. Stressing the importance of content means paying 
attention to legal reasoning. 
Here legitimacy is taken to mean the extent to which the ECtHR has fulfilled 
the promise of its constitutive legitimacy through its decisions and through the 
interpretive principles that guide its decision-making processes. It should be 
stressed that as regards the substance of the judgment the focus is not on the 
outcome – e.g. how to balance the right to privacy against freedom of speech in 
practice – but on the legal reasoning contained in the judgment. This view of 
legitimacy focuses on the idea that the ECtHR either increases or diminishes its 
legitimacy through its performance, and is known as the normative performance 
dimension.246 The ECtHR’s performance will be measured by reference to the le-
gal reasoning it delivers. The articles provide detailed analysis of the arguments 
provided by the ECtHR when enlarging the scope of its interpretation of the 
Convention by adding, for example, more positive obligations or economic and 
social rights.
Even if the justification process has been conducted on a rational basis, this 
does not imply that the content of the interpretation is acceptable.247 Justification 
of a legal decision does not automatically lead to its acceptability.248 Certain crite-
ria have been formulated for a legal interpretation to be acceptable: the interpre-
tation should be coherent with legal sources and with interpretation methods which 
244  Aarnio 2011, at 143, 170–175.
245  It can be asked whether the majority principle is not too severe with the minority opinion. This is not, 
however, the case. This majority has nothing to do with the majority principle of a political democracy. 
This is because the model deals with legal reasoning in an ideal situation. The protection of the minor-
ity would have significance in a factual political community, that is, in an audience where all kinds of 
power constellations play some role, whereas in an ideal community the use of power is not a problem. 
This follows from the very concept of the ideal speech situation. The participants are supposed to be 
free. On the majority principle, see more Aarnio 2011, at 170–175.
246  Çali 2011, at 9.
247  Glenn, for example, regards rationality as one of the legal traditions (see Glenn 2014, at 20).
248  Aarnio 1987, at 185–190.
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are generally accepted in the political community.249 The question of whether an 
interpretation is coherent with accepted legal sources and interpretation methods 
is in turn dependent on the consensus on starting-points, norms and values within a 
given political community.250 Further, interpretative arguments have genuine jus-
tificatory force to the extent that they are grounded in values, particularly the 
underpinning values of legal and constitutional order. There may be a measure 
of consensus across systems about the general underlying values of legal orders 
as such.251
The requirements of acceptability are related to the result of the interpreta-
tion, i.e. its argumentative content. The result of the interpretative process is ac-
ceptable if it is in accordance with the value system of the political community.252 
Rational acceptability of legal interpretations is here regarded as having the same 
meaning as legitimacy of a legal decision. I would emphasise that a legitimate 
legal decision contains a procedural component (the formal requirements of the 
process) and a substance component (material acceptability).253  In rational argu-
mentation theories the procedural component specifies the conditions of rationality 
for legal discussions and the substance component identifies the material condi-
tions of acceptability for the final result. The substance component is the main focus 
of this study and the conditions of acceptability for the final result are analysed 
and further developed below. The differentiation made in this study concerns 
the procedural component, which, in theories of rational argumentation, means 
ways of conducting rational discussion.254 The procedural requirement is, how-
ever, here understood as being fulfilled by respecting the subsidiarity principle 
in its different forms.
As a result, the requirements for measuring the acceptability of legal decision 
are as follows:
(1) interpretation should be coherent with legal sources which are generally 
accepted in the political community; 
(2) interpretation should be coherent with interpretation methods which are ge-
nerally accepted in the political community; and
(3) the coherence of legal sources and interpretation methods is dependent on 
the consensus on starting-points, norms and values within a given political com-
munity. 
249  Cf. Aarnio speaks of the legal community (‘In order to be acceptable, the result must correspond 
to the knowledge and value systems of the legal community.’ Aarnio 1987, at 190). I would prefer to 
speak of political community. On political community which is a broader community compared to the 
legal community, see Dworkin 1986, at 195–201.
250  Aarnio 1987, at 185–187. See also Feteris 1999, at 131.
251  MacCormick – Summers 1991, at 532–533.
252  See Aarnio 1987, at 190.
253  Ibid., at 191; Alexy 1989; Peczenik 2009.
254  See e.g. Aarnio 1987, at 191; Alexy 1989. The rationality of legal discussion can be traced back to 
Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality.
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The acceptability of the ECtHR’s judgments will be evaluated in the light of 
these requirements. Rational argumentation theory holds that a legal decision’s 
legitimacy is a direct consequence of its being a rationally accepted legal deci-
sion.255
In addition, the distinction between internal and external justification has been 
developed further. Internal justification means deriving an interpretation from 
the premises in accordance with accepted rules of interference. Internal justifi-
cation is an instrument for controlling the consistency of judicial deliberation. 
The judgment has to be a logical consequence of applying the valid norm to the 
given facts. The premises on which a legal decision is based must be grounded 
on norms. However, internal justification does not explain why a certain norm 
was chosen. Detailed internal justification reveals the extent to which the chosen 
premises demand external justification. When evaluating the ECtHR’s reasoning, 
internal justification applies certain requirements to the legal argumentation and 
interpretation methods used.
In respect of external justification, the validity of the premises and the rules 
of interference are at issue: the judge has to justify the chosen norm and the sub-
stance given to it. Internal justification is often syllogistic, while external justifica-
tion involves pro and contra weighing. In hard cases the judge should reason both 
internally and externally.256 The legal decision should be based on legal sources 
as opposed to moral, political or social sources. External justification contributes 
certain criteria for the evaluation of the legal sources used in the interpretation.
The distinction between easy (routine) cases and hard cases is crucial when 
applying the acceptability requirements.257 In easy cases justification is achieved 
by literal interpretation and no further justifiability arguments are needed, 
while in hard cases the justifiability and acceptability arguments must be broad-
er. Furthermore, in easy cases formal aspects of legitimacy may be decisive.258 
Therefore, the acceptability requirements will be applied only to hard cases, 
which are defined as those where two different interpretations are possible and 
interpretation cannot be achieved by using the single argument pattern. The ele-
ments of formal and substance legitimacy are illustrated in the figure below:
255  Aarnio take the view that only a legal order which, rationally considered, can be accepted as reason-
able is legitimate (Aarnio 1987, at 107).
256  Aarnio 1987, at 195–200, 204; Alexy 1989, at 228–30; Peczenik 2009, at 305; Wróblewski 1992, at 
211–214.
257  On the distinction between easy and hard cases, see MacCormick 1994, at 100; Peczenik 2009, at 
14–15; Feteris 1999, at 73; Alexy 1989, at 223.
258  See Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 115.
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Figure 1: The construction of formal legitimacy and substance legitimacy.
This figure demonstrates the construction of formal and substance legitimacy. 
Formal legitimacy involves procedural rules, which, in the Convention system, 
are principally based on the following: (1) Articles 34 and 35; (2) case law relat-
ing to the provision of a fair trial under the Convention (Article 6); and (3) the 
doctrines derived from the subsidiarity principle, which are the margin of appre-
ciation doctrine and the fourth instance doctrine. Substance legitimacy contains 
elements of justification and acceptability. In respect of justification, different 
patterns can be identified, where the focus is on the nature of legal reasoning. 
Acceptability, for its part, involves paying attention to sources of law and meth-
ods of interpretation.
In sum, two elements are used to evaluate the acceptability requirements. 
Firstly, there is an element of interpretation which includes the evaluation of the in-
terpretation methods used in the judgment. Secondly, there is an element concern-
ing sources of law which evaluates the legal sources used in the judgment.
In the next section, the ECtHR’s judgments are tested in the context of these 
requirements. The question of whether it acquires or loses its legitimacy through 
its arguments is addressed by reference to four stories.
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3 ‘Once Upon a Time’ – 
Four Stories Regarding the 
Legitimacy of the ECtHR
3.1 THE PLOT: LEGITIMACY THROUGH LEGAL REASONING
The common thread in the stories presented here is that all of them analyse the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy and, by extension, that of the entire Convention system. The 
legitimacy of the ECtHR’s judgments has been evaluated by reference to the re-
quirements developed in the rational argumentation theory. It is closely interre-
lated with legal reasoning because the ECtHR’s reasoning enhances the accept-
ability of its judgments, and consequently, its judicial legitimacy.
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate the ECtHR’s doctrines of interpretation 
from the legitimacy point of view. As noted above, rational argumentation 
theory regards legal decisions as legitimate when they are rationally accepted. 
Justification and acceptability can be distinguished on the grounds that justifica-
tion refers to the argumentation the judge uses to justify the chosen interpreta-
tion to herself, while acceptability means making the legal decision acceptable 
to the audience. Therefore, the focus is on what is required in order for a legal 
decision to be acceptable. 
Evaluation of the acceptability of the ECtHR’s interpretative doctrines leads to 
analysis of its argumentation. According to rational argumentation theory, meas-
uring the acceptability of legal decision requires that attention be paid to the legal 
sources and interpretation methods. The importance of coherence is emphasised, 
and this is dependent on the consensus on starting-points, norms and values within a 
given political community.
Furthermore, the distinction between internal and external justification was 
further developed in this analysis. Internal justification lays down requirements 
for legal reasoning and consequently for interpretation methods. External justi-
fication involves justifying the premises used in the interpretation which leads 
to analysis of the sources of law. The acceptability of the ECtHR’s judgments is 
evaluated in the light of these requirements. Pursuant to rational argumentation 
theory, a legitimate legal decision is the same as a rationally accepted legal deci-
sion.
The Convention system’s primary legal source is the text of the Convention 
and its Protocols. This is followed by the ECtHR’s case law, other international 
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law instruments (e.g. different treaties and treaty bodies’ praxis of the UN), other 
instruments of the Council of Europe (such as recommendations and resolutions), 
Contracting States’ legislation and case law, other countries’ legislation and case 
law, the EU’s legal instruments and the case law of the CJEU, as well as general 
legal principles.259
The ECtHR uses rather creative methods of interpretation in respect of the 
cases that come before it.260 These include the ‘living instrument’ approach, the 
theory of ‘autonomous concepts’, the ‘practical and effective’ approach (includ-
ing the ‘positive obligations’ interpretation method), and the ‘common ground’ 
method.261
The coherence of legal sources and interpretation methods depends on consen-
sus being achieved in respect of starting-points, norms and values within a given 
political community. The starting-point and underlying goal of the Convention 
system is clearly the protection of human rights. Other starting-points and val-
ues, such as democracy, rule of law, peace and justice, are explicitly expressed in 
the Preamble of the Convention and may also be regarded as common principles. 
Other common principles applicable within the Convention system include the 
principle of proportionality, the principle of legal certainty, and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine.262 The range of starting-points, norms and values within 
the political community of the Convention is rather wide. I argue that the protec-
tion of human rights is prima facie the starting-point and principal value of the 
Convention system.263 Other principles come after the protection of human rights. 
In other words, substance trumps form. This should also be the case when evalu-
ating whether the ECtHR’s chosen interpretation fulfils the coherence require-
ments as regards legal sources and interpretation methods.
The external element involves evaluation of the kinds of legal sources used in 
a judgment and whether they are based on the idea of protecting human rights. 
In practice, this requirement means that interpretation should be based on several 
coherent legal sources, and not just on the ECtHR’s case law. The reason for using 
legal sources from other legal systems is that human rights issues are globally 
259  On the sources of law generally in international law, see e.g. Cassese 2005, at 153–212; Koskenniemi 
2000. On comparative and international sources in the context of the ECtHR, see e.g. White – Ovey 
2010, at 77–78; Dremczewski 1983; Leach 2011, at 170–171; Harris et al. 2014, at 10–13; Demir and Baykara 
v. Turkey (2008), paras. 65-86.
260  The evolutive method of interpretation is also common in other jurisdictions, see Bjorge 2014. On 
the ECtHR’s methods of interpretation, see e.g. Loucaides 2007, at 1–16; Chirdaris 2011. Furthermore, 
the ECtHR’s methods of interpretation are described in detail in chapter 2 of this study.
261  However, there are reasons to criticise interpretations based on state consensus, which means, in 
practice, taking state consensus as a significant factor in determining whether someone has a human 
right to something (Letsas 2011, at 315–322). Consequently, interpretation based on state consensus 
may sometimes go against the protection of human rights.
262  The distinction between methods of interpretation and constitutive principles of the Convention is 
followed by e.g. Leach 2011, at 159–177 (‘Some of the principles, such as legality and proportionality, 
are fundamental to the substantive Convention law, whereas others are issues of interpretation.’ ibid. 
at 159).
263  Accordingly, the ‘priority of rights’ principle stipulates that the rights and freedoms of the 
Convention must be accorded precedence over the democratic pursuit of the general interest; see van 
Hoof 2013, at 134.
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rather similar and are not bound to a certain legal system.264 Secondly, the inter-
nal element analyses the interpretation method(s) which the ECtHR has used and 
whether the chosen interpretation method is prima facie based on the starting-
point of the Convention system – the protection of human rights.
The acceptability requirements concern the ECtHR’s reasoning, not the out-
come of the judgment. This necessitates evaluation of the ECtHR’s legal reason-
ing. This is also why the protection of human rights can be set as the main start-
ing-point when evaluating the acceptability of a judgment, since the point is not 
to evaluate whether the outcome of the judgment was right or wrong, but instead 
whether the legal sources and interpretation methods used are based on the main 
starting-point of the system.265
The four stories regarding the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy are told below and 
the requirements of an acceptable judgment are analysed in each. The focus is 
thus on the coherence of legal sources and methods of interpretation. The legitima-
cy demand is that of whether the argumentation used in each judgment fulfils the 
acceptability requirements and is, consequently, legitimate on the basis that the 
ECtHR’s interpretation follows the legal sources and methods of interpretation 
that stem from the common values and starting-points of the Convention system.
Since legitimacy is a rather open-ended and constantly changing concept to 
which scholars ascribe different meanings, it would be futile to attempt to formu-
late a definitive view of the ECtHR’s legitimacy that would be satisfactory to all. 
The ECtHR’s methods of interpretation and the need to maintain its legitimacy 
occupy the centre ground of this research, and, as a consequence so does its rea-
soning. The ECtHR’s arguments have been analysed in relation to the legitimacy 
requirement. Instead of attempting to provide a definitive answer to the question 
of how the ECtHR acquires its legitimacy, this research approaches the issue by 
looking at four different aspects of its legitimacy in various contexts and seeking 
to further develop the connection between legal reasoning and judicial legiti-
macy. 
3.2 STORY 1: LEGITIMACY OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
In this story the element of sources of law are analysed in more detail. The posi-
tive obligations interpretation is by its nature already acceptable since positive 
obligations have been derived from the ‘practical and effective’ method of inter-
pretation, which seeks to protect everyone’s human rights in practice. However, 
the principle of proportionality must be kept in mind when imposing positive 
obligations. The ECtHR’s interpretations concerning positive obligations have 
264  In general, legal systems can hardly be regarded as isolated from other legal systems and legal issues 
are more or less similar across systems. This gives a fruitful basis for the use of sources of law from 
other legal systems. For more on this, see Glenn 2004, at 218–219.   
265  It is challenging to evaluate the rightness of the outcome of a judgment since well-known contradic-
tions may be involved, such as the fact that different human rights may conflict with one another, see 
Koskenniemi 2003, at 366–367.
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drifted rather far from the text of the Convention. This story highlights the need 
to affirm that the obligations the ECtHR imposes on states can be seen legitimate 
and acceptable. 
The Convention itself contains only a few positive obligations, such as the right 
to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and the duty to hold elections un-
der Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. These are, however, exceptional and the general 
rule is that the articles of the Convention are constructed around negative obliga-
tions. This means that the state will not interfere (as in the right to privacy under 
Article 8). The ECtHR has, however, derived from the effectiveness principle that 
even those provisions that do not explicitly lay down a positive obligation may 
sometimes impose a duty to act in a particular way. Positive obligations have been 
created as a consequence of applying ‘practical and effective’ interpretation of the 
Convention to protect the rights of individuals.266 In the ‘positive obligations’ article 
I sought to demonstrate that the ECtHR has not hesitated to create new positive 
obligations. At the same time, however, the fair balance test has been neglected.
The ‘positive obligations’ article noted that:
In order that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are realisable and functional… 
[positive obligations] must not create too great a burden on states. For the European 
Court of Human Rights this means that the proportionality test must step in to weigh 
up the competing public and private interests when deciding both the existence and 
content of a new positive obligation.267 
Proportionality is frequently used when testing whether limitations on the pro-
tected rights, which usually impose negative obligations on states, are justified. 
The article argued that:
…when deciding whether the Convention imposes a positive obligations and what that 
obligation entails, the European Court of Human Rights should use the same proportional-
ity principles as when it decides whether an interference with a protected right is permissible. 
In other words, the European Court of Human Rights’ analysis of positive obligations 
should be done using the same exercise of weighing up public and private interest as 
applied to negative obligations because negative and positive obligations are closely 
connected and strive towards the same goal – to secure the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.268
As early as the 1980s the ECtHR stated that a fair balance must be struck between 
the general interests of the community and the interests of the individual when 
266  Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 539–540; more on positive obligations, see e.g. Shelton 
2013; Lavrysen 2014; Xenos 2012; Hajiyev 2011; Klatt 2011; Costa 2008.
267  Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 542. However, the idea of weighing, which is inherent 
in proportionality analyses, does not have the same relevance in respect of all rights (e.g. it is highly 
questionable that the prohibition of torture provided for in Article 3 could be weighed against public 
interests).
268  Ibid., at 538 (emphasis added).
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determining positive obligations.269 It has also stressed that the positive obliga-
tion must be interpreted in a way that does not impose an impossible or dispro-
portionate burden on the states.270 The fair balance test it has developed in the 
context of positive obligations has focused mainly on the right to a private life 
(Article 8). The test seeks to achieve a justified decision as to the existence and 
requirements of positive obligations.271
In 2002 the ECtHR endorsed a fair balance test to determine the existence of 
positive obligations in relation to Article 8 of the Convention.272 This test has also 
been applied in relation to other provisions of the Convention. For instance, the 
ECtHR has been asked to rule on whether Article 10, which covers freedom of 
speech, imposes a positive obligation on the state to protect members of the press 
from violent attacks.273
In summary, the fair balance test emerges as a judicial method for determin-
ing the existence of individual positive obligations, addresses what that obli-
gation entails, and decides whether the positive obligation has been complied 
with.274 The article urged that:
… the fair balance test should undoubtedly be used on a regular basis where positive 
obligations are concerned. This way it will be ensured that the positive obligations 
can be accepted and complied with by states. The same principle should be applied as 
matter of routine as those that are relied on when dealing with negative obligations.275
However, case analysis shows that the test is not used consistently in all positive 
obligations cases. In Ramsahai, heard by the Grand Chamber, the positive obli-
gations under Article 2 (right to life) of the Convention were broadened.276 The 
case demonstrated how the ECtHR interprets the Convention so that the rights it 
contains will be ‘practical and effective’ rather than ‘theoretical or illusory’. The 
key question was whether the ECtHR properly applied the fair balance test when 
deciding on the existence of positive obligations.277 The case focused particularly 
on the effectiveness of the investigation of the matter at hand, and the obliga-
tions related to this investigation, in the light of the procedural obligations under 
Article 2. The Grand Chamber concluded that there was an obligation to conduct 
an investigation that was both adequate and independent, and held by a majority 
ruling that both these requirements had been violated. It also came to the rather 
stringent conclusion that an investigation is inadequate if any kind of failure or 
neglect has occurred in respect of any part of it.
269  Rees v. The United Kingdom (1986); James v. The United Kingdom (1986).
270  Osman v. The United Kingdom (1998), para. 116.
271  For more on this, see Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 545–546.
272  Christine Goodwin v. The United Kingdom (2002), para. 72.
273  Özgür Gündem v. Turkey (2000), para. 43.
274  Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 546.
275  Ibid.
276  Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands (2007).
277  Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 547.
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The dissenting opinion of four judges criticised this part of the judgment, stat-
ing that the procedural requirements under Article 2 were already a well-estab-
lished part of the ECtHR’s case law and there was no need to change that. The 
dissenting opinion went on to say that the case law made it clear that an inves-
tigation may satisfy the Convention requirements of effectiveness or adequacy 
even if it has not been shown that all possible investigative measures have been 
taken. Furthermore, a lacuna or deficiency in an investigation will give rise to a 
breach of the procedural obligation only if this in fact undermines its capacity to 
establish the facts surrounding the killing. The dissenting opinion also pointed 
out that the assessment must be made in light of the particular circumstances of 
each case.278
The ‘positive obligations’ article criticised this case on the ground that it raises 
the threshold of adequate investigation too high:
From the state’s perspective, the requirement of an adequate investigation has been 
raised relatively high. One can ask whether the obligation to have an adequate inves-
tigation has now been developed too high by the European Court of Human Rights. 
It can be stated that it is unreasonable burden on the state, if any failure at any stage of 
the investigation may cause a violation of art. 2…279
The ECtHR’s reasoning contains significant omissions. It entirely fails to assess 
procedural duties in terms of proportionality and the ruling contains no signs 
of the fair balance test. It is a fair criticism that the ECtHR leapt too quickly to 
the conclusion that the defects in the investigation were a breach of the positive 
obligations under Article 2.280 The conclusion of the case analysis was as follows:
If the European Court of Human Rights had used more of the tools which the propor-
tionality principles offers [sic] (such as objective suitability, necessity and reasonable-
ness of the positive obligations) and explained why stricter procedural obligations were 
necessary the decision would have been more convincing and justified.281
Lastly, the ‘positive obligations’ article concluded that the ECtHR is now in a cru-
cial position as regards the development of positive obligations:
Now it is crucial for the European Court of Human Rights to stop and consider posi-
tive obligations as a whole before choosing to expand them disproportionately under 
art.2. If the trend stays in the direction of expanding the obligations without taking 
competing interest into consideration, states will be in serious trouble as will be the 
whole credibility of the Convention system. It is basic fact that the duties and obliga-
278  Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Costa, Sir Nicholas Bratza, Lorenzen and Thomassen. For 
more on this, see Dahlberg (‘positive obligations’ article), at 547–549.
279  Ibid., at 549.
280  Ibid.
281  Ibid.
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tions which are imposed on the states must be bearable and feasible – in that way the 
corresponding rights are also effective.282
Particularly in terms of its legitimacy, the ECtHR should pay serious attention to the 
justifiability of positive obligations. The reason for this is that if positive obligations 
are openly weighed from the proportionality point of view, they will therefore be 
justified and may be accepted by the states. In addition, the overall legal argumen-
tation regarding the extension and evaluation of positive obligations is relevant. 
Application of the proportionality principle makes the ECtHR openly weigh up 
competing interests concerning whether or not to extend obligations. This may 
therefore lead to the use of pro and contra argumentation and to more open and 
transparent argumentation in general, which may in turn result in the justification 
of positive obligations. The proportionality principle is linked to legitimacy:
In order retain the credibility of the European Court of Human Rights, and the whole 
Convention system, the proportionality approach must permanently step in as regards 
positive obligations to protect life. The principle of proportionality is the only legiti-
mate way to approach the questions of whether positive obligations exist, to what 
extend and whether the state has complied with them.283
Sources of law and methods of interpretation
Legal sources provide the key to evaluating Ramsahai in relation to the accept-
ability requirements. However, in fact the ECtHR relied only on its previous case 
law to determine the principles applicable to the case.284 In particular, it made 
reference to Nachova, in which it had defined the obligations in respect of effec-
tive investigation under Article 2; and to Anguelova, which also dealt with obliga-
tions under Article 2.285 It also found support from its previous case law when 
examining the effectiveness of the investigation.286 Tahsin Acar, a Grand Chamber 
judgment in which the core elements of the effectiveness of investigation were 
formulated, was of particular relevance in this regard,287 and the issue of the in-
dependence of the police investigation was also based on several of the ECtHR’s 
previous judgments.288 The judgment given in Aktaş provides an example of the 
ECtHR’s case law in which inspection was held not to comply with the require-
ments under Article 2.289
282  Ibid., at 550.
283  Ibid.
284  Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands (2007), para. 321. Here the source of law is Nachova and Others 
v. Bulgaria (2005), paras. 110, 112-113.
285  Anguelova v. Bulgaria (2002), para. 140.
286  Ibid., paras. 324-325. Here the source of law is the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Tahsin Acar v. 
Turkey, 26307/95, 8 April 2004, GC, para. 223.
287  Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (2004), especially paras. 222-223.
288  Ibid., paras. 333-341. Here the sources of law are: Aktaş v. Turkey (2003), para 301; Hugh Jordan v. 
The United Kingdom (2001), para. 120; McKerr v. The United Kingdom (2001), para. 128; Romijn v. The 
Netherlands (2005).
289  Aktaş v. Turkey (2003), para. 301.
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The ECtHR stated that supervision by another authority, however independ-
ent, is not a sufficient safeguard of the independence of the investigation, and re-
ferred to the judgments in Hugh Jordan290 and McKerr291 in this regard. These cases 
are highly relevant to the ECtHR’s argumentation. Its reference to the Romijn case 
is also significant, in respect of which it noted the statement made by the Minister 
of Justice to Parliament to the effect that the the Netherlands’ National Police 
Internal Investigations Department are able to appear on the scene within, on 
average, no more than an hour and a half.292 The ECtHR concluded that: ‘[s]een in 
this light, a delay of no less than fifteen and a half hours is unacceptable.’293
This evaluation of the adequacy of the investigation was not, however, based 
on any legal sources, but rather on the facts of the case,294 as was the evaluation of 
the role of the public prosecutor.295 In these instances the ECtHR’s interpretation 
should have been based on legal sources and not just in the facts. Acceptability 
requires that the interpretation be based on several legal sources in order to con-
vince the audience. The identification of several legal sources that point in the 
same direction offers greater prospects of convincing the audience than an inter-
pretation based only on the facts of the case.296
Furthermore, I argue that the ECtHR could base its interpretation on more 
than simply its own previous case law. It could use other international legal 
sources, such as the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or 
the decisions of the UN Human Rights Committee. That said, the case law of the 
ECtHR on which the interpretation was based is wholly relevant.
As regards the substantial part of Article 2, the method of interpretation 
used in Ramsahai was based on the ‘no more than absolutely necessary’ require-
ment. The ECtHR has stated that the use of force under Article 2 must be no 
more than ‘absolutely necessary’ to achieve one of the purposes defined in the 
sub-paragraphs of the Article.297 It has also emphasised that the use of the term 
‘absolutely necessary’ in Article 2(2) indicates that a stricter and more compelling 
test of necessity must be employed than that normally applicable when determin-
ing whether state action is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ under the second 
paragraph of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention.298 The interpretation of the strict 
proportionality test to evaluate the violation of the right to life has its foundation 
on respect for human rights. Consequently, it is clearly based on the common 
starting-point and principal value of the Convention system.
290  Hugh Jordan v. The United Kingdom (2001), para. 120.
291  McKerr v. The United Kingdom (2001), para. 128.
292  Romijn v. The Netherlands (2005).
293  Ramsahai and Others v. The Netherlands (2007), para. 339.
294  Ibid., paras. 326-332.
295  Ibid., paras. 342-346.
296  There may well be situations where no legal sources are available on which to base the judgment, 
in which case acceptability may be gained through argumentation and by openly stating the lack of 
legal sources. 
297  Ibid., para. 286.
298  Ibid., para. 287.
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In respect of the procedural aspect of Article 2, the chosen method of interpre-
tation is ‘practical and effective’ interpretation. The ECtHR referred to its previ-
ous case law:
The obligation to protect the right to life under Article 2 of the Convention, read in 
conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to ‘secure to 
everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’, 
requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation 
when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force…299
This method of interpretation, which is based on the ‘practical and effective’ ap-
proach, is fully in line with the protection of human rights, which is the main 
starting-point and principal value of the Convention system. Consequently, it 
fulfils the acceptability requirement. However, the general legal principle of pro-
portionality has been totally ignored when applying the positive obligations doc-
trine. This is a consequence of the lack of an adequate range of sources of law: 
the general legal principle of proportionality should have been taken as a source 
of law in the reasoning and this would have also affected the interpretation of 
positive obligations.
In sum, the interpretation carried out in Ramsahai does not entirely fulfil the 
sources of law requirements, which is to the effect that interpretation should be 
based on several coherent legal sources. Some of the interpretations made were 
based only on the facts of the case, which by no means fulfils the acceptability 
requirements. Furthermore, the scope of the legal sources used was rather in-
adequate and other potential legal sources could have been taken into account, 
including other international texts and practices as well as general principles of 
law. The second requirement was partially fulfilled, since the chosen interpre-
tive methods (‘practical and effective’ and positive obligations interpretation 
methods) are generally accepted in the political community and are based on the 
starting-point of the protection of human rights. However, the proportionality 
principle should have been taken into account in the interpretation of positive 
obligations. As a result, the ECtHR did not entirely achieve judicial legitimacy 
in this case because, by neglecting the principle of proportionality as a source of 
law, the judgment lacks full acceptability.
3.3 STORY 2: LEGITIMACY AND COMPARATIVE 
REASONING
In this story, the starting-point is that the requirement of sources of law is fulfilled 
since comparative argumentation is based on different sources of law drawn from 
different legal systems. Thus, when using comparative reasoning the focus is on 
299  Ibid., para. 321.
63
methods of interpretation, and in particular on the different ways in which the 
ECtHR uses comparative argumentation.
The ‘comparative argumentation’ article asserts that the use of the compara-
tive method is closely linked to the rules of interpretation set out in Articles 31 to 
33 and, more specifically, in Article 31(3) of the VCLT. The article demonstrated 
that the ECtHR uses comparative argumentation in various ways, and too as its 
starting-point the fact that one can identify many different reasons for using com-
parative legal reasoning to interpret the Convention as well as the aims such use 
might be designed to achieve. The legal literature connects the ECtHR’s legiti-
macy with comparative legal reasoning, and claims that the latter increases the 
former.300 However, the article argues that that the acquisition of legitimacy by 
the ECtHR was not that simple, but that attention should also be paid to what 
kind of comparative reasoning supports the ECtHR’s legitimacy.301
Four different ways in which the ECtHR uses comparative reasoning were 
identified in the article: (1) cognitive; (2) decorative; (3) directional; and (4) deci-
sive.302 The different functions were described in the following way:
The first way of using comparative law is for cognitive purposes: comparative material 
is present at the preliminary fact-finding stage, but no further references exist in the 
later reasoning of the Court. Secondly, comparative law can be used in a decorative 
way. This means that comparative law material is briefly referred to in the reasoning 
without going into further depth. Thirdly, comparative law can softly steer the inter-
pretation in a certain direction. Here comparative material is directly referred to in 
the reasoning and there is therefore a link between the comparative material and the 
chosen interpretation. Fourthly, comparative material can play a decisive role, where 
the Court clearly states that the chosen interpretation is a direct result of the findings 
of the comparative material.303
I concluded by saying this about the use of comparative argumentation in the 
ECtHR’s case law:
The Court uses comparative argumentation rather regularly when the margin of ap-
preciation is in question, when the issue is new in the ECHR context, or when there 
is no settled case law by the Court. In addition, when attitudes have changed at the 
international and European level, comparative reasoning is frequently considered. 304
300  See e.g. Wildhaber – Hjartarson – Donnelly 2013, at 251. On the comparative law method as an 
important legitimatory source for the pronouncements of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 
see Jacob 2014, at 16; Lenaerts 2003.
301  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 2. More on comparative argumentation of the 
ECtHR, see e.g. Wildhaber 2013.
302  On the use of comparative law generally, see e.g. Smits 2006, at 514–530. On the comparative reason-
ing in European supreme courts, see Bobek 2013.
303  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 4. For more detail as to the functions, see ibid., 
at 9–35.
304  Ibid., at 36.
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The ECtHR rather typically uses argumentation based on the legal sources 
of Contracting States’ legislation and practices (so-called ‘consensus argumenta-
tion’) in order to make the interpretation more acceptable. However, as the ‘com-
parative argumentation’ article demonstrated, what the ECtHR actually means 
by consensus is open to interpretation:
In some cases the Court emphasises the same practices and principles that must be found 
in the Contracting States in order to establish the consensus; in others a clear common 
tendency and trend is enough for the consensus to exist, even though the national solu-
tions and exceptions may differ. Considering the possible deficiencies and actual errors 
of the comparative law analysis provided to the Court, one should be careful not to put 
too much weight on the similarities or differences of the principles or practices found in 
each Contracting State.305 It may be more fruitful to search for common attitudes than to 
put too much weight on the details in national legislative solutions.306
The article evaluated the different ways to use comparative law material from 
the justifiability point of view and addressed the question of whether the use of 
comparative argumentation makes the judgment more legitimate. As regards the 
cognitive function, I wrote that:
…use of comparative material solely for cognitive purposes does not, in my opinion, 
actually enhance the substantial legitimacy of the judgments. The informative section 
does not make the judgment clearer if this section is not openly used in the reason-
ing. On the contrary, the list of the comparative and international material presented 
obscures what role they in fact had in the interpretation. In addition, the comparative 
material is rarely univocal, and may give arguments both for and against. In these 
cases it is especially confusing and unclear as to what role comparative information 
had in the judgment.307
The decorative way of using comparative argumentation was not seen as being as 
questionable as it had appeared at first sight:
The decorative way shows that comparative material has played a role in at least cer-
tain parts of the judgment, and often this is sufficient to indicate to the audience that 
comparative material has influenced this part of the interpretation. Compared to the 
cognitive function, decorative use tells more about the impact of the comparative ma-
terial on the interpretation. From this angle, the decorative way – when leaning to 
comparative authoritative sources – actually makes the interpretation more justifiable 
and legitimate.308
305  See how the comparative law survey is provided for the ECtHR, e.g. Dzehtsiarou – Lukashevich 
2012, at 273–274. 
306  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 36. On determination of consensus by the ECtHR, 
see Wildhaber – Hjartarson – Donnelly 2013, at 256–259.
307  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 36–37.
308  Ibid., at 37.
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The article concluded that there was not that big a difference between the direc-
tional and decisive functions. Sometimes it is only a question of the gradation 
and differences in perspective. Furthermore, the article continued:
More interesting is that in both cases comparative arguments have an unquestionably 
significant role next to other legal arguments. Comparative reasoning is not something 
to be afraid of; on the contrary, it is something to use in order for the interpretation to 
be justified, accepted, and seen as legitimate.309
Consequently from the judicial legitimacy point of view, the problem seems to be 
the cognitive way of using comparative reasoning. In this case, the comparative 
material is present but is not used at all in the ECtHR’s reasoning.310 Since accept-
ability requirements emphasise that the legal interpretation should meet certain 
criteria, it follows that these should be laid down explicitly in the legal argumen-
tation (not just in the background material).
The decorative, directional and decisive ways of using comparative legal rea-
soning have considerable potential to fulfil the acceptability requirements. In com-
parative legal reasoning, a broad view is taken of legal sources – i.e. the ECtHR’s 
previous case law is not the only legal source – and the wide range of such sources 
also commonly supports ‘practical and effective’ or ‘common ground’ interpreta-
tions, both of which are generally accepted in the Convention system and support 
the main starting-point in respect of the protection of human rights. 
Sources of law and methods of interpretation
From the acceptability requirements point of view, comparative reasoning seems 
to have great potential: interpretation is based on various international and com-
parative legal sources. For example, in Wagner the ECtHR used several coher-
ent legal sources in its reasoning, including its previous case law, the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child311, and a recommendation of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.312 Furthermore, the interpreta-
tion method used in the judgment was based on ‘living instrument’ interpretation: 
the Convention was taken to be ‘a living instrument and must be interpreted in the 
light of the present-day conditions’.313 ‘Living instrument’ interpretation is gener-
ally accepted in the legal community and is based on the main starting-point and 
principal value of the protection of human rights. Consequently, both of the accept-
ability requirements were fulfilled and the ECtHR achieved legitimacy.
The case of Konstantin Markin is a good example of the way in which the ECtHR 
may use comparative reasoning to achieve legitimacy.314 In this case, the Grand 
309  Ibid., at 37–38.
310  On the cognitive function, see ibid., at 11–15.
311  CRC, UNTS Vol. No. 1577, came into force on 2 September 1990.
312  Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg (2007), paras. 118-135.   
313  Ibid., para. 135. For more on this judgment, see Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 
19–20. 
314  Konstantin Markin v. Russia (2012) GC.  
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Chamber addressed the issue of parental leave under Article 14 of the Convention 
(freedom from discrimination) taken in conjunction with Article 8 (the right to pri-
vate and family life). The Grand Chamber used different legal sources in its reason-
ing, including its previous case law, the case law and legislation of the Contracting 
states and the EU, and the ILO Convention.315 Furthermore, it applied the ‘common 
ground’ method by finding that the relevant international and comparative law 
material demonstrates that in the majority of European countries parental leave 
may be taken by both men and women. The ECtHR opined that it ‘cannot overlook 
the widespread and consistently developing views’ concerning this issue.316 Both 
the various coherent legal sources available and the generally accepted method of 
interpretation are based on the common starting-point of protecting human rights 
within the Convention system. Consequently, the acceptability requirements in re-
spect of the judgment were met and the ECtHR achieved legitimacy.
In practice, however, the use of a large amount of legal sources does not neces-
sarily lead to ‘dynamic’ or ‘common ground’ interpretations of the Convention 
provisions. For example, in Vinter, a broad approach to legal sources was taken, 
which included the ECtHR’s previous case law as well as that of the Contracting 
States, the United States and Canada.317 The comparative survey conducted by 
the ECtHR indicated clear opposition to whole life sentences in Europe. However, 
the ECtHR did not take the view that this should have an impact on the case. 
It referred instead to Canadian case law and identified when sentencing would 
be ‘grossly disproportionate’.318 Its interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention 
(prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) in 
relation to the case of life sentences did not follow its generally accepted meth-
ods of interpretation. Rather than relying on ‘practical and effective’ or ‘common 
ground’ interpretation, the ECtHR instead emphasised the ‘grossly dispropor-
tionate’ requirement when evaluating life sentences in terms of Article 3. This 
approach is not a commonly accepted method of interpretation in respect of the 
Convention system and fails to represent the starting-point and principal value 
of the Convention system – the protection of human rights.319
Comparative material was of central importance in Sitaropoulos.320 The ques-
tion at issue was whether Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention was vio-
lated when two Greek nationals were not able to vote in the Greek Parliamentary 
elections from abroad. Significantly, comparative law material was taken into ac-
count in the ECtHR’s reasoning. It came to rather interesting conclusions. Firstly, 
it found that that the great majority of Contracting States allow their citizens to 
315  Ibid., paras. 129-148.
316  Ibid., para. 140. For more on this judgment, see Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 
30–31.
317  Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom (2012), paras. 87-94.
318  Ibid., para. 93. For more on this judgment, see Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 27–28.
319  This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which decided that the requirements of Article 3 had 
not been met in relation to any of the three applicants; see the Grand Chamber’s judgment of 9 July 
2013. As a result, the Grand Chamber’s decision was contrary to that of the Chamber.
320  Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (2012).
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vote from abroad. Secondly, it looked at how this is arranged, and found that 
arrangements for the exercise of expatriates’ voting rights varied between the 
Contracting States. The ECtHR accordingly found that there was no consensus 
between the Contracting States on the matter at hand.321
This takes us back to the question of what is actually meant by ‘common ground’ 
or ‘consensus’ between Contracting States? European consensus, basically, means 
that there is a common understanding or clear trend concerning the issue at hand. 
However, it is rather misleading to state that this means that all the countries in-
volved must have similar arrangements in place to deal with this issue. On the 
contrary, European consensus arguably involves a broader perspective on how the 
Contracting States react to the issue before them, not a narrow focus on the techni-
cal solution they adopt. The ECtHR, however, became entangled in such technicali-
ties and accordingly failed to take a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the 
right to vote. As a result, the Grand Chamber unanimously concluded that there 
had been no breach of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.322
In sum, the cognitive way of using comparative argumentation is not legitimate 
because the sources of law stay in the background material and are not explicitly 
part of the interpretation, while in the other ways of using comparative reasoning 
(the decorative, directional and decisive functions), comparative sources of law ex-
plicitly form part of the interpretation.323 In this story, methods of interpretation are 
repeatedly problematic with respect to judicial legitimacy: the ECtHR does not al-
ways use rights-centred methods of interpretation, even though the various sourc-
es of law commonly support ‘practical and effective’ protection of human rights.
3.4 STORY 3: LEGITIMATE SOCIAL RIGHTS 
INTERPRETATIONS
In this story, sources of law are the main challenge from the legitimacy point of 
view. The ECtHR may have used various international sources of law, but this 
may not be apparent in the interpretation it provides. The methods of interpreta-
tion used are basically legitimate since dynamic rights-centred interpretations 
are the main way to include social rights in the ECtHR’s case law.
The story focuses on the ECtHR’s interpretations concerning social rights. In 
fact, social rights are not formally covered under the Convention, which relates 
essentially to civil and political rights. The Council of Europe’s legal system, how-
ever, protects economic and social rights under the European Social Charter.324 
321  Ibid., paras. 74-75. ‘As to the arrangements for exercising that right put in place by those Council of 
Europe member States that allow voting from abroad, there is currently a wide variety of approaches.’ 
(para. 75). For more on this judgment, see Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 21–24.
322  Dahlberg (‘comparative argumentation’ article), at 23. See also Dzehtsiarou 2011.
323  Cf. Dzehtsiarou – Lukashevich 2012, at 278 where they argue that the pure existence of compara-
tive law data in informative manner increases the legitimacy of the ECtHR per se since it shows the 
stakeholders that the decision is well informed. 
324  European Social Charter (revised), CETS No. 163, came into force on 1 July 1999.
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To this extent, the picture seems initially clear. However, investigation of the 
ECtHR’s case law in relation to civil and political rights reveals that it frequently 
takes socio-economic rights into account when interpreting the Convention. In 
sum, while at treaty level two different instruments cover two sets of rights, the 
ECtHR does not strictly apply this distinction in its case law.325
The ECtHR’s methods of interpretation allow it to include social rights within 
the ambit of the Convention. For example, by applying the principle of effective-
ness and ‘living instrument’ interpretation, as well as the method of positive ob-
ligations, weight may be put on socio-economic rights even though they do not 
feature in the text of the Convention.326
The question posed in the article was:
Since economic and social rights are not initially included in the Convention, is it 
legitimate for the Court to include them? It has been argued that the development of 
economic and social norms and procedures should go hand-in-hand with legitimacy-
enhancing strategies. This point of view stresses, on the one hand, the need to restrain 
over-anxious human rights interpretations and, on the other hand, that to avoid stick-
ing to the drafters’ intentions. Accordingly, the article argues that legitimate interpreta-
tions can be found somewhere in between.327
The ECtHR’s inclusion of social rights within the ambit of the Convention has 
been heavily criticised. It has been claimed that that the ECtHR has gone too far 
with regard to incorporating socio-economic rights within the Convention. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, others consider that interpreting the Convention in 
a dynamic way is the only way of gaining legitimacy.328
The ECtHR’s praxis has been far from transparent. It frequently de facto incor-
porates socio-economic rights within the Convention by means of broad inter-
pretation of civil and political rights while, at the same time, emphasising that 
the Convention does not cover socio-economic rights. The ‘social rights’ article 
argues that the ECtHR’s action illustrates that the incorporation of social rights 
within the Convention through a broad interpretation of civil and political rights 
is not a clearly defined process even for the ECtHR itself.329
The aim of the ‘social rights’ article was:
…to analyse the arguments concerning social rights in the Court’s interpretation of 
the Convention’s provisions. In addition, it was examined the question how the Court 
legitimises its interpretations concerning social rights when the text of the Convention 
does not include social rights.330
325  Dahlberg (‘social rights’ article), at 252–253.
326  Ibid.
327  Ibid., at 253.
328  Ibid., and references therein.
329  Ibid. 
330  Ibid.
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If legitimacy is understood in a purely formal and strictly conservative sense, it is 
not legitimate to imply economic and social rights into the Convention. But if it is 
instead understood in a substantive sense, the chain of reasoning is no longer that 
simple. Substance legitimacy emphasises that the content of the judgment must 
be justified and acceptable in order to be legitimate, and leads one to evaluate the 
legal reasoning given in the judgment.
In my article on social rights I took the view that legitimacy means the extent to 
which the ECtHR has fulfilled the promise of its constitutive legitimacy through its 
decisions and through the interpretative principles that guide its decision-making 
processes. The focus is on how well the ECtHR is perceived to actually protect hu-
man rights. This view of legitimacy focuses on the ECtHR’s performance, through 
which it either contributes to or detracts from its legitimacy. In the context of the 
ECtHR, normative performance legitimacy means focusing on its argumentation.331
In addition to taking normative performance legitimacy as a starting-point, the 
article also took into account the principle of the indivisibility of human rights. 
This means that ‘all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent 
and interrelated’,332 and that the distinction between different categories of hu-
man rights, such as for instance civil, political or social rights, should not lead 
to watertight compartmentalisation. This is also the reason why the Convention 
cannot totally isolate itself from the influence of social rights.333
The article categorises social rights arguments under five Convention 
provisions:334 (1) Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment);335 (2) Article 8 (respect for private and family life);336 
(3) Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (right to possession);337 (4) Article 11 (freedom of 
association);338 and (5) Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement).339
The article concluded that:
The analysis of case law shows that the Court has evolved rich case law praxis in the 
field of social rights. Although the Convention does not cover social rights, this has 
not stopped the Court from including social rights within the Convention’s provisions. 
The Court has openly broadened the traditional scope of Convention provisions and 
incorporated social rights within the civil and political rights.340 
331  For more on this see ibid., at 254.
332  Vienna Declaration, World Conference of Human Rights, 14-15 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24, 
para. 5.
333  Dahlberg (‘social rights’ article), at 254–255.
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340  Ibid., at 272.
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However, I emphasised that the incorporation should be done in an overt and 
transparent way: ‘If the ECtHR fails to acknowledge the true arguments which 
led it to support social rights in its decisions, then there is much to criticise in rela-
tion to considerations of legal certainty and justifiability.’341
The article also contains an example from the CJEU which likewise incorpo-
rates social rights within its case law. The case law of both the ECtHR and the 
CJEU show a clear trend in which social rights are increasingly included in the 
interpretation of the applicable law.342 
Lastly the ‘social rights’ article went back to the question it originally posed, 
which was whether it is legitimate for the ECtHR to read social rights into inter-
pretations of the Convention. This question was answered as follows:
The answer is two-fold. Firstly, in order for the incorporation of social rights to be le-
gitimate, the reasoning must be overt and transparent and the arguments, both for and 
against, must be stated. Secondly, justification of the extended interpretations should 
be based on widely adopted international instruments. Furthermore, additional weight 
should be placed on the matter of whether the majority of the Contracting States have 
approved that line of interpretation. Similarities in case law praxis concerning social 
rights’ protection across the European Union is one way in which the legitimacy of the 
incorporation of social rights into the Convention by the European Court of Human 
Rights is increased. When both of the European courts are on the same side, it is hard 
to argue to the contrary.343
Sources of law and methods of interpretation
Analysing social rights cases in terms of the acceptability requirements shifts 
the focus to legal sources and methods of interpretation. The ECtHR’s method of 
treating social rights as part of the Convention is frequently based on its gener-
ally accepted methods of interpretation (such as the ‘practical and effective’ and 
‘common ground’ methods). For example, in the case of M.S.S. it used consensus 
argumentation.344 It stated that: ‘[there is] existence of a broad consensus at the 
international and European level concerning this need for special protection, as 
evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR 
and the standards set out in the Reception Directive’.345 Consequently, several 
coherent legal sources were used by the ECtHR in its interpretation. This judg-
ment clearly demonstrates how the ECtHR achieves judicial legitimacy by ful-
filling the acceptability requirements in its interpretation: both the legal sources 
and the method of interpretation are based on the common starting-point of the 
Convention system – the protection of human rights.
341  Ibid., at 272–273.
342  Ibid., at 273–274.
343  Ibid., at 274.
344  The ECtHR does not explicitly mention positive obligations, but the partly concurring and partly 
dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó shows that it in fact applies them (see Partly concurring and partly 
dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011), at 103). On consensus argumen-
tation see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011), para. 251.
345  Ibid., para. 251. For more on this, see Dahlberg (‘social rights’ article), at 259–260.
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There are, however, rather often shortcomings in the manner in which the 
ECtHR uses legal sources. For example, in Kurić, comprehensive material drawn 
from different comparative and international legal sources was used as back-
ground material. This included the European Convention on Nationality346, 
the Council of Europe’s Convention on the Avoidance of Stateless in rela-
tion to State Succession347, the United Nation’s Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness348.349 However, none of this material found their way into the 
ECtHR’s reasoning. Instead, it employed interpretations of ‘practical and effec-
tive’ and positive obligations based on generally accepted methods of interpreta-
tion in the Convention system.350
The case of Tatishvili provides an example of the failure to use several coherent 
legal sources as well as the commonly accepted methods of interpretation used 
in social rights judgments.351 In this case, the ECtHR used its previous case law 
and that of the respondent state’s constitutional court as its only legal sources.352 
It concluded that the binding interpretation of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation had been disregarded by the domestic authorities in the case. 
Consequently, the breach of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 was not ‘in accordance 
with the law’ and the violation was clear without further evaluation. However, 
by invoking positive obligations, the ECtHR could have incorporated social rights 
under the provision on liberty of movement and its argumentation would have 
been based more directly on the protection of human rights. However, the case 
was rather simple (an easy case) and one could argue that the ECtHR did not have 
to use all the available means to find an acceptable interpretation.353
In the field of social rights interpretations, the ECtHR holds all the keys to achiev-
ing acceptable interpretation, and consequently judicial legitimacy. Firstly, there are 
various coherent comparative and international legal sources on social rights avail-
able on which the ECtHR may base its interpretations. These include the European 
Social Charter, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union354, and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights355.
Secondly, the commonly accepted methods of interpretation, such as the ‘practi-
cal and effective’, ‘positive obligations’ and ‘common ground’ methods, offer means 
346  CETS No. 166, came into force on 1 March 2000.
347  CETS No. 200, came into force on 1 May 2009.
348  UNTS Vol. No. 989, came into force on 13 December 1975.
349  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (2012), paras. 216-228.
350  Ibid., para 358: ‘[Article 8 of the Convention] does not merely compel the State to abstain from such 
interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in 
effective “respect” for private or family life or both... .’ For more on this, see Dahlberg (‘social rights’ 
article), at 261–262.
351  Tatishvili v. Russia (2007).
352  Ibid., para. 53. For more on this, see Dahlberg (‘social rights’ article), at 271–272.
353  The distinction between easy and hard cases was made by Hart 1961. On the discussion of the dif-
ference between the justification of an easy case as compared to a hard case, see MacCormick 1994, at 
100; Peczenik 2009, at 14–15; Feteris 1999, at 73; Alexy 1989, at 223, Paso 2014, at 238–239.
354  OJ C 326, 26 October 2012, p. 391–407.
355  ICESC, UNTS Vol. No. 993, came into force on 3 January 1976.
72
of incorporating social rights within the Convention. As a result, for the sake of the 
ECtHR’s legitimacy, this should be done in reliance on its methods of interpretation 
and on several coherent international and comparative legal sources. In terms of 
the rational argumentation theory perspective, this is not a way for the ECtHR to 
lose but rather for it to gain acceptability and, ultimately, judicial legitimacy.
3.5 STORY 4: FORMAL LEGITIMACY VS. SUBSTANCE 
LEGITIMACY
From the point of view of judicial legitimacy, this story’s main concern relates to 
methods of interpretation. It reveals how formal legitimacy aspects may override 
rights-centred perspectives in the interpretation carried out by the ECtHR. This 
story also demonstrates that the relevance of source of law used in the judgment 
must be analysed before drawing any conclusions that depend on the scope of 
available legal sources.
This last story pits two opposite sides of legitimacy against each other. The 
fourth instance doctrine represents formal legitimacy, while the effective inter-
pretation of Article 6 of the Convention represents substance legitimacy. The 
‘fourth instance’ article focused on the tensions and problems involved in bal-
ancing the fourth instance doctrine against an expansive approach to the inter-
pretation of the right to a fair trial. It aimed to systemise the role of the fourth 
instance doctrine in fair trial cases and to critically evaluate its justifiability in 
such cases.356
The article explained the tension between formal and substance legitimacy:
[The fourth instance doctrine]…acts as a brake on the Court’s interpretations of the 
Convention by ensuring that it bears in mind the constitutional limits on its compe-
tence. From the fourth instance viewpoint, legitimacy is assessed in terms of formality, 
focusing on procedural steps as opposed to substance. If all the required procedural 
steps are taken at the national level, then no criticism is required. Consequently, the 
Court guarantees its own legitimacy through a formalistic approach in which it pays 
attention to procedural requirements only. By contrast, the legitimacy question mani-
fests itself differently when it comes to the interpretation of rights, in which the Court’s 
legitimacy is viewed from the opposite position.
As Letsas has recently argued the living instrument interpretation does not threaten 
the legitimacy of the Court. On the contrary, the Court loses legitimacy without it.357 
Legitimacy in this sense stresses substance, which means that the Court gains legiti-
macy by evaluating issues of content as opposed to purely procedural matters. It is not 
enough for the national authorities to take all necessary procedural steps, since the 
focus in this approach is on the content of these procedures.358
356  Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 90.
357  Letsas 2013, at 126, 141.
358  Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 91.
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The background of the fourth instance doctrine is explained:
The fourth instance doctrine stems from two main sources. Firstly, it is a simple matter 
of efficiency in the use of resources. Secondly, at the level of legitimacy, it is recognised 
that democratically non-accountable judges in Strasbourg should not use their juris-
diction to override national authorities.359 The main rule is clear: the facts of the case 
brought before the Court will not be questioned. This means in practice that the Court 
accepts that the national authorities investigate the facts of the case. However, if the 
national court’s decision violates the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention 
then it is necessary for the Court to step in.360
I emphasised that the fourth instance doctrine defines the limits within which a 
human rights interpretation can be made. In other words, it provides a starting-
point for later interpretation.361
The article divided fourth instance doctrine arguments under Article 6 of the 
Convention into four categories: (1) ‘clear fourth instance nature’; (2) ‘length of 
proceedings’; (3) ‘balancing approach’; (4) ‘disregard of fourth instance approach’.
The first two of these categories – ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of 
proceedings’ –related to easy cases and were thus unproblematic from a justifi-
ability viewpoint.362 Issues clearly of a fourth-instance nature should be ruled in-
admissible. In these cases, arguments concerning the provision of a fair trial had 
little weight. Issues concerning the length of the proceedings were also cut and 
dried. Little needs to be weighed up in order to conclude that the length of the 
proceedings had been unreasonable, since a decision by the ECtHR that proceed-
ings had taken too long does not go to the heart of the fourth instance doctrine.363 
However, the next two categories – ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ – showed the tensions and problems involved in balancing 
the fourth instance doctrine against an expansive approach to the interpretation 
of the right to a fair trial.364 In these hard cases, the ECtHR’s reasoning must be 
transparent and take both sides of the argument into account in order for the 
judgment to be justifiable and convincing.365
As regards the tension between the fourth instance doctrine and effective in-
terpretation of Article 6, I concluded that:
359  Arai-Takahashi 2001, at 235–236.
360  Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 95.
361  Ibid., at 97.
362  For more on the first category (‘clear fourth instance nature’), see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), 
at 99–101. For more on the second category (‘length of proceedings’), see ibid., at 101–103.
363  Ibid., at 115.
364  For more on the third category (‘balancing approach’), see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 
103–108. For more on the fourth category (‘disregard of fourth instance approach’), see ibid., at 108–115.
365  Ibid., at 116.
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…it is obvious that the Court cannot both strictly avoid acting as a fourth instance 
court and at the same time interpret the right to a fair trial provision effectively. Either 
it should apply a lower threshold in cases concerning the fourth instance doctrine and 
continue to interpret Article 6 in an effective manner, or it should stick with its strict 
fourth-instance formula and refrain from interpreting Article 6 in an effective way. 
The latter is by no means desirable or probable as far as the protection of human rights 
is concerned.366 
The article finally suggested a flexible and practical approach to the fourth in-
stance doctrine. It defined a flexible and practical approach as one:
…in which the Court interpreted it to mean that the state has authority to choose the 
measures needed to secure adequate and effective enforcement of judicial decisions.367 
A strict approach to the fourth instance doctrine threatens, in my opinion, the effective 
protection of human rights. If the starting point of legal interpretation is dominated 
by an extremely strict approach to the fourth instance doctrine, then it is on the wrong 
track from the outset.368
As to the justifiability of the categories of the fourth instance doctrine, I stressed 
that the ECtHR should continue using the fourth instance doctrine in the first two 
approaches: ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of proceedings’. However, 
the last two categories – ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of fourth instance 
approach’ – are more critical and complex, since the application of the fourth 
instance doctrine is a matter of balance as well as transparent reasoning as to the 
scope of the fourth instance doctrine in relation to the effective application of the 
right at issue. Strict application of the fourth instance doctrine, which is to the 
effect that there must be ‘something arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ in the 
domestic proceedings in order for the ECtHR to interfere, should not be used at 
all by the ECtHR.369 The phrase ‘arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ should be 
openly explained and evaluated on a case-by-case basis.’370
Sources of law and methods of interpretation
The evaluation of fourth instance cases in the light of acceptability requirements 
is revealing. In Tomić the ECtHR used its previous case law as a source of law,371 
and also referred to general legal principles: the rule of law and the legal certain-
ty.372 It could have broadened the range of legal sources to include other inter-
national legal praxis, such as that of the UN Human Rights Committee and the 
366  Ibid., at 117.
367  Pelipenko v. Russia (2012), para. 51. 
368  Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 118.
369  See e.g. Sebahattin Evcimen v. Turkey (2010), para. 26; Rybczyńscy v. Poland (2006), para. 37.
370  Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 118.
371  Tomić and Others v. Montenegro (2012), paras. 53-59.
372  Ibid., para. 53.
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights, because fourth instance questions are 
also familiar to such human rights bodies.373
The approach taken by the ECtHR to methods of interpretation in Tomić was 
rather narrow and took the fourth instance doctrine as a starting-point:
The Court reiterates that it is not its role to question the interpretation of the domestic 
law by the national courts. Similarly, it is not in principle its function to compare dif-
ferent decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently similar proceedings; it 
must respect the independence of those courts…374 
There are no signs here of effective fair trial interpretation.375 The fourth instance 
doctrine has been recognised as one of the common principles of the Convention 
system, which may guide the ECtHR’s interpretation in a certain direction. 
However, protection of human rights is the main starting-point and principal 
value of the Convention system. Other values, such as national sovereignty, come 
after this. The requirement of coherence in methods of interpretation means that 
effective interpretation of the fair trial provision should come before the fourth 
instance doctrine. As a result, making the fourth instance doctrine a starting-
point in the interpretation and ignoring the methods of interpretation which sup-
port the effective protection of human rights will cause both the individual judg-
ment to lose acceptability and the ECtHR to lose its judicial legitimacy.376
In Şahin, the fourth instance doctrine took precedence over the ‘practical and 
effective’ interpretation of Article 6 of the Convention.377 The case concerned 
whether the proceedings before the domestic courts were unfair under Article 
6(1) in circumstances where facts on which the proceedings were based could give 
rise to differing legal assessments from one court to another. The ECtHR took the 
fourth instance doctrine as a decisive principle378 and repeatedly reiterated that 
conflicting national case law does not automatically result in a violation of Article 
6(1) of the Convention.379 It emphasised that it had found no evidence of arbi-
trariness, stating that ‘examining the existence and the impact of such conflicting 
decisions does not mean examining the wisdom of the approach the domestic 
courts have chosen to take… its role… is limited to cases where the impugned de-
373  See e.g. Human Rights Committee, Communication Pillai v. Canada (2011), para. 11.2; Communication 
Masih v. Canada (2013), dissenting opinion of Committee member Mr. Shany, joined by Committee mem-
bers Mr. Flinterman, Mr. Kälin, Sir Rodley, Ms. Seibert-Fohr and Mr. Vardezelashvili, para. 2; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador (2012), para. 83; Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Marco Bienvenido Palma Mendoza et al. v. Ecuador (2011), para. 53.
374  Tomić and Others v. Montenegro (2012), para. 53.
375  See likewise Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey (2011), in which the Court’s interpretation took 
the fourth instance doctrine as a starting-point and there were no signs of ‘practical and effective’ 
interpretation of the fair trial provision.
376  For more on the evaluation of the judgment, see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 103–104.
377  Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey (2011).
378  Ibid., paras. 49-50, 68-70, 88.
379  Ibid., paras. 51, 88.
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cision is manifestly arbitrary’.380 It concluded that the ‘interpretation made by the 
Supreme Military Administrative Court… cannot be said to have been arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capable of affecting the fairness of the proceedings, but was sim-
ply a case of application of the domestic law’.381 Finally it stressed that its role: ‘it 
must avoid any unjustified interference in the exercise by the States of their judi-
cial functions or in the organisation of the judicial systems’.382 The ECtHR held 
that there had been no violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention.383
In Jovanović, however, the ECtHR interpreted the fair trial provision effective-
ly: ‘where such courts [of appeal or of cassation] exist the guarantees contained 
in Article 6 must be complied with, inter alia, by ensuring effective access to the 
courts’.384 It used its previous case law as the main source of law and also referred 
to general principles of law: the principle of legal and procedural certainty.385 It 
also openly stated the counter-argument concerning the fourth instance doctrine: 
‘It is, of course, primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to re-
solve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court’s role is not… 
to question it…’386 In this fourth-instance-related case, however, the method of 
interpretation based on effective protection of fair trial provision comes first.387
A positive obligation under Article 6 of the Convention to put in place a sys-
tem for enforcement of judgments arose in Pelipenko.388 The ECtHR noted that the 
state has a positive obligation to put in place a system for enforcement of judg-
ments that is effective both in law and in practice and that ensures their enforce-
ment without undue delay. It stated that ‘when final judgments are issued against 
“private” defendants, the State’s positive obligation consists of providing a legal 
arsenal allowing individuals to obtain, from their evading debtors, payment of 
sums awarded by those judgments’.389 It also emphasised that the state’s positive 
steps must be adequate and sufficient. Consequently, when it is established that 
measures taken by the national authorities were adequate and sufficient, the state 
cannot be held responsible for a ‘private’ defendant’s failure to pay the judgment 
debt.
The main method of interpretation of the fair trial provision is by means of 
the doctrine of positive obligations, as articulated on several occasions in the 
ECtHR’s reasoning.390 The practical and effective protection of human rights is 
the starting-point for the interpretation of positive obligations. Consequently, the 
380  Ibid., para. 89.
381  Ibid., para. 93.
382  Ibid., para. 94.
383  The majority vote was supported by ten judges, with seven dissenting. For more on the evaluation 
of the judgment, see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 104–106.
384  Jovanović v. Serbia (2012), para. 46.
385  Ibid., para. 50.
386  Ibid., para. 50.
387  For more on this, see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 109–111.
388  Pelipenko v. Russia (2012).
389  Ibid., para. 49. For more on the evaluation of the judgment, see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), 
at 111–112.
390  Pelipenko v. Russia (2012), paras. 49, 51, 56.
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interpretation of positive obligations promotes individuals’ rights and freedoms 
by enhancing the state’s responsibilities.
In respect of legal sources, it is evident that the ECtHR does not draw on any 
sources other than its own previous case law. However, one has to take a closer 
look at the previous case law used in this respect before drawing any conclusions. 
When framing the positive obligations interpretation under Article 6, the ECtHR 
referred to the following cases: Fuklev v. Ukraine (2005);391 Dachar v. France (2000);392 
Scollo v. Italy (1995);393 Kunashko v. Russia (2009);394 and Fociac v. Romania (2005).395 
Furthermore, on the subsidiarity side of the case, it referred to Ruianu v. Romania 
(2003).396
The reference to Fuklev is relevant, since in that case the ECtHR articulated the 
content of the positive obligation to organise a system for enforcement of judg-
ments that is effective both in law and in practice and ensures their enforcement 
without undue delay. The purpose of the reference to Dachar is, however, rather 
opaque. Dachar concerned the length of criminal proceedings to which the appli-
cant was a civil party. No mention was made of positive obligations in the case, 
but the ECtHR referred to it when outlining what the positive obligation under 
Article 6 entails.397
The ECtHR formulates the state’s responsibility as follows: ‘[w]hen the author-
ities are obliged to act in order to enforce a judgment and they fail to do so, their 
inactivity can engage the State’s responsibility on the basis of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention.’398 
The ECtHR referred to Scollo, in which it had stated that: ‘While not overlook-
ing the practical difficulties raised by the enforcement of a very large number of 
evictions, the Court considers that the inertia of the competent administrative 
authorities engages the responsibility of the Italian State under Article 6 para. 1 
(art. 6-1).’399 The reason for this reference is clear, since in Scollo the responsibilities 
of a state under Article 6 were formulated.
In Kunashko the issue at hand related to the incomplete execution of a judg-
ment ordering an employer to pay arrears of wages. The case is a relevant source 
of law, because in it the ECtHR states that the authorities have to take reasonably 
accessible steps to assist the recovery of any judgment debt.400 In Fociac, also on the 
subject of enforcement of a judgment, the ECtHR found that the state had made 
every required effort in order to secure compliance with the judicial decisions in 
favour of the applicant and unanimously held that there had been no violation of 
391  Fuklev v. Ukraine (2005), para. 84.
392  Dachar v. France (2000).
393  Scollo v. Italy (1995), para. 44.
394  Kunashko v. Russia (2009), para. 38.
395  Fociac v. Romania (2005), para. 70.
396  Ruianu v. Romania (2003), para. 66.
397  Pelipenko v. Russia (2012), para. 49.
398  Ibid.
399  Scollo v. Italy (1995), para. 44.
400  Pelipenko v. Russia (2012), para. 49.
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Article 6. More significantly, in that case the ECtHR formulated the obligation to 
act diligently in order to assist a creditor in the execution of a judgment.401
In sum, the case law used as a legal source in Pelipenko case is largely relevant, 
with the exception of Dachar. Consequently, the acceptability element that focuses 
on sources of law is fulfilled.
In this story it is revealing, from the judicial legitimacy point of view, that 
the method of interpretation which takes the fourth instance doctrine as a strict 
starting-point is not in line with the acceptability requirements. From the accept-
ability requirements point of view, the use of the strict fourth instance doctrine in 
hard cases leads automatically to unacceptable judgments. However, the fourth 
instance doctrine is a well-justified interpretative principle in easy cases, e.g. 
when the case is purely of a fourth instance nature.402 Furthermore, a closer look 
at the acceptability of sources of law reveals that the number of sources of law 
used by the ECtHR is not in itself decisive. However, the sources used must be 
relevant and logical in the ECtHR’s reasoning.
401  Fociac v. Romania (2005), para. 70.
402  The ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of proceedings’ categories contain only easy cases. For 
more on these categories, see Dahlberg (‘fourth instance’ article), at 99–103.
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4 Conclusions
The key conclusions of the study are that argumentation and legitimacy are in-
separably interlinked in relation to the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy, and that sub-
stance trumps form in relation to legitimacy. The ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy is 
based on substance legitimacy but a minimum level of formal legitimacy must 
be respected. Consequently, acceptability is one of the core elements of substance 
legitimacy, which brings us to the question of how a judicial decision can be seen 
as acceptable. Evaluation of the acceptability of a judicial decision involves pay-
ing attention to the legal reasoning used in respect of it. As a matter of fact, adher-
ence to legal reasoning is probably the only way to maintain the ECtHR’s judicial 
legitimacy. The requirements of acceptable legal interpretation adopted from the 
rational argumentation theory combined with the four legitimacy stories have 
revealed how the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy can be acquired.
As regards form, the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy depends on the minimum 
requirements of formality being followed. For example, certain procedural require-
ments must be respected, such as the requirement that domestic remedies be 
exhausted and that there is a six-month period within which the case must be 
brought before the ECtHR. The conclusion of the analysis was that the formal 
aspects are not in themselves enough for the ECtHR to acquire full judicial legiti-
macy.
Judicial legitimacy may be achieved by respecting procedural boundaries only 
up to a point. This means, in practice, that in respect of easy cases, it may well be 
achieved purely by meeting procedural requirements,403 but that substance legiti-
macy steps in when cases turn out to be more difficult (hard cases). .404 Achieving 
substance legitimacy involves paying attention to the ECtHR’s interpretation by 
automatically assessing the argumentation used, and then assessing whether this 
is acceptable to the audience. 
The acceptability requirement concerning the sources of law used to achieve 
the interpretation means that the interpretation should be coherent with legal 
sources generally accepted in the Convention system. In other words, it should 
be based on more than the ECtHR’s own case law. Comparative and international 
sources of law, as well as general principles of law, should also be used. Various 
sources of law are available in respect of the ECtHR’s field of operation, and other 
conventions and legal instruments created by the Council of Europe would be 
an obvious place to begin. Such Council of Europe (CoE) sources include treaties 
403  On the justification of easy cases, see e.g. MacCormick’s contribution of deductive justification in 
easy cases (MacCormick 1994, at 19–52). 
404  MacCormick speaks about ‘second-order justification’, which is needed when deductive justification 
is not enough; see MacCormick 1994, at 100–128.
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such as the European Social Charter, the European Convention for the Prevention 
of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment405, as well as 
the CoE’s Committee of Ministers’ recommendations etc. It could be argued that 
these should be considered hierarchically higher sources of law than other sourc-
es drawn from either international or national legal systems since those derived 
from the CoE legal system would appear to be more part of the general interpreta-
tive framework of the Convention itself than such other international or national 
sources may be considered to be.406 Furthermore, many sibling institutions oper-
ate in the field of human rights, including the UN Human Rights Committee, 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. In addition, the CJEU’s case law should be taken as a rou-
tine source of law – especially after the Lisbon Treaty, given that more case law 
relating to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union can be expected. Lastly, comparative material from the Contracting States 
should be gathered and used as sources of law for interpretative purposes.   
The acceptability requirement focusing on methods of interpretation requires 
them to be coherent and generally accepted within the political community. 
Coherency depends on consensus as to the starting-points and values of the 
Convention system. The ECtHR has created several rights-centred methods of 
interpretation in its case law, including ‘autonomous concepts’ interpretation 
and ‘living instrument’ interpretation. There are also various common principles 
within the Convention system which may guide its interpretation in a certain di-
rection. These include, for example, the margin of appreciation doctrine and the 
fourth instance doctrine. Since the protection of human rights is seen as a prima 
facie starting-point and value of the Convention system and other principles, such 
as national sovereignty, come after it, it follows that coherent methods of interpre-
tation are those that prioritise the protection of human rights.
In addition to the requirements of acceptable legal interpretation, the role of 
the nature of reasoning should be emphasised in respect of the ECtHR’s judicial 
legitimacy. The ECtHR should use cumulative argumentation since it has the po-
tential to provide further justification and therefore acceptability for a particular 
judgment on the basis that the arguments, taken together, should point to the 
same interpretative outcome. In this way, the force of the whole may be trans-
formed into something much greater than the sum of its parts.407 Cumulative ar-
gumentation should also show the counter-arguments that may be used in rela-
tion to the case, and is best achieved by drawing on a variety of legal sources.
Consequently, the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy comprises four requirements: 
(1) form; (2) sources of law; (3) methods of interpretation; and (4) nature of reason-
ing. This is illustrated in the following figure:
405  CETS No. 126, came into force on 1 February 1989.
406  The doctrine of sources of law is well known in Continental legal systems (see e.g. Aarnio 2011, at 
147–163; Peczenik 2009, at 257–303). However, the common law tradition does not recognise such a 
hierarchy related to sources of law.
407  On the potential of cumulative argumentation in respect of legal justification, see MacCormick – 
Summers 1991, at 526–527.
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Figure 2: Four requirements of the judicial legitimacy of the European Court of Human 
Rights.
Judicial legitimacy starts from ‘form’ which ensures that the minimum level of 
procedural requirements has been met (e.g. the exhaustion of domestic remedies). 
The next step (‘legal sources’) seeks to ensure that the ECtHR uses relevant and 
coherent legal sources in relation to the case at hand. The importance of using 
comparative and international sources is also emphasised. ‘Methods of interpre-
tation’ stresses that the judgment should be based on interpretations which aim 
to protect human rights dynamically and extensively. In practice, this means us-
ing the methods of ‘positive obligations’, the ‘practical and effective’ approach, 
‘living instrument’ or ‘autonomous meaning’. Lastly the reasoning should be in 
focus (‘nature of reasoning’). Here the cumulative argumentation is emphasised. 
This means that the arguments should, taken together, point to the same inter-
pretative outcome, which may be much greater than the sum of its parts. I em-
phasise that the cumulative argumentation should also openly state the counter-
arguments and not only those pointing to the same outcome. Judicial legitimacy 
requires that all four requirements are fulfilled at the same time. If one is lacking, 
judicial legitimacy is weakened. Importantly, however, the requirements are not 
based on any chronological order, which means that one does not logically follow 
another. This means in practice that when evaluating whether the ECtHR has ac-
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complished its judicial legitimacy, one must move both back and forth between 
these requirements and not follow them chronologically.
In sum, this study has outlined the elements required in order for the ECtHR 
to achieve judicial legitimacy. If any of these are missing, judicial legitimacy is 
weakened. Significantly, the outcome may also be used to evaluate the judicial 
legitimacy of human rights reasoning in general; i.e. by courts other than the 
ECtHR. Further studies could, therefore, test these requirements in the reasoning 
adopted, for example, by the Finnish Supreme Court or the CJEU in their judg-
ments concerning human rights.
Looking back
It would have been possible to have approached this research topic in a different 
way. Approaches other than the study of legal cases and analysis of argumenta-
tion could have been taken. Theories other than rational argumentation theory 
could have been used.408 Different search terms could have been used to collect 
case law data for analysis in the four articles. The contexts chosen in which to 
test the ECtHR’s legitimacy could also have been different. For example, case 
law could have been assessed in relation to the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
The approaches I have chosen, however, allow deeper insight into the questions 
posed at the beginning: (1) what is the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy based on; and 
(2) how can its judicial legitimacy be accomplished? The chosen contexts (positive 
obligations, comparative arguments, social rights arguments and the fourth in-
stance doctrine) also demonstrate rather comprehensively the breadth of the field 
in which the ECtHR operates. Furthermore, the rational argumentation theory 
provided the tools to evaluate its argumentation from the point of view of accept-
ability.
I chose to take judicial legitimacy questions as the theoretical framework in 
which to analyse the ECtHR’s case law and legal argumentation. Something else 
could also have been chosen – for instance, traditional constitutionalism (separa-
tion of power, checks and balances) vs. human rights constitutionalism – and the 
theoretical framework of the debate concerning judicial activism vs. judicial self-
restraint could have been used instead.409 
I have presented four different stories on how the ECtHR’s argumentation re-
sponds to the demands of judicial legitimacy and, more significantly, I have of-
fered suggestions as to how it may achieve such legitimacy. This research is, how-
408  On the alternative view of justification of legal decisions in comparison to rational argumentation 
theory, see e.g. Dworkin 1978, at 105–130, 358–359. Dworkin’s theory consists of an ideal judge, the 
semigod Hercules, who is able to create a basic legal theory which brings the different elements of the 
legal order into harmony with each other. Basic legal theory is the way to justify the legal decisions in 
the best possible way. Also Klami introduces levels of justification of a legal decision (Klami 1992, at 
846; and Klami 1997, at 11). Raitio has applied Klami’s justification levels in his study on legal certainty 
in EU law (Raitio 2003, at 302–303). On the critics against Aarnio’s emphasis on coherence, see Tuori 
2011, at 134 (where Tuori states: ‘Differing from Aarnio, present-day discussants would probably not 
appraise the law’s unity by the rules of formal logic but by employing the looser concept of coherence, 
alluding to the law’s principle-based systematicity.’)
409  See e.g. Greer – Wildhaber 2012; Mahoney1990.
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ever, not a final destination as regards research relating to the judicial legitimacy 
of human rights reasoning, since application of the developed requirements of 
legitimacy will remain a fruitful field for human rights research in the future.
ECtHR and national courts
Even though the ECtHR can achieve judicial legitimacy by following the four 
developed requirements in its legal reasoning, in practice national courts’ com-
pliance is also important for the future of the Convention system.410 Legitimacy, 
as conceived in this study, is only one of the aspects that ultimately determine 
the ECtHR’s effectiveness.411 Besides achieving acceptability for the ECtHR’s judg-
ments, two other methods could be used to strengthen national courts’ readiness 
to follow them.
Firstly, the ECtHR should state more precisely what each case at hand is about. 
In failing to do this, the ECtHR shifts the responsibility for framing the main 
points of the case to national courts.412 Secondly, the ECtHR should be more pre-
cise in indicating how the case should be resolved. If the ECtHR were to make the 
main point of each case (its focus) and the means of resolving it (the details of the 
case) clear, this would help the national courts to follow its judgments. 
European human rights reasoning
Although legitimacy questions have been examined here in certain Convention 
contexts – such as in the field of comparative reasoning or in social rights inter-
pretations – the research has also shed light on the ECtHR’s judicial legitimacy 
at a more general level. Argumentation analysis is an approach that focuses on 
reasoning, in which the researcher moves to the level of legal culture. This allows 
one to make more general points about the ECtHR’s reasoning and judicial le-
gitimacy.413
The two European courts, namely the ECtHR and the CJEU, meet each other 
at the level of legal culture, and share a similar approach to argumentation in 
the field of human rights.414 Consequently, I regard it as appropriate to speak of 
European human rights reasoning.415 Especially after the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU’s 
case law has increasingly contained interpretation relating to human rights.416 
More importantly, the accession of the EU to the Convention system would move 
410  It has been stated that the most important way that international human rights tribunals affects 
changes in human rights is through states’ compliance with their rulings (Hillebrecht 2013, at 3).
411  See e.g. Hillebrecht 2013, in which states’ compliance is at the centre.
412  See e.g. example from the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court (KHO 2012:75).
413  In respect of the levels of the law, especially on the methodological side of legal culture, see Tuori 
2002, at 166–169; Tuori 2011, at 7.
414  Both courts regularly cite each other’s case law in human rights cases, see e.g. Jacobs 2012, at 204–206; 
Guild – Lesieur 1998; Groussot – Gill-Pedro 2013; Matthews v. The United Kingdom (1999); Bosphorus Hava 
Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland (2005); C-260/89 ERT (1991); C-94/00 Roquette Frères 
(2002).  On the dialogue of the two European courts, see Krisch 2008, at 198–202; Scheeck 2005; Scheeck 
2011; Ehlers – Becker 2009, at 35–36.
415  On the growing European human rights acquis, see Douglas-Scott 2006.
416  See e.g. joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/15 Digital Rights Ireland (2014).
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the systems and reasoning related to human rights even closer to each other.417
 The legitimacy debate is also well known in the EU’s legal order,418 where it 
has largely focused on the so-called ‘democratic deficit’.419 Fundamental rights 
have also been a focus of the legitimacy debate within the EU. On the one hand, 
it has been argued that the EU’s legitimacy will be enhanced through the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.420 On the other hand, the Charter 
has been viewed as liable to bring about the legitimisation and strengthening of 
positions of power within the EU that are not in fact legitimate.421 
Consequently, such criticism has been rather similar to that levelled at the 
ECtHR, focusing on how the Charter of Fundamental Rights affects the powers 
of the CJEU and the whole of the EU.422 This illustrates that both European legal 
systems have common blind spots where legitimacy questions and human rights 
are concerned. It also demonstrates why legitimacy-related research will remain 
important in the future.
417  On the accession of the EU to the Convention system, see e.g. Lock 2012; Gaja 2012; Schütze 2012, 
at 433–435; Kornobis-Romanowska 2009; Jacque 2011; Heissl 2014; Eckes 2013. However, it has been 
argued that the Convention system offers rather limited benefit for the EU (see Williams 2013, at 1184).
418  See e.g. de Búrca 1996.
419  See e.g. Moravcsik 2002; Majone 1998; Nicolaidis – Howse 2001; Kohler-Koch – Rittberger 2007.
420  See e.g. Jacobs 2002. It has even been argued that placing the EU’s regime under the external norma-
tive supervision of the Strasbourg Regime would enhance its legitimacy, see Harpaz 2009, at 118–124.
421  Funk 2002, at 321; De Smijter – Lenaerts 2001, at 288–290. The legitimacy debate in respect of the EU 
has also focused on process; see Lenaerts – Desomer 2002 who argue that in order to secure the EU’s 
legitimacy, reform of the Treaty amendment procedure is required.
422  For more on the legitimacy discussion in respect of the EU’s legal order, see e.g. Føllesdal 2007b; 
Weiler 1999; Soledad 1993; Blondel – Sinnot – Svensson 1998. 
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Fair and Balanced Positive Obligations—DoThey
Exist?
Maija Pitkänen*
M.Sc (constitutional law), E.MA (human rights and democratisation) and PhD candidate,
University of Eastern Finland, Department of Law
Deadly force; Duty to undertake effective investigation; Human rights; Police officers; Positive
obligations; Proportionality; Right to life
Abstract
This article discusses whether positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights are
being weighed enough from the proportionality point of view by the European Court of Human Rights.
The argument is that the obligations which have been and will be addressed to states must be by their
nature fair and balanced and should not create too great a burden on states. The idea of the article is that
when deciding whether the Convention imposes a positive obligation and what that obligation entails, the
European Court of Human Rights should use the same proportionality principles as when it decides
whether an interference with a protected right is permissible. In other words, the European Court of
Human Rights’ analysis of positive obligations should be done using the same exercise of weighing up
public and private interests as applied to negative obligations because negative and positive obligations
are closely connected and strive towards the same goal—to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
This article examines the question with particular reference to theRamsahai case, and illustrates the scale
of positive obligations under art.2 and the lack of any principled application of the concept of
proportionality.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is to ask whether positive obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) are being weighed enough from the proportionality point of view by the European Court
of Human Rights. Furthermore, at the heart of the article is a claim that when deciding whether the
Convention imposes a positive obligation and what that obligation entails, the European Court of Human
Rights should use the same proportionality principles as when it decides whether an interference with a
protected right is permissible. In other words, the European Court of Human Rights’ analysis of positive
obligations should be done using the same exercise of weighing up public and private interests as that
applied to negative obligations. Negative and positive obligations are closely connected and both are
striving towards the same goal—to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention.
This article first explains what positive obligations actually are in the context of the Convention.
Secondly, the principle of proportionality will be discussed from the point of view of the Convention and
positive obligations in particular. Lastly, the case law example shows what kind of positive obligations
for protecting life (art.2 of the ECHR) there are and how the principle of proportionality has been taken
into account when extending those obligations. The argument is that when imposing more positive
* I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the referees for the valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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obligations on states, the European Court of Human Rights must also seriously take into account whether
those obligations are fair and balanced.
Positive obligations under the ECHR
Historically, fundamental rights tended to be predominantly of the negative kind, meaning that the state
simply had to refrain from interfering with a right. More recent constitutions have explicitly guaranteed
positive rights to education, housing and health care, where the state is obliged to take action to fulfil the
rights. The ECHRwas drafted at the time when rights and freedoms were mainly conceived of in negative
terms.1 However, the European Court of Human Rights has identified a number of positive obligations
on the state.
In many respects, the ECHR simply sets limits on the extent to which the state can intervene in an
individual’s rights. The scheme of the ECHR is therefore to spell out a number of rights and then to set
out the circumstances in which those rights can be lawfully restricted.2 In this sense, the general rule of
the ECHR is to define the negative obligations of state authorities—obligations to refrain from certain
action. It follows that the ECHR is not usually concerned with what a state must do, but what it must not
do.3
However, the ECHR also contains positive obligations, in other words, obligations on state authorities
to take positive and active steps to protect the rights of individuals. In these cases the right will not be real
without state action. The right to free legal assistance in criminal cases under art.6(3)(c), the right to
education under art.2 of Protocol No.1 and the duty to hold elections under art.3 of Protocol No.1 are all
examples of rights that require states to do something active in order to fulfil the right. These articles are,
however, exceptional and the general rule is that articles of the ECHR are constructed around negative
obligations.
Positive obligations can also arise by implication from a negative right. Their foundation lies in the
recognition that a purely negative approach to the protection of human rights cannot guarantee their real
and effective protection and that the acts of private individuals can threaten human rights just as much as
the acts of state authorities.4 The content and scope of the positive obligations which arise in this way are
more controversial than the positive obligations which explicitly and directly arise from the ECHR. This
article focuses on the positive obligations which have arisen by implication and where the ECHR does
not directly or explicitly create a positive obligation.
Background to positive obligations
Article 1 of the ECHR creates a basis for positive obligations. Article 1 requires Contracting Parties to
secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention to those within their jurisdiction. It is questionable whether
securing those rights is limited to a prohibition on state measures which intervene with them or whether
it requires the state to take steps to ensure their fulfilment.5
1 See more about the drafting process and historical background of the Convention, L. Zwaak, “General Survey of the European Convention” in P.
van Dijk et al., (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn (Antwerpen and Oxford: Intersentia, 2006) pp.2–4.
2Articles 8–11, which all follow the same pattern: in the first paragraph the right is provided and in the second paragraph the circumstances in which
the right can be limited are spelt out.
3 K. Starmer, “Positive Obligations under the Convention” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2001), pp.139–140; J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1993), pp.102–103.
4Closely allied to positive obligations is the extent to which the Convention is applicable to the behaviour of private parties. See aboutDrittwirkung,
Zwaak, “General Survey of the European Convention” in P. van Dijk et al., (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights
(2006), pp.28–32; H. Krieger, “Funktionen von Grund- und Menschenrechten” in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar
zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp.306–312.
5C. Ovey and R.C.A. White, Jacobs &White: European Convention on Human Rights, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.38–39;
H-J. Cremer, “Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation” in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und
deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp.202–203, 223–225.
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The European Court of Human Rights has declared several times that the object and purpose of the
ECHR is that the rights which it guarantees must be practical and effective.6 The Court uses a certain form
in its judgments: “the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but
rights that are practical and effective”.7 The European Court of Human Rights has derived from the
effectiveness principle that even in respect of provisions which do not explicitly contain a positive obligation
there may sometimes be a duty to act in a particular way.8 The Court has, however, explicitly declined to
develop any “general theory” of positive obligations.9 Positive obligations have been created as a
consequence of applying the effective and dynamic interpretation of the ECHR to protect the rights of
individuals.10
The circumstances in which the European Court of Human Rights has employed the principle of
effectiveness to place states under a positive obligation can be illustrated by a number of cases involving
art.8(1) of the ECHR which does not directly contain any positive obligations.11 In the Marckx (App.
No.6833/74), judgment of June 13, 1979 case, the Strasbourg Court had to decide whether the Belgian
law that placed a mother and her daughter under certain legal disadvantages because of the child’s
illegitimacy amounted to a violation of the Convention. The Court decided that it did violate the Convention
and relied in part on positive obligations concerning respect for family life.12
Article 8 is by no means the only article of the Convention where the European Court of Human Rights
has found positive obligations even though the text of the article concerned does not contain any explicit
demand. For example, art.2(1) states: “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law”. The European
Court of Human Rights has derived from that an obligation on state authorities to have an effective official
investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force.13 Nowadays, the principle
of effectiveness can be regarded as a general principle applicable whenever rights of the Convention are
in issue. However, this raises the further question of whether recognising the principle of effectiveness
as a general principle in the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence also leads to recognising
and accepting the doctrine of positive obligations.
The question about positive obligations takes us back to the philosophical question about the relationship
between rights and duties. According to Henry Shue, every basic right entails duties of three types: duties
to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation and duties to aid the deprived.14 Alastair Mowbray
develops Shue’s idea further and says that basic rights require those subject to their corresponding duties
to undertake a number of different types of obligations. Whilst the specific balance between negative and
positive obligations vary according to the particular right at issue, all basic rights involve some positive
6Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (1993), pp.98–99 and also Artico v Italy (App. No.6694/74),
judgment of May 15, 1980 at [33]; Adolf v Austria (App. No.8269/78), judgment of March 26, 1982 at [30]; Airey v Ireland (App. No.6289/73),
judgment of October 9, 1979 at [24].
7 See about the effectiveness principle, P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights,
3rd edn (The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), pp.74–76. Effectiveness principle may also be called as practical and effective
doctrine, see A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights” (2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 72.
8 See, e.g. Artico (App. No.6694/74), judgment of May 15, 1980; Adolf (App. No.8269/78), judgment of March 26, 1982; Airey (App. No.6289/73),
judgment of October 9, 1979.
9Platform "Arzte fur das Leben" v Austria (App. No.10126/82), judgment of June 21, 1988 at [31]. The continental courts have traditionally not
seen it as their task to create any general theories as such.
10Krieger, “Funktionen vonGrund- undMenschenrechten” in R. Grote and T.Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG,Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen
und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), pp.278–283.
11 According to art.8(1): “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”
12Marckx v Belgium (App. No.6833/74), judgment of June 13, 1979 at [31]. The Court explicitly stated: “Nevertheless it does not merely compel
the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective
‘respect’ for family life.”
13 See, e.g. Gul v Turkey (App. No.22676/93), judgment of December 14, 2000 at [88]; Ilhan v Turkey (App. No.22277/93), judgment of June 27,
2000.
14 See H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.52–53.
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obligations on states, the European Court of Human Rights must also seriously take into account whether
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recognition that a purely negative approach to the protection of human rights cannot guarantee their real
and effective protection and that the acts of private individuals can threaten human rights just as much as
the acts of state authorities.4 The content and scope of the positive obligations which arise in this way are
more controversial than the positive obligations which explicitly and directly arise from the ECHR. This
article focuses on the positive obligations which have arisen by implication and where the ECHR does
not directly or explicitly create a positive obligation.
Background to positive obligations
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secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention to those within their jurisdiction. It is questionable whether
securing those rights is limited to a prohibition on state measures which intervene with them or whether
it requires the state to take steps to ensure their fulfilment.5
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doctrine, see A. Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights” (2005) 5(1) Human Rights Law Review 72.
8 See, e.g. Artico (App. No.6694/74), judgment of May 15, 1980; Adolf (App. No.8269/78), judgment of March 26, 1982; Airey (App. No.6289/73),
judgment of October 9, 1979.
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seen it as their task to create any general theories as such.
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14 See H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.52–53.
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obligations.15 There is therefore a close connection between negative and positive obligations and this is
why the European Court should analyse them using the same proportionality principles.
Development of positive obligations by the European Court of Human Rights
Through examination of the case law, it is possible to identify a number of eras in the European Court of
Human Rights’ development of positive obligations. The earliest case law regarding these obligations
was generally concerned with interpreting and applying explicit positive obligations. The first cases include
the institutional and procedural requirements of the obligation to provide detainees with access to speedy
judicial proceedings to decide the lawfulness of their detention,16 the nature of the duty to provide free
interpretation assistance for defendants facing criminal charges,17 and the substance of the obligation to
provide free legal assistance for impecunious defendants facing criminal charges.18 It is understandable
that the complainants would initially focus upon those positive obligations as they are explicitly included
in the text of the Convention.
The next significant period began in the late 1970s and continued until the early 1990s. During this
period the European Court of Human Rights elaborated a diverse range of positive obligations derived
from the requirement of “respect” found in art.8(1) of the ECHR. These obligations extended from the
duty to provide legal recognition of the family relationship between parents and illegitimate children,19 to
the obligation to protect persons’ homes and family lives from serious environmental pollution.20 Once
the European Court of Human Rights found that the notion of “respect” contained positive elements, the
extent of the rights protected by art.8 ensured that complainants could assert related positive obligations
in many different contexts.
The third phase in the Strasbourg Court’s development of positive obligations began in the mid-1990s
and ended when the Commission dissolved and a full-time Court began its work in 1998. During this time
the Court rapidly articulated several key positive obligations under art.2,21 including the duty to undertake
effective investigations into killings and the obligation to provide protection to persons whose lives are
known to be at immediate risk from the criminal acts of others. By the end of this period analogous
investigation obligations had been developed under arts 322 and 5.23 The growing case load of complainants
alleging significant violations of fundamental Convention rights by the Turkish security forces provided
the jurisprudential context in which a number of these positive obligations were developed.24
The full-time European Court of Human Rights has expanded the situations in which positive obligations
arise and elaborated the measures that states are required to take in respect of many of these obligations.
For example, under art.2, the European Court of Human Rights has refined the fundamental components
15A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p.224.
16Article 5(4) provides: “Everyone arrested or detained shall be brought promptly before a judge … and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable
time….” See De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium (App. Nos 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66), judgment of June 18, 1971;Winterwerp v Netherlands
(App. No.6301/73), judgment of October 24, 1979.
17 Article 6(3)(e) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court. See Luedicke v Germany (App. Nos 6210/73, 6877/75, 7132/75), judgment of November 28, 1978.
18 Article 6(3)(c) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing, or if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when in the interest of justice it is so required. See Artico
(App. No.6694/74), judgment of May 15, 1980.
19 See, e.g.Marckx (App. No.6833/74), judgment of June 13, 1979.
20 See, e.g. Powell v United Kingdom (App. No.9310/81), judgment of February 2, 1990.
21 Important cases under art.2 includeMcCann v United Kingdom (App. No.18984/91), judgment of September 27, 1995;Osman v United Kingdom
(App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998.
22Assenov v Bulgaria (App. No.24760/94), judgment of October 28, 1998.
23Kurt v Turkey (App. No.24276/94), judgment of May 25, 1998.
24 See cases against Turkey, e.g.Mentes v Turkey (App. No.23186/94), judgment of November 28, 1997; Tekin v Turkey (App. No.22496/93),
judgment of June 9, 1998.
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of effective investigations.25 It has also found breaches of the protective policing obligation26 and broadened
its ambit to encompass public authorities having responsibilities for a prisoner’s welfare.27 Furthermore,
for example, under art.3 the obligation to protect vulnerable persons has been enhanced to mandate the
deployment of state officials, such as social workers, in addition to the basic duty of ensuring that domestic
law contains adequate protection for such persons.28 In addition, the Court has been willing to find that
poor conditions of detention and the failure to provide appropriate medical care for detainees violate art.3.29
What is even more noteworthy is that the Court has recently developed new positive obligations. These
include, inter alia, the duty upon states, under art.10, to take operational measures (such as deploying
police personnel) to protect media organisations and their employees from acts of violence intended to
undermine the freedom of expression of a targeted organisation,30 and the duty upon states under art.14
to avoid discriminating against persons in the enjoyment of their Convention rights by ensuring that they
treat people in different situations differently.31 These emerging positive obligations demonstrate that the
European Court of Human Rights is continuing its predecessor’s practice of developing more efficient
protection of human rights by imposing greater obligations on states.32
In the future the expected positive obligations could include, among other things, the provision of health
care services under art.2,33 the provision of legal aid for civil proceedings under art.6(1),34 and facilitating
the maintenance of traditional lifestyles by minorities under art.8(1).35 When imposing new positive
obligations on states, the European Court of Human Rights must take proportionality carefully into account.
A positive obligation, for instance, to provide health care services under art.2 seems welcome. However,
one must not forget the reality and the capacity of states to handle all further obligations which the positive
obligation to provide health care services entails. This could include, for example, specific obligations
concerning the quality of health care, cost and expenses to the individuals, and the contents and scale of
health care services. In order that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are realisable and functional
they must not create too great a burden on states. For the European Court of Human Rights this means
that the proportionality test must step in to weigh up the competing public and private interests when
deciding both the existence and content of a new positive obligation.
The principle of proportionality in the context of the ECHR
In this section, the principle of proportionality will be discussed in the context of the ECHR. First, it will
be explained what elements this principle contains. Then the role that the principle of proportionality has
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be studied. Lastly, the way that the
principle of proportionality is reflected in the context of positive obligations will be looked at.
The proportionality principle, which implies the need to strike a proper balance between various
competing interests, permeates the interpretation of the ECHR. The principle requires, in particular, that
the extent of any deviation is not excessive in relation to legitimate needs and interests. The ECHR has
internal contradictions, inter alia, between the rights it guarantees. This kind of contradiction lies, for
25 See Kelly v United Kingdom (App. No.30054/96), judgment of May 4, 2001; Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), pp.228–229.
26 See, e.g.Mahmut Kaya v Turkey (App. No.22535/93), judgment of March 28, 2000.
27Edwards v United Kingdom , (App. No.46477/99), judgment of March 14, 2002.
28 Z v United Kingdom (App. No.29392/95), judgment of May 10, 2001.
29Dougoz v Greece (App. No.40907/98), judgment of March 6, 2001; Keenan v United Kingdom (App. No.27229/95) judgment of April 3 2001;
MS v United Kingdom (App. No.24527/08), judgment of May 3, 2012.
30Özgür Gündem v Turkey (App. No.23144/93), judgment of March 16, 2000.
31 Thlimmenos v Greece (App. No.34369/97), judgment of April 6, 2000.
32Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(2004), pp.228–229.
33 This question arose in Cyprus v Turkey (App. No.25781/94), judgment of May 10, 2001.
34Botta v Italy.
35Chapman v United Kingdom. See further about potential positive obligations in the future Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), pp.229–231.
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obligations.15 There is therefore a close connection between negative and positive obligations and this is
why the European Court should analyse them using the same proportionality principles.
Development of positive obligations by the European Court of Human Rights
Through examination of the case law, it is possible to identify a number of eras in the European Court of
Human Rights’ development of positive obligations. The earliest case law regarding these obligations
was generally concerned with interpreting and applying explicit positive obligations. The first cases include
the institutional and procedural requirements of the obligation to provide detainees with access to speedy
judicial proceedings to decide the lawfulness of their detention,16 the nature of the duty to provide free
interpretation assistance for defendants facing criminal charges,17 and the substance of the obligation to
provide free legal assistance for impecunious defendants facing criminal charges.18 It is understandable
that the complainants would initially focus upon those positive obligations as they are explicitly included
in the text of the Convention.
The next significant period began in the late 1970s and continued until the early 1990s. During this
period the European Court of Human Rights elaborated a diverse range of positive obligations derived
from the requirement of “respect” found in art.8(1) of the ECHR. These obligations extended from the
duty to provide legal recognition of the family relationship between parents and illegitimate children,19 to
the obligation to protect persons’ homes and family lives from serious environmental pollution.20 Once
the European Court of Human Rights found that the notion of “respect” contained positive elements, the
extent of the rights protected by art.8 ensured that complainants could assert related positive obligations
in many different contexts.
The third phase in the Strasbourg Court’s development of positive obligations began in the mid-1990s
and ended when the Commission dissolved and a full-time Court began its work in 1998. During this time
the Court rapidly articulated several key positive obligations under art.2,21 including the duty to undertake
effective investigations into killings and the obligation to provide protection to persons whose lives are
known to be at immediate risk from the criminal acts of others. By the end of this period analogous
investigation obligations had been developed under arts 322 and 5.23 The growing case load of complainants
alleging significant violations of fundamental Convention rights by the Turkish security forces provided
the jurisprudential context in which a number of these positive obligations were developed.24
The full-time European Court of Human Rights has expanded the situations in which positive obligations
arise and elaborated the measures that states are required to take in respect of many of these obligations.
For example, under art.2, the European Court of Human Rights has refined the fundamental components
15A. Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004), p.224.
16Article 5(4) provides: “Everyone arrested or detained shall be brought promptly before a judge … and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable
time….” See De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v Belgium (App. Nos 2832/66, 2835/66, 2899/66), judgment of June 18, 1971;Winterwerp v Netherlands
(App. No.6301/73), judgment of October 24, 1979.
17 Article 6(3)(e) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot
understand or speak the language used in court. See Luedicke v Germany (App. Nos 6210/73, 6877/75, 7132/75), judgment of November 28, 1978.
18 Article 6(3)(c) provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing, or if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when in the interest of justice it is so required. See Artico
(App. No.6694/74), judgment of May 15, 1980.
19 See, e.g.Marckx (App. No.6833/74), judgment of June 13, 1979.
20 See, e.g. Powell v United Kingdom (App. No.9310/81), judgment of February 2, 1990.
21 Important cases under art.2 includeMcCann v United Kingdom (App. No.18984/91), judgment of September 27, 1995;Osman v United Kingdom
(App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998.
22Assenov v Bulgaria (App. No.24760/94), judgment of October 28, 1998.
23Kurt v Turkey (App. No.24276/94), judgment of May 25, 1998.
24 See cases against Turkey, e.g.Mentes v Turkey (App. No.23186/94), judgment of November 28, 1997; Tekin v Turkey (App. No.22496/93),
judgment of June 9, 1998.
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of effective investigations.25 It has also found breaches of the protective policing obligation26 and broadened
its ambit to encompass public authorities having responsibilities for a prisoner’s welfare.27 Furthermore,
for example, under art.3 the obligation to protect vulnerable persons has been enhanced to mandate the
deployment of state officials, such as social workers, in addition to the basic duty of ensuring that domestic
law contains adequate protection for such persons.28 In addition, the Court has been willing to find that
poor conditions of detention and the failure to provide appropriate medical care for detainees violate art.3.29
What is even more noteworthy is that the Court has recently developed new positive obligations. These
include, inter alia, the duty upon states, under art.10, to take operational measures (such as deploying
police personnel) to protect media organisations and their employees from acts of violence intended to
undermine the freedom of expression of a targeted organisation,30 and the duty upon states under art.14
to avoid discriminating against persons in the enjoyment of their Convention rights by ensuring that they
treat people in different situations differently.31 These emerging positive obligations demonstrate that the
European Court of Human Rights is continuing its predecessor’s practice of developing more efficient
protection of human rights by imposing greater obligations on states.32
In the future the expected positive obligations could include, among other things, the provision of health
care services under art.2,33 the provision of legal aid for civil proceedings under art.6(1),34 and facilitating
the maintenance of traditional lifestyles by minorities under art.8(1).35 When imposing new positive
obligations on states, the European Court of Human Rights must take proportionality carefully into account.
A positive obligation, for instance, to provide health care services under art.2 seems welcome. However,
one must not forget the reality and the capacity of states to handle all further obligations which the positive
obligation to provide health care services entails. This could include, for example, specific obligations
concerning the quality of health care, cost and expenses to the individuals, and the contents and scale of
health care services. In order that the rights guaranteed by the Convention are realisable and functional
they must not create too great a burden on states. For the European Court of Human Rights this means
that the proportionality test must step in to weigh up the competing public and private interests when
deciding both the existence and content of a new positive obligation.
The principle of proportionality in the context of the ECHR
In this section, the principle of proportionality will be discussed in the context of the ECHR. First, it will
be explained what elements this principle contains. Then the role that the principle of proportionality has
in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights will be studied. Lastly, the way that the
principle of proportionality is reflected in the context of positive obligations will be looked at.
The proportionality principle, which implies the need to strike a proper balance between various
competing interests, permeates the interpretation of the ECHR. The principle requires, in particular, that
the extent of any deviation is not excessive in relation to legitimate needs and interests. The ECHR has
internal contradictions, inter alia, between the rights it guarantees. This kind of contradiction lies, for
25 See Kelly v United Kingdom (App. No.30054/96), judgment of May 4, 2001; Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the
European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), pp.228–229.
26 See, e.g.Mahmut Kaya v Turkey (App. No.22535/93), judgment of March 28, 2000.
27Edwards v United Kingdom , (App. No.46477/99), judgment of March 14, 2002.
28 Z v United Kingdom (App. No.29392/95), judgment of May 10, 2001.
29Dougoz v Greece (App. No.40907/98), judgment of March 6, 2001; Keenan v United Kingdom (App. No.27229/95) judgment of April 3 2001;
MS v United Kingdom (App. No.24527/08), judgment of May 3, 2012.
30Özgür Gündem v Turkey (App. No.23144/93), judgment of March 16, 2000.
31 Thlimmenos v Greece (App. No.34369/97), judgment of April 6, 2000.
32Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(2004), pp.228–229.
33 This question arose in Cyprus v Turkey (App. No.25781/94), judgment of May 10, 2001.
34Botta v Italy.
35Chapman v United Kingdom. See further about potential positive obligations in the future Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations
under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), pp.229–231.
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example, between the right to a private life under art.8 and freedom of expression under art.10 which
requires the balancing of a newspaper’s right to be critical about public figures and those figures’ right to
a private life. The search for a fair balance between demands of the community and requirements of the
individual’s fundamental rights is, in the words of the European Court, “inherent” in the Convention
system.36
The principle of proportionality is a remarkably systematic and well-developed doctrine especially in
German law. The Strasbourg Court, however, has developed its own proportionality review under the
Convention which is not as detailed as the German one. But also in the Convention one can see influences
from German doctrines, such as necessity, which are strongly emphasised.37
The principle of proportionality relates to the question of whether restrictions and limitations to protected
rights are permissible. When testing whether a limitation on the right concerned is justified, one of the
most important parts of the test is the principle of proportionality (in German, Verhältnismäßigkeit).38 It
gives expression to the idea that all lawmust be reasonable (angemessen). The principle of proportionality
in a wider sense is seen as having four elements which must be tested in succession when deciding whether
a restriction satisfies its requirements. The principle of proportionality includes legitimate aim (legitimer
Zweck), objective suitability (Geeignetheit), necessity (Erforderlichkeit) and reasonableness or
proportionality in the narrower sense (Angemessenheit, also called as Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren
Sinne).
The pattern, which the limits of limitation create, takes into account the extensive nature of the principle
of proportionality. The main purpose of the doctrine is to weigh-up the ends and means. Every measure
must have proportionate (reasonable) means reaching a proportionate (reasonable) goal. Having a legitimate
aim is quite a general requirement and it tends to encompass any public aim. The requirement of objective
suitability means that the means chosen must be capable of producing at least some progress towards the
desired end. Necessity demands that when there are several objectively suitable means, the one must be
chosen which imposes the least burden on the affected parties. Reasonableness involves a more complex
question. It demands that the disadvantages which the affected parties suffer as a result of the measure
must be in proportion to the advantages which the general population will gain from the measure. This
means that the competing interests must be weighed against one another. In this process all the legal
interests which are involved must be drawn into a reasonable (angemessene) balance and preserved as far
as possible.39
As we have seen, the principle of proportionality is normally used when testing whether limitations on
the protected rights, which usually create negative obligations on states, are justified. However, the principle
of proportionality can also be used the other way around. This is to test whether positive obligations, which
the European Court of Human Rights imposes on states under the Convention’s provisions by implication,
fulfil the same principles of proportionality as when it decides whether an interference with a protected
right is permissible. The principle of proportionality in the context of positive obligations ensures that the
positive obligations do not impose a disproportionate burden on the state. The European Court of Human
36See van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), pp.80–81; Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp-Oxford-New York: Intersentia, 2002), p.14;
Soering v United Kingdom (App. No.14038/88), judgment of July 7, 1989 at [89].
37 Cremer, “Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation” in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und
deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), pp.226–229; C. Grabenwarter and T. Marauhn, “Grundrechtseingriff und-schranken”, in R. Grote and T.Marauhn
(eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp.365–372;
Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002), p.194.
38For more about the principle of proportionality in German law, see P. Häberle,DieWesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, Zugleich
ein Beitrag zum institutionellen Verständnis der Grundrechte und zur Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt (Karlsruhe: Verlag C.F. Müller, 1962), pp.67–69.
39G. Robbers, An Introduction to German Law, 3rd edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), pp.53–54. Also Fordham and de la Mare
introduce a similar four-question template. (1) Legitimacy: is the measure adopted to pursue a legitimate aim? (2) Suitability: can it further that aim?
(3) Necessity: is it the least restrictive way? and (4) Means/Ends: viewed overall, does the end justify the means? (M. Fordham and T. de la Mare,
“Identifying the Principles of Proportionality” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2001), p.28.
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Rights has accepted that, in determining whether or not a positive obligation exists under a Convention
provision, it must have regard for the fair balance to be struck between the general interest of the community
and the interests of the individual.40
Proportionality in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law
The principle of proportionality is one of the main instruments of the interpretation of the Convention.41
It can be argued that interpreting the Convention is all about finding a fair balance between the different
interests and rights. There is no doubt that the European Court of Human Rights engages in a balancing
approach both as a method of interpretation and as a method of adjudication. This balancing approach,
known as the principle of proportionality, has reached the status of a general principle in the Convention
system.42
The Convention does not itself spell out a doctrine of proportionality. That has been left to the European
Court of Human Rights. The entry point of the principle of proportionality has largely been the Convention
phrase “necessary in a democratic society”43 and “no more than absolutely necessary”.44 The Court did
not apply the proportionality test in a uniform manner until around 199845 and it uses different variants of
proportionality in different contexts. There are four identifiable contexts for the application of the
proportionality test by the European Court of Human Rights.
First, the test is applied in a strict manner in the context of the “necessary in a democratic society”46
requirement when dealing with negative obligations. This means answering the question of whether the
restrictive measure is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, whether there is a “pressing social
need”47 for the restriction, and whether the reasons given for it by the state authorities are “relevant and
sufficient”.48 The test is even stricter in the context of art.2(2): deprivation of life as a result of use of force
“which is no more than absolutely necessary”.49
Secondly, a much more flexible version is applied for examining restrictions on property rights under
art.1 of Protocol No.1. There, the proportionality principle takes the form of the requirement that there be
a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised” or a “fair balance” between the general and the individual interests at stake.50
Thirdly, under art.14 the principle of proportionality plays a central role when decidingwhether difference
of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is, if it does not
40Rees v United Kingdom (App. No.9532/81), judgment of October 17, 1986 at [37]; James v United Kingdom (App. No.8793/79), judgment of
February 21, 1986 at [50]; Paulik v Slovakia (App. No.10699/05), judgment of October 10, 2006 at [43].
41 For more about the European Court of Human Rights’ methods of interpretation, see e.g. D.J. Harris et al., Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.5–18; G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of
the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.58–79.
42 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81.
43 Articles 8(2) to 11(2).
44 Article 2(2). Fordham and de la Mare. “Identifying the Principles of Proportionality” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding Human
Rights Principles (2001), pp.51–52; Grabenwarter andMarauhn, “Grundrechtseingriff und-schranken”, in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG,
Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), pp.362–368.
45 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81.
46 For example, art.9(2) of the ECHR: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety … ”[emphasis added].
47For example,Roemen and Schmit v Luxembourg (App. No.51772/99), judgment of February 25, 2003 at [51]; Lesnik v Slovakia (App. No.35640/97),
judgment of March 11, 2003 at [51].
48 See, e.g. Perna v Italy (App. No.48898/99), judgment of May 6, 2003 at [39]; Skalka v Poland (App. No.43425/98), judgment of May 27, 2003
at [35].
49 See K. Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn (London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), p.494;
see alsoMcCann (App. No.18984/91), judgment of September 27, 1995 at [143]; Simsek v Turkey (App. Nos 35072/97, 37194/97), judgment of July
26, 2005 at [112].
50 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81. See also Sporrong and Lönnroth v
Sweden (App. Nos 7151/75, 7152/75), judgment of September 23, 1982 at [69]; James (App. No.8793/79), judgment of February 21, 1986; Jahn v
Germany (App. Nos 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01), judgment of January 22, 2004 at [82].
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example, between the right to a private life under art.8 and freedom of expression under art.10 which
requires the balancing of a newspaper’s right to be critical about public figures and those figures’ right to
a private life. The search for a fair balance between demands of the community and requirements of the
individual’s fundamental rights is, in the words of the European Court, “inherent” in the Convention
system.36
The principle of proportionality is a remarkably systematic and well-developed doctrine especially in
German law. The Strasbourg Court, however, has developed its own proportionality review under the
Convention which is not as detailed as the German one. But also in the Convention one can see influences
from German doctrines, such as necessity, which are strongly emphasised.37
The principle of proportionality relates to the question of whether restrictions and limitations to protected
rights are permissible. When testing whether a limitation on the right concerned is justified, one of the
most important parts of the test is the principle of proportionality (in German, Verhältnismäßigkeit).38 It
gives expression to the idea that all lawmust be reasonable (angemessen). The principle of proportionality
in a wider sense is seen as having four elements which must be tested in succession when deciding whether
a restriction satisfies its requirements. The principle of proportionality includes legitimate aim (legitimer
Zweck), objective suitability (Geeignetheit), necessity (Erforderlichkeit) and reasonableness or
proportionality in the narrower sense (Angemessenheit, also called as Verhältnismäßigkeit im engeren
Sinne).
The pattern, which the limits of limitation create, takes into account the extensive nature of the principle
of proportionality. The main purpose of the doctrine is to weigh-up the ends and means. Every measure
must have proportionate (reasonable) means reaching a proportionate (reasonable) goal. Having a legitimate
aim is quite a general requirement and it tends to encompass any public aim. The requirement of objective
suitability means that the means chosen must be capable of producing at least some progress towards the
desired end. Necessity demands that when there are several objectively suitable means, the one must be
chosen which imposes the least burden on the affected parties. Reasonableness involves a more complex
question. It demands that the disadvantages which the affected parties suffer as a result of the measure
must be in proportion to the advantages which the general population will gain from the measure. This
means that the competing interests must be weighed against one another. In this process all the legal
interests which are involved must be drawn into a reasonable (angemessene) balance and preserved as far
as possible.39
As we have seen, the principle of proportionality is normally used when testing whether limitations on
the protected rights, which usually create negative obligations on states, are justified. However, the principle
of proportionality can also be used the other way around. This is to test whether positive obligations, which
the European Court of Human Rights imposes on states under the Convention’s provisions by implication,
fulfil the same principles of proportionality as when it decides whether an interference with a protected
right is permissible. The principle of proportionality in the context of positive obligations ensures that the
positive obligations do not impose a disproportionate burden on the state. The European Court of Human
36See van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), pp.80–81; Y. Arai-Takahashi, The Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Antwerp-Oxford-New York: Intersentia, 2002), p.14;
Soering v United Kingdom (App. No.14038/88), judgment of July 7, 1989 at [89].
37 Cremer, “Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation” in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und
deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), pp.226–229; C. Grabenwarter and T. Marauhn, “Grundrechtseingriff und-schranken”, in R. Grote and T.Marauhn
(eds), EMRK/GG, Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), pp.365–372;
Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002), p.194.
38For more about the principle of proportionality in German law, see P. Häberle,DieWesensgehaltsgarantie des Art. 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz, Zugleich
ein Beitrag zum institutionellen Verständnis der Grundrechte und zur Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt (Karlsruhe: Verlag C.F. Müller, 1962), pp.67–69.
39G. Robbers, An Introduction to German Law, 3rd edn (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), pp.53–54. Also Fordham and de la Mare
introduce a similar four-question template. (1) Legitimacy: is the measure adopted to pursue a legitimate aim? (2) Suitability: can it further that aim?
(3) Necessity: is it the least restrictive way? and (4) Means/Ends: viewed overall, does the end justify the means? (M. Fordham and T. de la Mare,
“Identifying the Principles of Proportionality” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding Human Rights Principles (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2001), p.28.
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Rights has accepted that, in determining whether or not a positive obligation exists under a Convention
provision, it must have regard for the fair balance to be struck between the general interest of the community
and the interests of the individual.40
Proportionality in the European Court of Human Rights’ case law
The principle of proportionality is one of the main instruments of the interpretation of the Convention.41
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requirement when dealing with negative obligations. This means answering the question of whether the
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of treatment is discriminatory if it “has no objective and reasonable justification”, that is, if it does not
40Rees v United Kingdom (App. No.9532/81), judgment of October 17, 1986 at [37]; James v United Kingdom (App. No.8793/79), judgment of
February 21, 1986 at [50]; Paulik v Slovakia (App. No.10699/05), judgment of October 10, 2006 at [43].
41 For more about the European Court of Human Rights’ methods of interpretation, see e.g. D.J. Harris et al., Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick: Law
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.5–18; G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of
the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.58–79.
42 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81.
43 Articles 8(2) to 11(2).
44 Article 2(2). Fordham and de la Mare. “Identifying the Principles of Proportionality” in J. Jowell and J. Cooper (eds), Understanding Human
Rights Principles (2001), pp.51–52; Grabenwarter andMarauhn, “Grundrechtseingriff und-schranken”, in R. Grote and T. Marauhn (eds), EMRK/GG,
Konkordanzkommentar zum europäischen und deutschen Grundrechtsschutz (2006), pp.362–368.
45 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81.
46 For example, art.9(2) of the ECHR: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety … ”[emphasis added].
47For example,Roemen and Schmit v Luxembourg (App. No.51772/99), judgment of February 25, 2003 at [51]; Lesnik v Slovakia (App. No.35640/97),
judgment of March 11, 2003 at [51].
48 See, e.g. Perna v Italy (App. No.48898/99), judgment of May 6, 2003 at [39]; Skalka v Poland (App. No.43425/98), judgment of May 27, 2003
at [35].
49 See K. Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd edn (London: Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), p.494;
see alsoMcCann (App. No.18984/91), judgment of September 27, 1995 at [143]; Simsek v Turkey (App. Nos 35072/97, 37194/97), judgment of July
26, 2005 at [112].
50 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (1998), p.81. See also Sporrong and Lönnroth v
Sweden (App. Nos 7151/75, 7152/75), judgment of September 23, 1982 at [69]; James (App. No.8793/79), judgment of February 21, 1986; Jahn v
Germany (App. Nos 46720/99, 72203/01, 72552/01), judgment of January 22, 2004 at [82].
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pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised”.51
Lastly, the European Court of Human Rights uses the principle of proportionality in the context of
positive obligations. In this context, the Court takes a “fair balance” approach when weighing up the
interests of the individual and the general interest of the community. The proportionality aspect is more
evident in negative obligations because the wording of the provision insists upon it. The positive obligations
by contrast are created by implication from the negative obligations and hence the proportionality aspect
is basically neither compulsory nor evident. The proportionality principles are, however, arguably the
same when deciding negative and positive obligations. As the European Court of Human Rights puts it:
“The boundaries between the State’s positive and negative obligations under this provision do not
always lend themselves to precise definition; nonetheless, the applicable principles are similar. In
both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing
interests of the individual and the community as a whole…”52[emphasis added].
The principle of proportionality is close to the European Court of Human Rights’ created concept of
the margin of appreciation. The margin of appreciation doctrine means that the Court leaves certain areas
of discretion to states “to do things their own way”. The idea of a margin of appreciation is used in the
Court’s reasoning to measure and police states’ discretion to interfere with or otherwise limit human rights
in specific instances. In essence it expresses that the Contracting Parties have some space in which they
can balance for themselves conflicting public goods.53 Balancing is an essential part of the proportionality
principle and the margin of appreciation. The more intense the standard of proportionality becomes, the
narrower the margin allowed to national authorities. If a fair balance is found, the national authorities are
considered to remain within the bounds of appreciation.54
Proportionality in the context of positive obligations
When talking about positive obligations, the principle of proportionality must be taken into account. It
must be taken into account when deciding whether a positive obligation exists, what that obligation entails
and whether a state has complied with the obligation. It is clear that if there is an unreasonable burden on
states to fulfil the obligations imposed by the European Court of Human Rights, the real functioning of
the Convention is at stake. It is clear that the Court must consider the right balance between state interest
and the interests of individuals because without it there is a risk that the Court’s rulings and reality will
diverge. This would be undesirable from every point of view.
In the 1980s the European Court of Human Rights declared that a fair balance must be struck between
the general interests of the community and the interests of the individual when determining positive
obligations.55 The European Court of Human Rights has formulated the proportionality of the positive
obligation in this way:
51 Inze v Austria (App. No.8695/79), judgment of October 28, 1987 at [41]; Sidabras and Dziautas v Lithuania (App. Nos 55480/00, 59330/00),
judgment of July 27, 2004 at [51].
52Paulik v Slovakia (App. No.10699/05), judgment of October 10, 2006 at [43].
53 See further on the margin of appreciation, J.A. Sweeney, “Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights
in the Post-ColdWar Era” (2005) 54 International and Comparative LawQuarterly 459; Letsas,A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention
on Human Rights (2007), A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, pp.80–98; I. de la Rasilla del Moral, “The
Increasingly Marginal Appreciation of the Margin-of-Appreciation Doctrine” (2006) 7(6) German Law Journal (2006) 611.
54 Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (2002). pp.14–15
who puts forward an idea of the principle of proportionality as the other side of the margin of appreciation.
55Rees v United Kingdom (App. No.9532/81), judgment of October 17, 1986; James v United Kingdom (App. No.8793/79), judgment of February
21, 1986.
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“… such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or
disproportionate burden on the authorities.”56
The European Court of Human Rights’ fair balance test has developed mainly under the right to private
life (art.8). The test tries to make a justified decision of the existence and requirements of positive
obligations. What is, however, crucial is that both majorities and minorities could utilise the test to produce
contrary outcomes. One could say that this is the main dilemma in using this test. In 2002 the European
Court of Human Rights was united in finding that the partial recognition by administrative authorities of
post-operative transsexuals’ new identities did not satisfy the positive requirements of art.8.57 In this case
the Court endorsed the well-established fair balance test to determinate the existence of positive obligations
under this article.
“… In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must also be had to the fair
balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the
individual, the search for which balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention …”58
The European Court of Human Rights finally concluded that a fair balance had not been achieved by
the limited administrative recognition available in the United Kingdom:
“… [s]ince there are no significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of this
individual applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-assignment, it reaches the
conclusion that the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention now tilts decisively in favour of
the applicant …”59
The fair balance test has also been applied under other provisions of the Convention. For example, the
European Court of Human Rights had to decide whether the state has a positive obligation under art.10
to protect members of the press from violent attacks. In Özgür Gündem v Turkey60 the Court stated:
“… [i]n determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance
that has to be struck between the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual,
the search for which is inherent throughout the Convention. The scope of this obligation will inevitably
vary, having regard to the diversity of situations obtaining in Contracting States, the difficulties
involved in policing modern societies and the choices which must be made in terms of priorities and
resources. Nor must such an obligation be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or
disproportionate burden on the authorities…”61
It can be summarised that the fair balance test emerges as a judicial method for determining the existence
of individual positive obligations, what that obligation entails, and whether the positive obligation has
been complied with. The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in Christine Goodwin
v United Kingdom (App. No.28957/95), judgment of July 11, 2002 unanimously applied the fair balance
test when determining positive obligations. It could therefore be said that the fair balance test is recognised
when the European Court of Human Rights decides on positive obligations.62 The fair balance test should
undoubtedly be used on a regular basis where positive obligations are concerned. This way it will be
ensured that the positive obligations can be accepted and complied with by states. The same principles
should be applied as a matter of routine as those that are relied on when dealing with negative obligations.
56Osman v United Kingdom (App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998 at [116].
57Goodwin v United Kingdom (App. No.28957/95), judgment of July 11, 2002.
58Goodwin (App. No.28957/95), judgment of July 11, 2002 at [72].
59Goodwin (App. No.28957/95), judgment of July 11, 2002 at [93].
60Özgür (App. No.23144/93), judgment of March 16, 2000.
61Özgür (App. No.23144/93), judgment of March 16, 2000 at [43].
62Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights
(2004), pp.186–187.
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It can be summarised that the fair balance test emerges as a judicial method for determining the existence
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v United Kingdom (App. No.28957/95), judgment of July 11, 2002 unanimously applied the fair balance
test when determining positive obligations. It could therefore be said that the fair balance test is recognised
when the European Court of Human Rights decides on positive obligations.62 The fair balance test should
undoubtedly be used on a regular basis where positive obligations are concerned. This way it will be
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56Osman v United Kingdom (App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998 at [116].
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However, as the foregoing analysis shows, the fair balance test is not used consistently across all positive
obligation cases before the European Court of Human Rights.
Case example: Ramsahai v Netherlands (2007)
Article 2(1) of the ECHR states:
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law.”63
Unlike the corresponding articles of the Convention (e.g. art.8), art.2 does not explicitly recognise the
existence of the right to life, but imposes upon national authorities an obligation to protect everyone’s
right to life by law, followed by a prohibition of intentional deprivation of life. The European Court of
Human Rights has developed a wide range of positive obligations to concretise what the obligation to
protect life actually means.64 Positive obligations which the European Court of Human Rights has created
under art.2 are, inter alia, that the use of force by the state agents must be of a proportionate degree,65 that
the planning and control of police or military action must be adequate,66 that the state must provide
individuals with suitable measures of protection against immediate threats to their lives from third parties,67
that there are procedural obligations (effective investigation when human life is lost)68 and that there is an
obligation on states to provide a limited range of medical facilities and services.69
The case of Ramsahai v Netherlands70 demonstrates how the European Court of Human Rights interprets
the ECHR so that the rights therein will be practical and effective rather than theoretical or illusory. The
focus here is to ask whether the European Court of Human Rights properly applied the fair balance test
when deciding on the existence of positive obligations.
Ramsahai was about a killing by a police officer. This case was first dealt with in the Chamber and
then, by government request, was referred to the Grand Chamber. The case concerned the death ofMoravia
Ramsahai and the events that transpired subsequently. In short, a police officer killed a man who was
armed and on drugs and acted aggressively and unpredictably towards police and other people. The main
question which the European Court of Human Rights had to resolve was whether the procedural obligations
under art.2 were fulfilled.
The Grand Chamber followed the Chamber’s findings. It pointed out that the officers had been entirely
unaware that Moravia Ramsahai was armed, and that they had thus no reason to believe that they would
be called upon to perform anything other than a routine arrest. Furthermore, the Chamber’s ruling
emphasised that the officer had drawn his service weapon only after Moravia Ramsahai had drawn his
pistol. The Grand Chamber accepted the Chamber’s ruling in this regard and determined very briefly that
63 The second sentence of art.2(1) reserves the right to states to subject convicted criminals to the death penalty. However, the second sentence of
art.2(1) is nowadays meaningless and the death penalty has been abolished due to Protocol No.6 and No.13. Protocol No.6 abolishes the death penalty
in peacetime. Most of the Contracting Parties of the Council of Europe have established Protocol No.6 concerning the abolition of the death penalty
in 1983, see http://conventions.coe.int [Accessed August 29, 2012]. Protocol No.13 concerns abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. Protocol
No.13 came into force in 2003 and the majority of the Contracting Parties have ratified it.
64 The questions that the European Court of Human Rights has had to struggle with is what kind of legal system, both in design and operation, is
enough to satisfy a state’s duty to protect life. See M. W. Janis et al., European Human Rights Law. Text and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), p.153.
65 See, e.g. Gül v Turkey (App. No.22676/93), judgment of December 14, 2000; Andronicou v Cyprus (App. No.25052/94), judgment of October 9,
1997.
66 See, e.g.McCann (App. No.18984/91), judgment of September 27, 1995; Andronicou (App. No.25052/94), judgment of October 9, 1997; Gül
(App. No.22676/93), judgment of December 14, 2000.
67 See, e.g. Osman (App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998.
68 See, e.g., Oneryildiz v Turkey (App. No.48939/99), judgment of November 30, 2004;McCann v United Kingdom (App. No.18984/91), judgment
of September 27, 1995; Ergi v Turkey (App. No.23818/94), judgment of July 28, 1998.
69 See, e.g. LCB v United Kingdom (App. No.23413/94), judgment of June 9, 1998; Cyprus (App. No.25781/94), judgment of May 10, 2001.
70Ramsahai v Netherlands (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007.
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the fatal shot fired by the officer was “no more than absolutely necessary” and, as a result, the shooting
of Moravia Ramsahai did not violate the substantive part of art.2.71
The procedural obligations under art.2 held the Court’s main focus.72 The Court underlined that the
obligation to carry out a prompt and effective investigation when individuals have been killed as a result
of the use of force is still required even if the killing did not violate art.2.73 The Court used a lot of space
in its judgment to formulate the procedural obligations more precisely. First, it stated that in order for the
investigation to be effective it must be adequate.74 The Court has used the concept of adequate investigation
in its previous case law, but in this judgment it defined the concept.75 Secondly, the Court concentrated
on the second element of effective investigation, namely the independence of the police investigation.76
The Court reformulated its previous jurisprudence concerning the independence of the investigation.77 In
this respect the Grand Chamber’s decision differed from the Chamber’s.
The adequacy of the investigation means that the investigation must be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but of means. The
authorities must have taken reasonable steps available to them in securing the evidence concerning the
incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to identify the perpetrator or
perpetrators will risk failing foul of this standard.78 This obligation is strictly formulated and the European
Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion that in this case the failings (including the fact that no
attempt had been made to determine the precise trajectory of the bullet, officers were not kept separate
after the incident and were not questioned until nearly three days later) impaired the adequacy of the
investigation. These lacunae in the investigation created a violation of art.2 in that the investigation into
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71Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [288]–[289].
72 The European Court of Human Rights first clarified the applicable principles and made a reference to the previous case of Nachova v Bulgaria
(App. Nos 43577/98, 43579/98), judgment of July 6, 2005.
73Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [322].
74Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [326]–[332].
75Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [324]. The European Court of Human Rights changed its wording and added the
word “adequate”, cf. Tahsin Acar v Turkey (App. No.26307/95), judgment of April 8, 2004 at [223].
76Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [333]–[341].
77Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [325]. Concerning the independent investigation the European Court of Human
Rights states that independence of investigation means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence, cf.
See Tahsin (App. No.26307/95), judgment of April 8, 2004 at [222]. The European Court of Human Rights also examined the role of the public
prosecutor, the involvement of the applicants in the procedure and the procedure followed by the Court of Appeal.
78Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [324].
79Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [326]–[332].
80Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [325].
81Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [333]–[341]. The European Court of Human Rights also examined the role of the
public prosecutor, involvement of the applicants in the procedure and also the procedure followed by the Court of Appeal. In all these cases the Court
found no violation of art.2. Concerning the involvement of the applicants, the European Court of Human Rights stated strongly that art.2 does not
impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by a relative in the course of an
investigation (at [348]).
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The Strasbourg Court was only unanimous regarding the substantive part of art.2, namely, that the
shooting of Moravia Ramsahai did not constitute a violation of the right to life. The European Court of
Human Rights’ majority (13 votes to four) held that there had been violation of art.2 in that the investigation
was inadequate. Furthermore, the majority (by 16 votes to one) held that the investigation was insufficiently
independent.
The European Court of Human Rights came to the rather strict conclusion that the investigation would
be inadequate if any kind of failure or neglect in any part of the investigation had happened. The dissenting
opinion of four judges criticised this part of the judgment. They stated that the procedural requirements
of art.2 were already well-established in the Court’s case law and there was no need to change that. In the
case law it is clear that an investigation may satisfy the Convention requirements of effectiveness or
adequacy even if it has not been shown that all possible investigation measures have been taken.
Furthermore, a lacuna or deficiency in an investigation will give rise to a breach of the procedural obligation
only if it is such as to undermine its capability of establishing the facts surrounding the killing. The
dissenting opinion pointed out that the assessment must be done in the light of the particular circumstances
of each case.82
From the state’s perspective, the requirement of an adequate investigation has been raised relatively
high. One can ask whether the obligation to have an adequate investigation has now been developed too
high by the European Court of Human Rights. It can be stated that it is an unreasonable burden on the
state, if any failure at any stage of the investigation may cause a violation of art.2, even if the deficiency
of the investigation made would not undermine the investigation as a whole. The formulation of the
obligation to have an adequate investigation gives a possibility to applicants to claim that an investigation
has not been effective with regard to the adequacy of the investigation, if a minor deficiency during the
investigation happened.
The European Court of Human Rights does not weigh the procedural duties from the proportionality
point of view at all. There were no signs of the fair balance test in the ruling. It is a well-grounded critique
that the Court leapt too quickly to the conclusion that defects in the investigation were a breach of the
positive obligations under art.2. There is a complete lack of a proper consideration of whether the imposition
of such an obligation strikes the right balance between the effective protection of human rights and the
burden placed on the state. The Court was, however, fairly open when listing the deficiencies of the
investigation.83 The deficiencies were, frankly, quite serious and show at least to some extent the partial
breach of the positive obligation to have an effective investigation. The dissenting judges emphasised the
need to take a holistic approach when measuring the adequacy of the investigation. The latter point of
view looks more towards proportionality. If the European Court of Human Rights had used more of the
tools which the proportionality principles offers (such as objective suitability, necessity and reasonableness
of the positive obligations) and explained why stricter procedural obligations were necessary the decision
would have been more convincing and justified.84
Comparing the Ramsahai case to the cases discussed earlier in which the European Court of Human
Rights used the fair balance test when deciding positive obligations, leaves a great deal to be desired. In
fact, in Ramsahai the Court does not use the fair balance test at all. This change in the approach towards
positive obligations can be seen as a regrettable step backwards.
82 See the joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Sir Nicholas Bratza, Lorenzen and Thomassen.
83 Inter alia, no attempt had been made to determine the precise trajectory of the bullet; officers were not kept separate after the incident; officers
were not questioned until nearly three days later.
84 Cf. the European Court of Human Rights’ brief way of saying that it will change the content of the positive obligation to have an effective
investigation: “The Court finds it opportune to clarify the scope and content of its examination of the effectiveness of the investigation.” Ramsahai
(App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007 at [323].
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Conclusion
The claim of this article was that the European Court of HumanRights should apply the same proportionality
principles when deciding positive obligations as it does when deciding whether there has been a breach
of a negative obligation. The fair balance test ensures that positive obligations will not impose too great
a burden on states. The above case law demonstrates that the Court has not hesitated in strengthening
positive obligations to protect life of the individuals under art.2, and consequently, the positive obligations
have been extended in many respects, particularly in relation to procedural obligations.85 Furthermore, the
trend is to extend positive obligations under art.2 even further.86 However, the reasoning of the positive
obligations to protect life does not in the Ramsahai case contain the fair balance test at all. The European
Court of Human Rights has not always neglected proportionality principles when deciding positive
obligations to protect life. For example, in Osman v United Kingdom (App. No.23452/94), judgment of
October 28, 1998 the Court said that the positive obligations under art.2 must be interpreted in a way
which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.87
Now it is crucial for the European Court of Human Rights to stop and consider positive obligations as
a whole before choosing to expand them disproportionately under art.2. If the trend stays in the direction
of expanding the obligations without taking competing interest into consideration, states will be in serious
trouble as will be the whole credibility of the Convention system. It is a basic fact that the duties and
obligations which are imposed on the states must be bearable and feasible—in that way the corresponding
rights are also effective.
The European Court of Human Rights should take a lesson from its own previous case law and return
to using the concept of proportionality in its judgments concerning positive obligations to protect life.88
Even if the Court has, in reality, considered the state’s point of view before making a judgment on the
positive obligations to protect life, it must show this openly in the ruling in order that the public can see
it too.
In order to retain the credibility of the European Court of Human Rights, and the whole Convention
system, the proportionality approach must permanently step in as regards positive obligations to protect
life. The principle of proportionality is the only legitimate way to approach the questions of whether
positive obligations exist, to what extent and whether the state has complied with them. Only by finding
fair and balanced interpretations can positive obligations work. There is a need for the same proportionality
assessment which the European Court of Human Rights is rigorously using with negative obligations
when deciding whether a state’s interference has been “necessary in a democratic community”.
85Oneryildiz (App. No.48939/99), judgment of November 30, 2004; Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15, 2007;Makaratzis v
Greece (App. No.50385/99), judgment of December 20, 2004.
86See, e.g.Oneryildiz v Turkey (App. No.48939/99), judgment of November 30, 2004, where a new positive obligation was created (also the domestic
trial stage must satisfy the requirements of positive obligation to protect lives through law) and Ramsahai (App. No.52391/99), judgment of May 15,
2007, where the procedural obligation to have an adequate investigation was expanded.
87Osman (App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998 at [116].
88 Under other articles the European Court of Human Rights has been more active in using the fair and balanced test, see e.g. Osman v United
Kingdom (App. No.23452/94), judgment of October 28, 1998 at [72]; Özgür Gündem v Turkey (App. No.23144/93), judgment of March 16, 2000 at
[43].
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1. Introduction 
The European Court of Human Rights’ (the Court or ECtHR) reasoning and method of 
interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention or ECHR) have been 
at the focus of legal research for quite some time. There is extensive potential for comparative 
argumentation;1 demonstrating uniformity and coherence, it has the ability to justify and 
legitimate Court judgments.  This potential is, however, often wasted in practice, as 
uniformity or coherence arguments are not sufficiently explained by the Court.2 
The use of the comparative method is closely linked to the general method of treaty 
interpretation used by the Court.3 As an international treaty, the Convention’s interpretation is 
subject to rules set out in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(the Vienna Convention).4 The Vienna Convention is mainly invoked by the Court when it 
takes into account other international treaties or instruments (such as UN Conventions or 
praxis of the UN-treaty bodies).5 It has been pointed out that the Court uses international texts 
and instruments as interpretative guidance in search of common ground.6  
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maija.dahlberg@uef.fi. I wish to extend my sincere thanks to Prof. Jaakko Husa, Mirjami Paso and Prof. Toomas 
Kotkas and the anonymous reviewers for the valuable comments and guidance they gave. All mistakes and 
omissions remain my own responsibility. 
1 Comparative argumentation is here synonymous with comparative legal reasoning. Both concepts are used 
interchangeably . 
2 See, for potential in the European Union context, Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A 
Comparative Study of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2004) at 351–
52, 356–59. 
3 See, on the existence of comparative method Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Rights and Judicial Use of 
Comparative Law’, in Esin Örücü (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom 
Comparative Law Series: London, Volume 22, UKNCCL, 2003), 1–22 at 7. 
4 UN Doc A/CONF.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331. 
5 See art. 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. See also how this Article has been used by the ECtHR, e.g. Demir and 
Baykara v. Turkey, Application no. 34503/97, Judgment (12 November 2008), Grand Chamber, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2008), paras 65–68. See more on treaty interpretation and art. 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, e.g. Leena Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of 
Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 21 European Journal of International Law 3 
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This paper argues that interpretative guidance does not fully describe the ways comparative 
reasoning is used by the Court. Consequently, the main research question of this article is: 
How is comparative argumentation used in the judgments of the Court? By ‘comparative 
legal reasoning’ I mean all Court decisions where a source or outcome of comparative legal 
analysis has been explicitly or implicitly cited. This article demonstrates that there are various 
ways of using comparative argumentation, though the role of such arguments differs greatly 
between judgments. One can identify many reasons for using comparative legal reasoning in 
interpreting the ECHR. It has been claimed that the legitimacy of the Court will be increased 
by more use of comparative consensus argumentation. 7  To acquire legitimacy through 
consensus argumentation is not, however, that simple. The legitimacy question is going to 
support, in its part, the main inquiry by explaining why the comparative method of the Court 
is worth analysing in more detail.8 
In this article, comparative law refers both to national jurisdictions and to the international 
community in its various guises: the Council of Europe, the European Union, the United 
Nations family of organisations, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and so on.9 
Comparative law in its traditional dimension, which tries to find similarities and differences 
between domestic legal systems, is not what this article urges.10 It is however often the way 
comparative law is used in, for example, law drafting processes. By ‘comparative law’ I 
instead mean the wider international texts, instruments and law in both the Contracting and 
non-Member States. 11 The Court’s practice of distinguishing between international and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’, 21 European Journal of International Law 3 
(2010) 585–604. 
6 George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’, 21 European Journal of 
International Law 3 (2010) 509–41 at 521–2. See also how the Court strongly argues in favour of the use of 
international texts and instruments for the interpretation of the Convention, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 
(2008), supra note 5, at paras 69–86. 
7 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ’Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, Public Law (2011) 534–53 (He suggests that European consensus should be 
sufficiently persuasive and procedurally clear in order to enhance legitimacy, at 534). 
8  See on argumentative means of generating judicial legitimacy examples of the argumentation from the 
European Court of Justice, French Cour de cassation and American Supreme Court, Lasser, Judicial 
Deliberations, supra note 2. 
9  See Paul Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Reference Back to National Law’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative 
Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 135–50 at 136–7.  
10 See comparative law in its traditional dimension, e.g., Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998) at 4 (‘Comparative lawyers compare the 
legal systems of different nations.’), at 32–47. There are multiple ways of understanding what comparative law 
is, see e.g. Esin Örücü, ‘Developing Comparative Law’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative 
Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007), 43–65 at 44–53. 
11  I do not make a distinction between when the Court refers in its reasoning to international texts and 
instruments (such as UN Conventions or UN-organs) and when it refers to the law of the Contracting States. 
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traditional comparative law12 material varies. In some cases, the Court handles traditional 
comparative law and international law material together; 13  in others, they have been 
structurally separated.14 
The assumption of the study is that comparative argumentation in the Court’s case law is used 
wisely and for relevant reasons. By this I mean the Court should not deploy comparative 
argumentation if it did not play an actual judicial role. Yet it has been argued that the very 
existence of comparative law data in an informative manner (merely listing the comparative 
data) increases the legitimacy of the Court per se as it shows the audience the decision is well 
informed.15 In order to gain the acceptance of the audience, however, it is not sufficient that 
comparative law data has been available for the judges – it should be used as a part of the 
argument itself rather than mere bare background data.  Like any other legal argument, 
comparative arguments must fulfil the requirements of rationality. Rationality is required in 
order to ensure the judgment is legitimate and excludes the possibility of arbitrariness. The 
use of comparative reasoning should hence, at least in principle, be rational. 
Situated at the crossroads of the forty-seven Contracting States, with many different legal 
cultures and traditions, the Court’s judicature is by its very nature a ‘comparative’ institution. 
The use of comparisons is thus somewhat natural and obvious, and it is easy to state that 
comparative law has a clear footing in the Court’s case law. The approach applied in this 
article is a case law study where the Court’s judgments will be examined. The examined years 
are: 2002, 2007 and 2012. The article analyses comparative arguments by classifying them 
into four groups according to their functions. These categories are (1) cognitive, (2) 
decorative, (3) directional and (4) decisive function.16 
                                                                                                                                                        
They all belong under the concept of ‘comparative legal reasoning’. I recognise that there is a difference between 
giving survey of other international texts and instruments and analysis of the state of art in the different 
Contracting States. This difference is not, however, decisive for this research. The focus is to find out what kind 
of role comparative legal reasoning has, regardless of what source the comparative reasoning is based on. 
12 By ‘traditional comparative law’ I mean an analysis of legislation and case law in the Contracting States. 
13 The Court may flexibly combine traditional comparative law, international law and legal material from the 
European Union, Inter-American Court, African Union and from non-contracting states (e.g. the USA, New 
Zealand, Hong Kong, South Africa, Canada), see e.g. Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application 
nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Judgment (17 January 2012), at paras 51-73. 
14 The Court may, however, clearly separate international law and traditional comparative law material, see e.g. 
Stanev v. Bulgaria, Application no. 36760/06, Judgment (17 January 2012), Grand Chamber, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012), at paras 72-87 and 88-95. 
15 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Vasily Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making: the Comparative Endeavours 
of the Strasbourg Court’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 3 (2012) 272–98, at 278. 
16  Comparative law arguments have been also categorised differently. See Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, 
‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15. In that study comparative law arguments were distinguished into 
two categories: for persuasive purposes and for informational purposes. 
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This paper argues that interpretative guidance does not fully describe the ways comparative 
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Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’, 21 European Journal of International Law 3 
(2010) 585–604. 
6 George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’, 21 European Journal of 
International Law 3 (2010) 509–41 at 521–2. See also how the Court strongly argues in favour of the use of 
international texts and instruments for the interpretation of the Convention, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 
(2008), supra note 5, at paras 69–86. 
7 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, ’Does Consensus Matter? Legitimacy of European Consensus in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, Public Law (2011) 534–53 (He suggests that European consensus should be 
sufficiently persuasive and procedurally clear in order to enhance legitimacy, at 534). 
8  See on argumentative means of generating judicial legitimacy examples of the argumentation from the 
European Court of Justice, French Cour de cassation and American Supreme Court, Lasser, Judicial 
Deliberations, supra note 2. 
9  See Paul Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method in Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: 
Reference Back to National Law’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative 
Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 135–50 at 136–7.  
10 See comparative law in its traditional dimension, e.g., Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law (3rd edn, Oxford Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1998) at 4 (‘Comparative lawyers compare the 
legal systems of different nations.’), at 32–47. There are multiple ways of understanding what comparative law 
is, see e.g. Esin Örücü, ‘Developing Comparative Law’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative 
Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007), 43–65 at 44–53. 
11  I do not make a distinction between when the Court refers in its reasoning to international texts and 
instruments (such as UN Conventions or UN-organs) and when it refers to the law of the Contracting States. 
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traditional comparative law12 material varies. In some cases, the Court handles traditional 
comparative law and international law material together; 13  in others, they have been 
structurally separated.14 
The assumption of the study is that comparative argumentation in the Court’s case law is used 
wisely and for relevant reasons. By this I mean the Court should not deploy comparative 
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comparative arguments must fulfil the requirements of rationality. Rationality is required in 
order to ensure the judgment is legitimate and excludes the possibility of arbitrariness. The 
use of comparative reasoning should hence, at least in principle, be rational. 
Situated at the crossroads of the forty-seven Contracting States, with many different legal 
cultures and traditions, the Court’s judicature is by its very nature a ‘comparative’ institution. 
The use of comparisons is thus somewhat natural and obvious, and it is easy to state that 
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They all belong under the concept of ‘comparative legal reasoning’. I recognise that there is a difference between 
giving survey of other international texts and instruments and analysis of the state of art in the different 
Contracting States. This difference is not, however, decisive for this research. The focus is to find out what kind 
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12 By ‘traditional comparative law’ I mean an analysis of legislation and case law in the Contracting States. 
13 The Court may flexibly combine traditional comparative law, international law and legal material from the 
European Union, Inter-American Court, African Union and from non-contracting states (e.g. the USA, New 
Zealand, Hong Kong, South Africa, Canada), see e.g. Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application 
nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, Judgment (17 January 2012), at paras 51-73. 
14 The Court may, however, clearly separate international law and traditional comparative law material, see e.g. 
Stanev v. Bulgaria, Application no. 36760/06, Judgment (17 January 2012), Grand Chamber, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012), at paras 72-87 and 88-95. 
15 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Vasily Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making: the Comparative Endeavours 
of the Strasbourg Court’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 3 (2012) 272–98, at 278. 
16  Comparative law arguments have been also categorised differently. See Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, 
‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15. In that study comparative law arguments were distinguished into 
two categories: for persuasive purposes and for informational purposes. 
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The first way of using comparative law is for cognitive purposes: comparative material is 
present at the preliminary fact-finding stage, but no further references exist in the later 
reasoning of the Court. Secondly, comparative law can be used in a decorative way. This 
means that comparative law material is briefly referred to in the reasoning without going into 
further depth. Thirdly, comparative law can softly steer the interpretation in a certain 
direction. Here comparative material is directly referred to in the reasoning and there is 
therefore a link between the comparative material and the chosen interpretation. Fourthly, 
comparative material can play a decisive role, where the Court clearly states that the chosen 
interpretation is a direct result of the findings of the comparative material. 
Section 2 of this contribution outlines generally the use of comparative legal reasoning in 
courts and in the ECtHR in particular. Section 3 surveys the case law and categorises the 
judgments into four groups. This categorisation reveals that there are many ways to use 
comparative material in the Court’s reasoning. Lastly, the possibilities for comparative 
reasoning to contribute to the legitimacy of the Court will be evaluated in Section 4.  
 
2. Comparative Legal Reasoning: Why Bother?  
 
2.1. Comparative Legal Reasoning in Courts 
Practical comparative law is nowadays a rather common part of adjudication, both in 
domestic and international courts. After twentieth-century legal positivism’s reinforcement of 
the marginal role of comparative legal reasoning, it was assumed that legal systems existed as 
a matter of fact, and that all legal systems could claim to be supreme.17 There was an alleged 
inherent presumption that a system should not give effect to laws other than its own. Today, 
however, there are major doubts concerning the completeness of legal systems.18 There is thus 
‘renewed interest in European legal theory in the use of comparative law before the courts’.19 
Individual legal systems can hardly be regarded as isolated from one another as legal 
                                                 
17 See H.L.A Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), at v, 24; H. Patrick 
Glenn, ‘Com-paring’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2007), 91–108 at 97. 
18 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Reasoning and the Courts: A View from the Americas’, in Guy Canivet, 
Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 217–
27 at 218–9. 
19 Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Reasoning’, supra note 18, at 219. 
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questions are more or less similar across these systems. This gives fruitful basis for the use of 
comparative legal reasoning.20 
The growing interest in comparative legal reasoning is in addition part of the greater 
philosophical notion that there cannot always be a ‘single right answer’ in contested cases. By 
recognising multiple solutions to the same legal question, the reasoning of the court can be 
deepened. This is especially true in human rights cases, due to their flexible, changing and 
complex nature. Comparative law gives a wider insight and range of plausible solutions to 
resolve the case in question. As Zweigert and Kötz have claimed, ‘[c]omparative law is an 
“école de vérité” which extends and enriches the “supply of solutions”’.21 Glenn underlines 
that the search for appropriate interpretation of law is too important for any potential external 
source to be eliminated a priori.22 It has, notwithstanding, been emphasised that we should 
not expect more of the proof of comparative law than of adjudication in general. 23 
Comparative reasoning does not mean that in every case the foreign law in question is to be 
followed or perceived to be binding; its relevance rests at the level of persuasive authority.24 
Comparative law in human rights cases seems obvious for those who support the universality 
of human rights - it is after all the same human right that is being applied.25 For those who 
support cultural relativism, however, the use of comparisons is pointless as rights are 
culturally determined.26 Claimants of the universality of human rights have gone even further, 
arguing that ‘if comparative human rights is to be the basis of some form of new natural law, 
then domestic courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
must discover the true meaning of human rights not only by looking forward but by looking 
sideways, at each other and beyond’.27 Moreover it is not seen to be enough that comparative 
law has been a part of the interpretation of the human rights cases; instead it must be ‘at the 
                                                 
20 See about the pragmatic aims of comparative law, H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Aims of Comparative Law’, in Jan M. 
Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing: Northampton, 2006), 57–65; 
see arguments for and against the use of foreign law, Martin Gelter and Mathias M. Siems, ‘Citations to Foreign 
Courts – Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe’, 62 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1 (2014) 35–85 at 37–42. 
21 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, supra note 10, at 15. 
22 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, 32 McGill Law Journal (1987) 261–98 at 293. 
23 See e.g. R.G. Fentiman, ‘Foreign Law in National Courts’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan 
Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 13–31 at 29. 
24 Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, supra note 22. 
25 See Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 2001). 
26  See US Supreme Court’s judge Scalia refers in its dissenting opinion to the ‘practices of the “world 
community”, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.’ (Atkins v. Virginia, 563 
US 304 at 348). 
27  See Esin Örücü, ‘Whither Comparativism in Human Rights Cases?’, in Esin Örücü (ed.), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, (UKNCCL: London, 2003), 229–42 at 230. Italics are by the author. 
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Comparative reasoning does not mean that in every case the foreign law in question is to be 
followed or perceived to be binding; its relevance rests at the level of persuasive authority.24 
Comparative law in human rights cases seems obvious for those who support the universality 
of human rights - it is after all the same human right that is being applied.25 For those who 
support cultural relativism, however, the use of comparisons is pointless as rights are 
culturally determined.26 Claimants of the universality of human rights have gone even further, 
arguing that ‘if comparative human rights is to be the basis of some form of new natural law, 
then domestic courts, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice 
must discover the true meaning of human rights not only by looking forward but by looking 
sideways, at each other and beyond’.27 Moreover it is not seen to be enough that comparative 
law has been a part of the interpretation of the human rights cases; instead it must be ‘at the 
                                                 
20 See about the pragmatic aims of comparative law, H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Aims of Comparative Law’, in Jan M. 
Smits (ed.), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing: Northampton, 2006), 57–65; 
see arguments for and against the use of foreign law, Martin Gelter and Mathias M. Siems, ‘Citations to Foreign 
Courts – Illegitimate and Superfluous, or Unavoidable? Evidence from Europe’, 62 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1 (2014) 35–85 at 37–42. 
21 Zweigert and Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, supra note 10, at 15. 
22 H. Patrick Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, 32 McGill Law Journal (1987) 261–98 at 293. 
23 See e.g. R.G. Fentiman, ‘Foreign Law in National Courts’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan 
Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 13–31 at 29. 
24 Glenn, ‘Persuasive Authority’, supra note 22. 
25 See Eva Brems, Human Rights: Universality and Diversity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 2001). 
26  See US Supreme Court’s judge Scalia refers in its dissenting opinion to the ‘practices of the “world 
community”, whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.’ (Atkins v. Virginia, 563 
US 304 at 348). 
27  See Esin Örücü, ‘Whither Comparativism in Human Rights Cases?’, in Esin Örücü (ed.), Judicial 
Comparativism in Human Rights Cases, (UKNCCL: London, 2003), 229–42 at 230. Italics are by the author. 
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heart of human rights cases’.28 According to that view, human rights are to be regarded as 
embodying principles that are universal rather than purely domestic or even European.29 
Universal human rights seem however to be a rather unrealistic vision. The universalist 
argument can only work at the level of regional legal systems. At the European level for 
example it is more plausible to talk about regionally shared conceptions of human rights - that 
is, the ius commune of human rights.30 
Comparative law’s central role, especially in human rights cases, has been emphasised by 
researchers. 31 Kentridge has sketched three reasons for why comparative reasoning is 
especially necessary in human rights cases. The first reason is the close family relationship 
between modern domestic bills or charters of rights in different countries. Instruments like the 
ECHR and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be traced back to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common ancestor. As the basis of these human 
rights is the same, human rights conventions should thus be interpreted taking each other into 
account.32 Secondly, many of the concepts found in a bill of rights are broadly stated. It is not 
easy to find judicial standards by which to assess the scope of, for example, the right to life, 
or freedom from cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. The body applying the law 
should recognise the dangers of an entirely subjective approach. Finally, comparative law 
enables the judge to test his or her value-judgment against the judgments of other judges 
grappling with similar provisions. It has been emphasised that in particular Articles 9, 10 and 
11 of the ECHR, which permit limitations on the rights stated, should be applied with a 
comparative law point of view.33 
 
2.2. The Use of Comparative Reasoning by the ECtHR 
The use of comparative legal argumentation in the ECtHR should mean much more than 
simply looking at the solutions to certain problems provided by the legal orders of the 
Contracting States. Some judges use comparative reasoning as part of the justification for a 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), 
Comparative Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) 371–97, at 373. 
31 See e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, 29 University of Richmond 
Law Review (1994) 99–137, who sees that transjudicial communication is particularly potent in the human rights 
field (at 132). 
32 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2000) 499–532 at 501. 
33 Sydney Kentridge, ‘Comparing Human Rights Jurisdictions’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan 
Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 235–42 at 235–6. 
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particular decision. In this way comparativism becomes a part of the process of reaching a 
more fully theorised result.34 Comparison can essentially become one of the methods of 
interpretation of the Convention. Comparison can however also be used as a part of other 
methods of interpretation, for example as a part of dynamic interpretation. Furthermore, 
comparative reasoning may have a significant role to play when the Court is applying the 
margin of appreciation doctrine.35 Comparative legal argumentation can also have functions 
other than an interpretative function: in the ECtHR’s judgments, for example, it can have a 
purely cognitive function. 
It has been pointed out that the ECtHR further uses comparative legal reasoning in an 
invisible way during the interpretative process.36 Although a brief comparative survey may 
have been before the judges during proceedings, it is often entirely absent from the final 
judgment. In these cases the comparative survey does no more than confirm an interpretation 
already arrived at by the Court on the basis of other considerations.37 Furthermore, it has been 
indicated that just because the judges in a certain court might never refer to a foreign case, 
piece of legislation, or doctrinal work, it does not follow that the comparison has no relevance 
or role for the Court.38 This invisibility cannot, however, be seen as a positive outcome. 
Judicial decision-making should be based upon open and transparent reasoning if it hopes to 
attain greater legitimacy. Scarce resources cannot serve as an excuse for the invisible way 
comparative law is sometimes used. In these cases it is rather misleading to even talk about 
such use as comparative legal reasoning. 
It is rather common for comparative law material to be provided before the Court by both the 
applicant and the respondent Government. Third-party interveners usually provide further 
comparative law material about the subject before the Court. 39  The Court itself rather 
regularly provides comparative law material in the case at hand.40 However, the Court’s 
preparatory work on the relevant comparative law aspects is not consistently done, and 
                                                 
34 McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 374. 
35 See Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 143–5.  
36 Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15, at 274. 
37 Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 149. 
38 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and the Courts’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve 
(eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 253–62 at 252. 
39 See e.g. Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8139/09, Judgment (17 January 2012), 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). In this case both the respondent Government and the 
applicant as well as the third party interveners provided comparative law material before the Court. 
40 See how the research division works Egbert Myjer, ‘Pieter van Dijk and His Favourite Strasbourg Judgment. 
Some Remarks on Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, in Marjolain van 
Roosmalen, Ben Vermeulen, Fried van Hoof and Marten Oosting (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles, 
Liber Amicorum Pieter van Dijk (Intersentia: Cambridge, 2013), 49–72 at 69–70. 
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28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds), 
Comparative Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) 371–97, at 373. 
31 See e.g. Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, 29 University of Richmond 
Law Review (1994) 99–137, who sees that transjudicial communication is particularly potent in the human rights 
field (at 132). 
32 See Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversations on 
Constitutional Rights’, 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4 (2000) 499–532 at 501. 
33 Sydney Kentridge, ‘Comparing Human Rights Jurisdictions’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan 
Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 235–42 at 235–6. 
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34 McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 374. 
35 See Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 143–5.  
36 Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15, at 274. 
37 Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 149. 
38 Geoffrey Samuel, ‘Comparative Law and the Courts’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve 
(eds), Comparative Law before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 253–62 at 252. 
39 See e.g. Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 8139/09, Judgment (17 January 2012), 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). In this case both the respondent Government and the 
applicant as well as the third party interveners provided comparative law material before the Court. 
40 See how the research division works Egbert Myjer, ‘Pieter van Dijk and His Favourite Strasbourg Judgment. 
Some Remarks on Consensus in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, in Marjolain van 
Roosmalen, Ben Vermeulen, Fried van Hoof and Marten Oosting (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles, 
Liber Amicorum Pieter van Dijk (Intersentia: Cambridge, 2013), 49–72 at 69–70. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
8 
 
depends inter alia on the interest of the Chamber judges, time limits, and resources, as well as 
the availability of comparative law material.  
What then is the legitimate way for the courts to use comparative reasoning? It has been 
stressed that great care must be taken when one talks of comparative law in the courts. Often 
one is not actually talking of comparative law but instead the consideration of foreign law, 
from which the court may or may not draw conclusions. Even if the comparative method is 
adopted, this does not in itself mean that comparison is at play.41 This critical aspect is, 
however, good to keep in mind when evaluating the comparative argumentation. 
There has been much discussion regarding exactly what way use of comparative reasoning 
before the courts can be considered legitimate. It has been stated that ‘[there is a] crucial 
difference between the legitimate use of foreign material as mere empirical evidence that 
legislation has a rational basis, and its use to buttress the court’s own decision to override 
legislation’.42 This distinction has been considered important due to the unhealthy effects of 
‘judicial adventurism’.43 Some scholars are ready to accept that comparative law can be used 
in a ‘rhetorical’ way. This decorative use means the court only shortly quotes materials from 
other legal systems. The second acceptable way for a court to use comparative law is in citing 
foreign material such as a judicial decision as part of the evidence to support an empirical 
conclusion that a particular approach is or is not workable in practice. It has been further 
pointed out that comparative data can be legitimately used in a cognitive manner. 
Accordingly, comparative law gives useful information to the Court and increases the Court’s 
awareness and thus the substantive legitimacy of the judgment.44 
It has been argued that an illegitimate way to use comparative reasoning is the citation of 
foreign material to establish a reason for why a human rights claim against a governmental 
entity should or should not succeed.45  The argument goes that a court must uphold the 
democratic decision of the legislature and cannot ignore the valid legislation by using 
comparative material from other legal systems. 
                                                 
41 Samuel,‘Comparative Law and the Courts’, supra note 38, at 254. 
42 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Judicial Tourism: What’s Wrong with the US Supreme Court Citing Foreign Law’, The 
Wall Street Journal, 2005, quoted in McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 
379. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15, at 274. 
45 McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 378–9. 
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It has been stated by the Court’s Judge Keller that ‘[w]hile I am generally in favour of citing 
international law materials, the Court should do this only where it is helpful for the reasoning 
in the case at hand...The bare citation of such judgments outside the comparative context is 
overly simplified and therefore misleading’.46 In other words, comparative arguments should 
either be used properly or not used at all. 
The principle of subsidiarity is a major reason for why comparative law is such a significant 
interpretative tool for the ECtHR. The enforcement machinery system set up under the ECHR 
is subsidiary to the national systems,47 and recognises that it can only properly function if the 
closely intertwined and interdependent Council of Europe and national legal orders are 
willing to ensure correct application of the ECHR. The ECtHR must therefore avoid going too 
far and may opt for a solution that is not necessarily the most ambitious - considered from the 
ECtHR’s perspective - but has the advantage of being compatible with the traditions of the 
Contracting States; taking particular care not to offend any special sensitivities of those 
Contracting States. 
This involves a balancing act. On the one hand, the ECtHR should instinctively seek the right 
balance between the interests of the ECHR and the acceptability of its ruling to national legal 
orders. It can therefore be maintained that the comparative approach provides an essential 
contribution in guaranteeing the effective application of the ECHR and the legitimacy of the 
Court.48 On the other hand, one can ask whether the Court should govern national law if it is 
itself led by or dependent on national law. According to that argument the Court should 
consider and base its judgments on how things ought to be according to the ECHR, not how 
things actually are on the national level.49 This is, however, based on misunderstandings – the 
Court uses comparative reasoning to fill the gaps of the ECHR’s provisions, not to override or 
replace the interpretation of the ECHR with national interpretations. 
 
3. Functions of the Comparative Reasoning: Case Law Study 
In this part of the article, case law of the Court from the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 will be 
analysed concerning comparative argumentation. The years are chosen to demonstrate the 
                                                 
46 Judge Keller’s dissenting opinion in Fáber v. Hungary, Application no. 40721/08, Judgment (24 July 2012), at 
para. 17. 
47 See Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 137. 
48 See this argument in the EU context, Koen Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal Orders or the European Union 
Variant of E Pluribus Unum’, in Guy Canivet, Mads Andenas and Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Comparative Law 
before the Courts (BIICL: London, 2004), 99–134 at 106. 
49 See Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 146. 
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potential change in the Court’s reasoning regarding the emerging use of comparative 
arguments. The first year (2002) is chosen to demonstrate the then emerging trend of the use 
of comparative law in the reasoning of the Court. 50  The five-year period is seen as an 
appropriate period to illustrate the progression of the use of comparative reasoning within the 
Convention system: the final year (2012) demonstrates the now relatively established use of 
comparative reasoning by the Court. The years could easily have been others (e.g. 2001, 
2006, 2011 etc.), but the choice of years is not decisive in this study. The research question 
concerns how comparative reasoning is used by the Court. In order to properly answer this 
question, I must first define the specific case law data which will be analysed. The study 
would be biased if I would take into account only cases which support my views.   
The search term was ‘comparative’. In total, 67 judgments were analysed.51 In 2002 there 
were only four cases where comparative reasoning was used; in 2007 there were 18 
judgments where comparative arguments could be found; and in 2012 the Court gave 45 
judgments where comparative legal reasoning played a role. These cases will be analysed 
from the Court’s point of view. 
Four different methods of using comparative argumentation can be found in the judgments of 
the Court. It has been stated that the case law of the Court displays a coherent and consistent 
approach to comparative references to national law. 52  This study separates comparative 
arguments according to their function within the Court’s reasoning.53 The first way of using 
comparative law is for cognitive purposes: comparative material is present at the preliminary 
fact-finding stage, but no further references exist in the later reasoning of the Court.  
Secondly, comparative law can be used in a decorative way. This means that comparative law 
material is briefly referred to in the reasoning without going into further depth. Thirdly, 
comparative law can softly steer the interpretation in a certain direction. Here comparative 
                                                 
50 On the beginning of the use of comparative law before the courts, see Hart, The Concept of Law, supra note 
17, at 24; Glenn, ‘Com-paring’, supra note 17, at 97. 
51 Inevitably, the term ‘comparative’ used in the case search might leave some relevant cases out, and there 
again, take other irrelevant cases into account. This problem is, however, evident and unavoidable in all 
researches based on case law study: one can never be sure that the search covers all possible relevant cases. In 
2012 there were 11 irrelevant cases out of 56 cases. In 2007 there were eight irrelevant cases out of 26 cases and 
in 2002 there were four irrelevant cases out of eight. In these cases, the word ‘comparative’ had another 
meaning. However, the search term ‘comparative’ can be seen as appropriate and justified, because it crystallises 
what is really looked at in the judgments. Two cases which were done only in French had to be left out of the 
study due to linguistic reasons. These were: Flamenbaum et autres c. France, Application nos. 3675/04 and 
23264/04, Judgment (13 December 2012); Ölan c. Turquie, Application nos. 41445/04, 41453/04, Judgment (2 
October 2012). 
52 Mahoney, ‘The Comparative Method’, supra note 9, at 150. 
53 See other categorisations of comparative arguments, Gelter and Siems, ‘Citations to Foreign Courts’, supra 
note 20, at 69–82. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
11 
 
material is directly referred to in the reasoning and there is therefore a link between the 
comparative material and the chosen interpretation. Fourthly, comparative material can play a 
decisive role, where the Court clearly states that the chosen interpretation is a direct result of 
the findings of the comparative material. 
This article has chosen to present the most representative examples of comparative argument 
functions in each particular category. The citations are thus chosen according to which 
examples best demonstrate the character of that particular argument. 
 
3.1. Cognitive Function 
Cognitive function means that the comparative section is included in the judgment but is not 
considered in the Court’s reasoning. The comparative law section is usually called ‘Relevant 
comparative law and practice’ or ‘Relevant international and comparative law material’. This 
section aims to show whether there are certain trends and similarities in interpretations. The 
material consists, frequently, of Council of Europe documents (from the Committee of 
Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, and Commissioner for Human Rights), United Nations 
documents (conventions, case law of the Human Rights Committee, International Court of 
Justice’s praxis, and ad hoc courts such as International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY)), the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and African 
Union materials. Furthermore, the legal practice of both Contracting States of the Council of 
Europe and non-European legal systems (such as those of Canada, the USA, New Zealand, 
Hong Kong, and South Africa) are presented. Curiously, this material is presented but not 
referred to at all in the reasoning of the judgments.  
The cognitive function appears to show that the Court is aware of the comparative solutions in 
question, even without explicit reference in its reasoning. It has been stated that this use of 
comparative law is not a mere coincidence but a deliberate choice by the Court. Comparative 
data is called upon to show that the Court is aware of the European legal context of the 
material issue.54 This, however, leaves open questions for the audience as to, for example, the 
role the comparative law material played in the interpretation of the ECHR and why several 
different, and perhaps contradictory, solutions were presented. Relevant considerations which 
affected the judgment are thus intentionally left out of the reasoning. 
                                                 
54 Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, ‘Informed Decision-Making’, supra note 15, at 281. 
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An example of cognitive function is visible in the case of Knecht, which dealt with the 
sensitive issue of artificial procreation.55 In this case comparative material is shortly presented 
in one paragraph called ‘Relevant domestic and comparative law’: 
An overview of the law and practice concerning artificial procreation 
in general and on the standards of quality and safety for the donation, 
procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and 
distribution of human tissue and cells in Europe is included in S.H. 
and Others v. Austria.56 
 
No reference to this paragraph is made in the reasoning of the judgment. The Court concluded 
that artificial procreation was still a sensitive moral and ethical issue, and thus the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the respondent State was a wide one. There was no mention or 
evaluation of the European consensus on this matter even though the Court explicitly applied 
the margin of appreciation doctrine.57 This case leaves a lot to be desired. Application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine requires an evaluation of the European consensus on this 
issue. The way of comparative law was used in this case was less than adequate, and it can be 
argued that this paragraph should have been left out of the judgment entirely as its role is 
artificial and virtually empty. The Court should have had more ambition in its use of 
comparative analysis.  
In the Grand Chamber’s judgment in de Souza Ribeiro an in-depth section called ‘Relevant 
International Instruments and Practice’ is provided.58 The section consists of: 
- Council of Europe’s instruments, such as, ‘Twenty guidelines on forced return’ 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers and the recommendation by the Commissioner 
for Human Rights; 
- Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
was included and specific Articles presented; 
- Concluding observations of the United Nations Human Rights Committee on the 
fourth periodic report of France. 
 
                                                 
55 Knecht v. Romania, Application no. 10048/10, Judgment (2 October 2012).  
56 Ibid., at para. 43. 
57 Ibid., at para. 59. Cf. e.g. Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, Application no. 76240/01, Judgment (28 June 
2007), at para. 128: ‘The scope of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the circumstances, the 
subject-matter and the context; in the respect one of the relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence of 
common ground between the laws of the Contracting States’. 
58 de Souza Ribeiro v. France, Application no. 22689/07, Judgment (13 December 2012), Grand Chamber, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
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There are no references to this comparative law material in the reasoning of the Court. The 
Grand Chamber, however, came to the opposite conclusion of the Chamber, finding a 
violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.59 One can assume that the comparative 
law material had an influence on the Court’s interpretation even though there is no direct sign 
of it in the reasoning. This creates questions and uncertainty: if the comparative law material 
affected the interpretation, it should be reflected in the reasoning. In order to convince the 
audience and to gain full legitimacy, the Court should be transparent in its reasoning.60 
In the Mouvement case the question was whether the State can prohibit the display of posters 
in public spaces which campaigned to promote, inter alia, human cloning.61 International 
Conventions are presented in the section ‘Relevant Law and Practice’, namely: 
- the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (also known as the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine or the Oviedo Convention); 
- Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention.  
 
There is no comparative reasoning in the judgment, and the survey concerning the two 
international conventions is brief. However, the Court’s majority was tight: by only nine votes 
to eight the Grand Chamber decided that there had been no violation of Article 10. The 
dissenting opinion by Judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vučinič presents comprehensive 
comparative reasoning on, for example, the nature of public space and the accessibility to all 
for the display of posters. 62  The dissenting opinion includes an appendix, containing a 
comparative survey of US and Canadian law and practice, as well as the practice of the 
German Constitutional Court.63 This gives the impression that comparative law reasoning was 
at least present during the deliberations of the 17 judges. This discussion is, however, 
nowhere in the majority’s reasoning, and unfortunately suggests ‘cherry-picking’ - a problem 
comparative researchers have long discussed.64 It is probable that the majority ignored the 
comparative survey as it did not support their chosen interpretation of the ECHR. The short 
list of international conventions concerning human cloning had no visible impact on their 
reasoning. 
                                                 
59 Ibid., at para. 99. 
60 Cf. Concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vučinič of de Souza Ribeiro v. 
France (2012), supra note 58, which takes comparative material greatly into account in the reasoning. 
61  Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, Judgment (13 July 2012), Grand 
Chamber, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
62 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion of judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vučinič, at 37. 
63 Ibid., at 44-5. 
64 See e.g. McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 388. 
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of it in the reasoning. This creates questions and uncertainty: if the comparative law material 
affected the interpretation, it should be reflected in the reasoning. In order to convince the 
audience and to gain full legitimacy, the Court should be transparent in its reasoning.60 
In the Mouvement case the question was whether the State can prohibit the display of posters 
in public spaces which campaigned to promote, inter alia, human cloning.61 International 
Conventions are presented in the section ‘Relevant Law and Practice’, namely: 
- the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
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59 Ibid., at para. 99. 
60 Cf. Concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vučinič of de Souza Ribeiro v. 
France (2012), supra note 58, which takes comparative material greatly into account in the reasoning. 
61  Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, Application no. 16354/06, Judgment (13 July 2012), Grand 
Chamber, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
62 Ibid., joint dissenting opinion of judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vučinič, at 37. 
63 Ibid., at 44-5. 
64 See e.g. McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 388. 
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In the D.H. case the comparative section was exceptionally detailed.65 First there was a 
section called ‘Council of Europe Sources’ which included, inter alia, recommendations of 
the Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly, policy recommendations and 
reports by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) and Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 66  A further section, ‘Relevant 
Community Law and Practice’, contained the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
three Council Directives, and several judgments of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities.67  Furthermore, the section ‘Relevant United Nations Materials’ included a 
comprehensive list of UN materials, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, a General Comment and Communication by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, General Comments by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. A final section entitled ‘Other 
Sources’ contained further comparative material by the European Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia as well as case law from the United Kingdom House of Lords and 
the United States Supreme Court. 
The Grand Chamber did not use all the comparative material in its reasoning. There is no 
mention in the reasoning about the case law of the House of Lords, the US Supreme Court or 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. In addition, the extensive UN material is 
bypassed quickly: ‘supervisory bodies of the United Nations treaties habitually accept 
statistics as evidence’. 68  More consideration could have been given to, for example, the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child in the instant case. 
Cognitive function is problematic from the point of view of justifiability. It shows that 
comparative material had been available to the judges but was not used in the reasoning part 
                                                 
65 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, Judgment (13 November 2007), Grand 
Chamber, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2007-IV). 
66 Recommendation No. R (2000) of the Committee of Ministers; Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 
No. 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe; Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation No. 1557 (2002) on the 
legal situation of Roma in Europe; General Policy Recommendation No. 3 (1998) by the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI); General Policy Recommendation No. 7 (2002) by ECRI; ECRI report 
on the Czech Republic of 1997; ECRI report on the Czech Republic of 2000; ECRI report on the Czech Republic 
of 2004; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; Final Report on the Human Rights 
Situation of the Roma, Sinti and Travellers in Europe (2006) by the Commissioner for Human Rights. 
67 Council Directive 97/80/EC on burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex; Council Directive 
2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin; Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009 the name of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities has been the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
68 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic (2007), supra note 65, at para. 187. 
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of the judgment. It informs the reader that the judges were aware of the comparative aspects 
of the legal question at hand, but leaves unclear the extent to which the comparative data 
affected the chosen interpretation and why. These questions are relevant from the justifiability 
point of view. 
 
3.2. Decorative Function 
In the decorative manner comparative law’s role may look undeniably narrow. In these cases, 
comparative reasoning pops up rather surprisingly and the argumentation is rather loose and 
short. In the Court’s judgments, comparative reasoning is quite often used only as decoration 
in support of the chosen interpretation. The decorative use is, however, vulnerable to 
criticism. A short and loose use as only part of the chain of reasons can be seen to be 
neglectful or to underestimate the audience. More depth is required in order to be truly 
convincing. 
It has been argued that references to comparative law are often no more than ‘decorative’69 or 
an ‘accident’70. The point is well-founded but some caution should still be considered when 
making such criticisms. According to Nelken, criticising the decorative manner in 
comparative reasoning depends on how the institutional and constitutional roles of judges are 
perceived. Judges can be seen as bonded to the requirements of their own domestic legal 
culture.71 Furthermore, in some cases the comparative aspect may appear as a decoration, but 
in reality may have played a decisive role in the judgment. 
A decorative reference to comparative law is seen in the case of Yordanova.72 The case 
concerned removal of people of Roma origin from their makeshift houses. When evaluating 
whether the State’s order to remove the inhabitants was justified under Article 8 paragraph 2, 
the Court paid attention to the Government’s assertion that the applicants’ removal was the 
appropriate solution. The Court did not accept the Government’s claim of appropriateness of 
the removal as there was no proof that alternative methods of dealing with the risks had been 
                                                 
69 See e.g. McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 378. 
70  See e.g. Ulrich Drobning, ‘General Report’, in Ulrich Drobning and Sjef van Erp (eds), The Use of 
Comparative Law by Courts (Kluwer Law International: London, 1999), 3–21 at 4. 
71 See David Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
(eds), Comparative Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007), 3–42 at 37. 
72 Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application no. 25446/06, Judgment (24 April 2012). 
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69 See e.g. McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’, supra note 30, at 378. 
70  See e.g. Ulrich Drobning, ‘General Report’, in Ulrich Drobning and Sjef van Erp (eds), The Use of 
Comparative Law by Courts (Kluwer Law International: London, 1999), 3–21 at 4. 
71 See David Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken 
(eds), Comparative Law a Handbook (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007), 3–42 at 37. 
72 Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application no. 25446/06, Judgment (24 April 2012). 
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seriously studied by the authorities.73 The Court continued that there were a wide range of 
different options to be considered in respect of unlawful Roma settlements: 
Among those are legalizing buildings where possible, constructing 
public sewage and water-supply facilities and providing assistance to 
find alternative housing where eviction is necessary (see paragraphs 
…73-83…above).74 
 
The paragraphs to which the Court refers consist of Council of Europe materials: a decision 
against Bulgaria delivered by the Council of Europe’s European Committee of Social Rights, 
a resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, a 
recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, as well as 
a resolution by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and a recommendation 
by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights.75 In addition, European Union 
documents are listed; namely, the comparative report by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights. Furthermore the General Comment concerning forced evictions and the 
right to adequate housing by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is contained in the section on ‘Relevant international material’.76 
This way of using comparative law material is far from comparative reasoning. It is a blunt 
use of comparative law in a purely decorative manner – a short reference to the paragraphs 
where comparative law material has been presented. It is, however, certainly possible and 
even highly likely that there was more discussion amongst the judges on the findings of the 
comparative material than the text suggests. This discussion is left absent from the final 
decision. 
A short reference to comparative law material is made, for example, in the case of 
Khodzhamberdiyev.77 Here the ECtHR concluded that the applicant was no longer at risk of 
treatment in breach of Article 3 as the domestic court had already annulled the extradition 
order.78 In the next paragraph, however, the Court points out that: 
[T]he Moscow Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNCHR) Representation informed…that the UNCHR had 
determined that the applicant met the criteria set out in its Statue in 
                                                 
73 Ibid., at para. 124. 
74 Ibid., at para. 125. 
75 Ibid., at paras 73-79. 
76 Ibid., at paras 80-83. 
77 Khodzhamberdiyev v. Russia, Application no. 64809/10, Judgment (5 June 2012). 
78 Ibid., at paras 73-74. 
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connection with the Article 1 A of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees.79 
 
This reference to a comparative authoritative source of law is rather surprising, considering 
that the ECtHR had already declared that a breach of Article 3 was not in question. The 
reference to the UNCHR is thus rather loose and serves only a decorative function. 
In Samsonnikov the question was whether the expulsion of a second-generation immigrant 
violated the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8.80 The Court concluded 
that in this context - where the applicant had several convictions for drug smuggling and 
violence - an absolute right not to be expelled could not be derived from Article 8, regardless 
of whether an alien entered the host country as an adult, at a very young age, or indeed even if 
he or she was born there.81 After entering its conclusions, the Court added: ‘Furthermore, 
according to the Recommendation Rec(2000)15 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe, each member state should have the option to provide in its internal law’.82 This 
addition seems superfluous as it only further supports the outcome already made. 
In the case of Aslakhanova comparative reasoning was used in interpreting Article 46.83 The 
substantial Articles in which the Court unanimously found violations were, inter alia, Article 
2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) and 
Article 5 (right to liberty). Even though a long section was included in the judgment 
concerning international and comparative law on enforced disappearances, the interpretation 
of these Articles did not contain any comparative argumentation.84 
Article 46 requires that Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the 
Court in any case to which they are party. Moreover, the Article says that the final judgment 
of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its 
execution. The Court can exceptionally take into consideration consequences which may be 
drawn from Article 46. The Court reiterated that Article 46, taken in conjunction with Article 
1, imposes a legal obligation on the respondent state to implement appropriate general and/or 
                                                 
79 Ibid., at para. 75. 
80 Samsonnikov v. Estonia, Application no. 52178/10, Judgment (3 July 2012). 
81 Ibid., at para. 90. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, Application nos. 2944/06, 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08 and 42509/10, 
Judgment (18 December 2012). 
84 Ibid., at paras 60-68 (called ‘III International and Comparative Legal Instruments in the Area of Enforced 
Disappearances’) and at paras 69-79 (called ‘IV International and Domestic Reports on Disappearances in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia’).  
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79 Ibid., at para. 75. 
80 Samsonnikov v. Estonia, Application no. 52178/10, Judgment (3 July 2012). 
81 Ibid., at para. 90. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, Application nos. 2944/06, 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08 and 42509/10, 
Judgment (18 December 2012). 
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individual measures to secure the rights of the applicant. The Court also made further general 
references to wider international law.85 
The Court emphasised that this international principle has been consistently acknowledged by 
the Committee of Ministers in its supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments. The 
Court further observed that it is not its task to decide what measures of redress may be 
appropriate for a respondent State to take in accordance with its obligations under Article 46. 
The Court’s concern is instead to facilitate the rapid and effective suppression of the 
shortcomings found within the national system.86 
Under Article 46 the Court may find that there is a systemic practice incompatible with the 
Convention - an accumulation of identical breaches which are sufficiently numerous and 
inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or 
system of incompatibility.87 The Court repeated its findings of severe violations of Articles 2, 
3, 5 and 13 by the Russian Government. The Court had regularly found violations of the same 
rights in similar cases: more than 120 such judgments had been adopted by September 2012. 
Moreover, more than 100 similar cases had been communicated to the Government and yet 
more were currently pending before the Court. As a result, it was easy for the Court to 
conclude that the situation in the present case must be characterised as resulting from 
systemic problems at national level, for which there was no effective domestic remedy.88 
Before coming to these conclusions, the Court referred to the comparative material: ‘The 
widespread nature of the above-mentioned problems is attested by other relevant sources, 
including national and international bodies, and statements by various public officials’.89 
This kind of comparative reasoning would be more convincing if the content of these 
comparative authoritative sources was opened up. The Court ended up providing guidance to 
the Russian authorities in order to solve the systemic failure to investigate disappearances in 
the Northern Caucasus. 
In the Fáber case there was only a short reference to the comparative material.90 The section 
‘Relevant Domestic and International Texts’ broadly presents reports of the European 
                                                 
85 Ibid., at para. 210. 
86 ‘The Contracting State’s duty in international law to comply with the requirements of the Convention may 
require action to be taken by any State authority, including the legislature’. Ibid., at paras 210-211. 
87 Ibid., at para. 212. 
88 Ibid., at paras 216-217. 
89 Ibid., at para. 218. 
90 Fáber v. Hungary (2012), supra note 46. 
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Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Hungary, UN Human Rights Committee’s 
interpretation, a decision by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), as 
well as recent case law from the US Supreme Court. The Court’s reasoning, however, only 
makes one brief reference to this comparative material.91 
This reference, to the European Commission (not Committee, as the Court wrongly claims) 
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), was used to help evaluate whether the display of the 
flag in question constituted a reprehensible act in the context of the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression. The referred ECRI’s report contained evaluation of the extreme right-
wing’s movements in Hungary and their use of certain flags. After referring to the ECRI’s 
report, the Court came to the conclusion that the applicant’s decision to display that flag must 
be regarded as an expression of his political views. 
As to the question of freedom of expression - when balanced against the counter 
demonstrators’ right to protect against disruption of their assembly - there may have been a 
lot more relevant information to take from the comparative material, such as the practice of 
the UN Human Rights Committee and US Supreme Court praxis. It can also, however, be 
argued that it would have been better to forget entirely about this kind of comparative 
reasoning. There would have been more to cite in comparative law material than simply 
whether the display of a flag constituted a reprehensible act in the context of the applicant’s 
right to freedom of expression, especially when it appeared the flags played no role in 
evaluating the danger which these members created.92 
The right to adopt arose before the Court in the case of Wagner.93 The Court made brief 
reference to the comparative material: ‘[T]he positive obligations that Article 8 lays on the 
Contracting States in this matter must be interpreted in the light of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’.94 
Further, the Court took into account the comparative material when it considered how 
children’s rights had been respected by the national authorities: ‘[T]he Court reiterates the 
terms of Recommendation 1443 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
                                                 
91 Ibid., at para. 52. 
92 Ibid., at para. 56. There is an opposing view as to how comparative material should be used in the Court’s 
reasoning, see dissenting opinion of Judge Keller in Fáber v. Hungary (2012), supra note 46, at para. 17. 
93 Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg (2007), supra note 57. 
94 Ibid., at para. 120. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
18 
 
individual measures to secure the rights of the applicant. The Court also made further general 
references to wider international law.85 
The Court emphasised that this international principle has been consistently acknowledged by 
the Committee of Ministers in its supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments. The 
Court further observed that it is not its task to decide what measures of redress may be 
appropriate for a respondent State to take in accordance with its obligations under Article 46. 
The Court’s concern is instead to facilitate the rapid and effective suppression of the 
shortcomings found within the national system.86 
Under Article 46 the Court may find that there is a systemic practice incompatible with the 
Convention - an accumulation of identical breaches which are sufficiently numerous and 
inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or 
system of incompatibility.87 The Court repeated its findings of severe violations of Articles 2, 
3, 5 and 13 by the Russian Government. The Court had regularly found violations of the same 
rights in similar cases: more than 120 such judgments had been adopted by September 2012. 
Moreover, more than 100 similar cases had been communicated to the Government and yet 
more were currently pending before the Court. As a result, it was easy for the Court to 
conclude that the situation in the present case must be characterised as resulting from 
systemic problems at national level, for which there was no effective domestic remedy.88 
Before coming to these conclusions, the Court referred to the comparative material: ‘The 
widespread nature of the above-mentioned problems is attested by other relevant sources, 
including national and international bodies, and statements by various public officials’.89 
This kind of comparative reasoning would be more convincing if the content of these 
comparative authoritative sources was opened up. The Court ended up providing guidance to 
the Russian authorities in order to solve the systemic failure to investigate disappearances in 
the Northern Caucasus. 
In the Fáber case there was only a short reference to the comparative material.90 The section 
‘Relevant Domestic and International Texts’ broadly presents reports of the European 
                                                 
85 Ibid., at para. 210. 
86 ‘The Contracting State’s duty in international law to comply with the requirements of the Convention may 
require action to be taken by any State authority, including the legislature’. Ibid., at paras 210-211. 
87 Ibid., at para. 212. 
88 Ibid., at paras 216-217. 
89 Ibid., at para. 218. 
90 Fáber v. Hungary (2012), supra note 46. 
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Commission against Racism and Intolerance on Hungary, UN Human Rights Committee’s 
interpretation, a decision by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), as 
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91 Ibid., at para. 52. 
92 Ibid., at para. 56. There is an opposing view as to how comparative material should be used in the Court’s 
reasoning, see dissenting opinion of Judge Keller in Fáber v. Hungary (2012), supra note 46, at para. 17. 
93 Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg (2007), supra note 57. 
94 Ibid., at para. 120. 
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Europe’. 95  The references are again short, but make clear that the comparative material 
directly affected the interpretation. 
In the Evans case the applicant complained that provisions of English law - requiring embryos 
to be destroyed once the man withdraws his consent to their continued storage - violated both 
the embryo’s right to life (Article 2) and the applicant’s right to respect for her private and 
family life (Article 8).96 The Grand Chamber evaluated the balance of the applicant’s rights 
against the rights of the man who withdrew his consent: ‘[T]his difficulty is also reflected in 
the range of views by the two panels of Israeli Supreme Court in Nachmani and in the United 
States case-law’.97 
Comparative reasoning was present in the D.H. case, where Roma children were channelled 
to special schools.98 The applicants maintained they had been discriminated against on the 
basis of their race or ethnic origin (alleged violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1). First, the Grand Chamber emphasised the emerging consensus 
concerning the special needs of minorities: ‘[T]here could be said to be an emerging 
international consensus among the Contracting States…recognising the special needs of 
minorities and obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle’.99 
The Court did not, however, develop this consensus argumentation any further. Nor is any 
further mention made in the rest of the Court’s reasoning. The Court additionally referred to 
the comparative authoritative material: 
[S]ee also the general observations in the Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Recommendation No. 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe…and point 4 
of its Recommendation no. 1557 (2002) on the legal situation of Roma 
in Europe…As is attested by the activities of numerous European and 
international organisations and the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe bodies…this protection also extends to the sphere of 
education.100 
 
The Court referred also to EU law material: ‘In accordance with…Council Directives 
97/80/EC and 2000/43/EC…and the definition provided by ECRI…such a situation may 
                                                 
95 Ibid., at para. 126. 
96 Evans v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 6339/05, Judgment (10 April 2007), Grand Chamber, Reports 
of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2007-I). 
97 Ibid., at para. 80. 
98 D.H. and Others v. The Czech Republic (2007), supra note 65. In this judgment some comparative material is 
used decoratively, while other sections are left cognitive purposes (these are dealt above). 
99 Ibid., at para. 181. 
100 Ibid., at para. 182. 
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amount to “indirect discrimination”’.101 Accordingly, the Court concluded (by thirteen votes 
to four) that there has been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 1. 
These citations clearly show that comparative material is used in the Court’s argumentation 
and does affect the interpretation of the ECHR. Even though reference to comparative 
material is brief and is often left unexplained as to the comparative material’s input and 
weight on the interpretation, it still works to convince the audience. For this reason the 
decorative manner of comparative reasoning should not automatically be seen as bad 
argumentation. 
 
3.3. Directional Function 
Directional function means that comparative arguments play a role in channelling the 
interpretation in a certain direction. The comparative arguments do not, however, play a 
decisive role; only a directional one. In these cases decisive arguments come from other 
sources.102 
In Sitaropoulos comparative material was centrally present in the judgment.103 The question 
was whether Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was violated when two Greek nationals were unable 
to vote in the Greek Parliamentary elections from abroad. The case was handled initially in 
the Chamber’s First Section104 and then, on the Government’s request, in the Grand Chamber. 
The Grand Chamber operated with an extensive range of comparative material concerning the 
right to vote from abroad. The sections which go through the international and comparative 
material contain 15 paragraphs (from paragraph 21 to paragraph 45). 
The comparative law material was taken into account in the Court’s reasoning. First, the 
Court shaped the general principles relating to the right to vote. The Court reiterated the effect 
of possible consensus among Contracting States with regard to the interpretation of the 
Convention. It further emphasised that the existence or non-existence of common ground 
between Contracting States is one of the relevant factors in determining the scope of an 
                                                 
101 Ibid., at para. 184. 
102 In the categories of directional and decisive functions it must be emphasised that the selection used in this 
article might leave some relevant cases aside; namely, comparison between two systems can clearly be made 
without using the word ‘comparative’. Still, the word ‘comparative’ used in the search of directional and 
decisive arguments is well-founded, since usually a comparative material section is included in the judgment 
before leaning on them in the reasoning. 
103 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece, Application no. 42202/07, Judgment (15 March 2012), Grand 
Chamber, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
104 Sitaropoulos and Others v. Greece, Application no. 42202/07, Judgment (8 July 2010). 
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authority’s margin of appreciation. 105  The Court used the comparative survey from this 
consensus angle and stated: 
Furthermore, a comparative survey of the legislation of Council of 
Europe member States in this sphere shows that, while the great 
majority of them allow their nationals to vote from abroad, some do 
not…However, as regards those States which do allow voting from 
abroad, closer examination reveals that the arrangements for the 
exercise of expatriates’ voting rights are not uniform, but take a 
variety of forms.106 
 
This conclusion is rather interesting. It was clear that there was a great majority of 
Contracting States that allowed voting from abroad. The Court then looked at how voting 
from abroad is arranged in these States. As a result, where arrangements for the exercise of 
expatriates’ voting rights vary, the Court seemed to come to the conclusion that there was no 
consensus between the Contracting States on the matter at hand. The Court laconically 
concluded: ‘As to the arrangements for exercising that right put in place by those Council of 
Europe member States that allow voting from abroad, there is currently a wide variety of 
approaches’.107 
This takes us back to the question: what is actually meant by ‘common ground’ or 
‘consensus’ amongst Contracting States? European consensus basically means there is a 
common understanding or clear trend of interpretation on a certain issue.108 But it is rather 
misleading to state that the European consensus would demand that all the countries have 
similar arrangements on the issue at hand. On the contrary, European consensus arguably 
refers to a broader view on how Contracting States react to a certain issue, rather than how 
they technically solved it. 
In this judgment the Court defined the European consensus by paying attention to the variable 
arrangements between the Contracting States and came to the conclusion that there was no 
consensus on the right to vote from abroad. This finding was not, however, decisive to the 
outcome of the interpretation. It only directed and supported the final interpretation. In this 
case the decisive consideration was the domestic constitutional revision concerning voting 
                                                 
105 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (2012), supra note 103, at para. 66. 
106 Ibid., at para. 74. 
107 Ibid., at para. 75. 
108  See e.g. Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Application no. 30078/06, Judgment (22 March 2012), Grand 
Chamber, Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012), at para. 126. 
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rights. The Court emphasised the constitutional revision in Greek legislation which was about 
to come into force, deciding it would improve the exercise of the voting rights from abroad.109 
There was thus a unanimous conclusion by the Grand Chamber that there had been no breach 
of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It is worth noting that the Chamber had come to the opposite 
conclusion. In the Chamber’s judgment the European consensus was seen differently, finding  
there was a consensus between the Contracting States on the right to vote from abroad.110 The 
Chamber explicitly based its interpretation on this consensus: ‘[T]hat Greece clearly falls 
short of the common denominator among Contracting States as regards the effective exercise 
of voting rights by expatriates’.111 
These cases give a good example of how the same comparative argumentation can play 
different roles: in the Chamber’s judgment the comparative arguments played a decisive role, 
whereas in the Grand Chamber’s ruling it played only a directional role. This is a revealing 
example of the difficulties that lie in defining European consensus. 
Besides consensus argumentation, the Court made wider use of the international texts and 
practices. The Court said that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 should be interpreted with reference 
to the relevant international and comparative law and to the domestic law of the country 
concerned.112 The Court continued to the findings of the international texts and practice:  
Firstly, with regard to the international law, the Court notes that 
neither the relevant international and regional treaties – such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights – nor their interpretation by the competent 
international bodies provide a basis for concluding that voting rights 
for persons temporarily or permanently absent from the State of which 
they are nationals extend so far as to require the State concerned to 
make arrangements for their exercise abroad.113 
 
The Court made reference to the international documents and concludes that the international 
texts did not impose a direct obligation on the states, but rather recommendations: 
                                                 
109 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (2012), supra note 103, at paras 46-78. 
110 In the Chamber’s judgment there were fewer international law and comparative law sections (contained only 
texts of the Council of Europe and the comparative survey of the Contracting States’ practices was limited to one 
paragraph). See Sitaropoulos and Others v. Greece (2010), supra note 104, at paras 18-19.  
111 Ibid., at para. 46. 
112 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (2012), supra note 103, at para. 71. 
113 Ibid., at para. 72. 
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[T]he institutions of the Council of Europe have, inter alia, invited 
member States to enable their citizens living abroad to participate to 
the fullest extent possible in the electoral process. Hence, Resolution 
1459 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe…states that member States should take appropriate 
measures…Furthermore, in Recommendation 1714 (2005), the 
Parliamentary Assembly…aimed at improving the conditions…While 
it [the Venice Commission] also recommended that member States 
facilitate the exercise of expatriates’ voting rights, it did not consider 
that they were obliged to do so.114 
 
The Court admitted that there is a strong international and European tendency to improve 
external voting rights, but concluded that there was no obligation to do so. The Court repeated 
the outcome of the international texts: ‘[N]one of the legal instruments examined above forms 
a basis for concluding that, as the law currently stands States are under an obligation to enable 
citizens living abroad to exercise the right to vote’.115 
Usually when the Court observes that there is a clear course according to international texts 
and practice, it has used dynamic interpretation to expand the State’s obligations in line with 
the present-day conditions. 116  Further, the effectiveness principle has meant that the 
Convention must be interpreted so that the rights are practical and effective, rather than 
theoretical or illusory.117 A dynamic interpretation could have turned the interpretation of 
external voting rights in the opposite direction. The comparative material would also have 
supported this: there is a clear trend in international texts to support external voting rights, 
even if there is not yet any clear obligation. Comparative law reasoning can, in this case, 
support either of these outcomes. It depends on what factors one emphasises - either the 
clearly-stated no-obligation, or the looser recommendation to improve external voting rights. 
The directional role of the comparative reasoning was also present in the Grand Chamber’s 
Boulois case.118 The applicant complained that he had been deprived of his right to a fair 
hearing and his right of access to a court in connection with the refusal of his requests for 
prison leave under Article 6. The Grand Chamber first examined whether Article 6 was 
applicable and whether a right to prison leave existed; the application of Article 6 demands 
                                                 
114 Ibid., at para. 73. 
115 Ibid., at para. 75. 
116 See about the ‘in the light of present-day conditions’ interpretation e.g. I v. The United Kingdom, Application 
no. 25680/94, Judgment (11 July 2002), Grand Chamber, at para. 55. 
117 See e.g. Coeme and Others v. Belgium, Application nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 
33210/96, Judgment (22 June 2000), Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2000-VII), at para 98. 
118 Boulois v. Luxembourg, Application no. 37575/04, Judgment (3 April 2012), Grand Chamber, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
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that there must be a dispute over a ‘civil right or obligation’. This was the main question of 
the case. 
After examination of the national legislation, the Court pointed out that it is apparent that the 
applicant cannot claim to possess a ‘right’ recognised in the domestic legal system. Neither 
the ECHR nor the Protocols further provided expressly for such a right. The comparative 
reasoning also directed the Court to conclude that no such right existed: 
Lastly, no consensus exists among member States regarding the status 
of prison leave and the arrangements for granting it. In some 
countries, the decision-making authority is obliged to grant leave once 
the statutory conditions are met, while in others it enjoys complete 
discretion in the matter. Similarly, not all States provide avenues of 
appeal against decisions refusing prison leave.119 
 
The Court emphasised that the Luxembourg authorities provided other means of achieving the 
reintegration of prisoners back to society in addition to prison leave. The ECtHR paid further 
attention to the national law reform which was under way concerning the execution of 
sentences and the establishment of a post-sentencing court. These were the decisive parts of 
the reasoning. After these considerations, the Court did not have to go further in examining 
whether the body who decides on prison leave - or the proceedings overall - fulfilled the 
requirements of a fair trial. The Court concluded by 15 votes to two that Article 6 was not 
applicable, and hence there had been no breach of Article 6. 
Questions of the requirements of a fair trial under Article 6 were interestingly visible in the 
case of Marini.120 The applicant complained that in domestic court proceedings he was denied 
his right of access to a court due to the tied vote in the Constitutional Court’s decision. 
According to the Albanian Constitutional Court Organisation Act (‘the CCOA’) the 
Constitutional Court must dismiss individual appeals in the event of a tied vote. It is worth 
noting that the Albanian Constitutional Court sits in a seven-judge formation, and it is 
impossible for any judge on the bench to abstain from voting.121 
The ECtHR determinedly concluded that the Constitutional Court’s failure to reach a majority 
on the proposals placed before it left the applicant without any final determination on his case, 
and thus restricted the essence of his right of access to a court. The Court continued that, 
                                                 
119 Ibid., at para. 102. 
120 Marini v. Albania, Application no. 3738/02, Judgment (18 December 2007). 
121 Ibid., at para. 119. 
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Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
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that there must be a dispute over a ‘civil right or obligation’. This was the main question of 
the case. 
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case of Marini.120 The applicant complained that in domestic court proceedings he was denied 
his right of access to a court due to the tied vote in the Constitutional Court’s decision. 
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119 Ibid., at para. 102. 
120 Marini v. Albania, Application no. 3738/02, Judgment (18 December 2007). 
121 Ibid., at para. 119. 
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leaning on other Contracting States’ practice, the Albanian solution differed greatly from 
others: ‘[T]he approach adopted in Albania…appear to differ significantly from that adopted 
in the legal systems of other Contracting Parties’.122 
After these findings, the Court concluded that the tied vote arrangements foreseen in the 
CCOA do not serve the interests of legal certainty and are capable of depriving an applicant 
of an effective right to have his constitutional appeal finally determined. Consequently, the 
ECtHR unanimously held that there had been a violation of the right to access a court under 
Article 6. The comparative arguments’ function had obviously been to show that the Albanian 
system is not typical and that all other Contracting States had resolved the question 
differently. 
A well-known incident concerning the Arab Spring and its consequences came before the 
Court in the Hirsi Jamaa case.123 The applicants complained, inter alia, that they had been 
exposed to the risk of inhuman and degrading treatment (Article 3) in Libya. More precisely, 
the applicants alleged that they had been the victims of an arbitrary refoulement, in violation 
of the ECHR, when Italian authorities had returned them back to Libya. 
The Grand Chamber used a wide range of international reports from different organisations 
(such as those of NGOs and the Council of Europe’s Committees) in order to gain a reliable 
picture of the situation in Libya at that time.124 The Court noted that the situation was well-
known and easy to verify on the basis of multiple sources. The Italian authorities therefore 
knew or should have known that, as irregular immigrants, the applicants would be exposed in 
Libya to treatment in breach of the ECHR.125 The Court leant to the authority sources: 
[T]he Court notes that none of the provisions of international law cited 
by the Government justified the applicants being pushed back to 
Libya…impose on States the obligation to fulfil the obligations arising 
out of international refugee law, including the ‘non-refoulement’ 
principle.126 
 
The Court continued, leaning especially on the law of the European Union: 
                                                 
122 Ibid., at para. 123. 
123 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application no. 27765/09, Judgment (23 February 2012), Grand Chamber, 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
124 Ibid., at paras 118, 123, 124-127. 
125 Ibid., at para. 131. 
126 Ibid., at para. 134. 
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[N]on-refoulement principle is also enshrined in Article 19 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union...particular 
weight to the content of a letter…by Mr Jacques Barrot, Vice-
President of the European Commission, in which he stressed the 
importance of compliance with the principle of non-refoulement…by 
Member States of the European Union.127 
 
After this, the Court unanimously concluded that in the present case substantial grounds had 
been shown for believing there was a real risk that the applicants would be subjected to 
treatment in Libya contrary to Article 3. Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 3. 
The use of European Union authority is certainly a deliberate choice by the Court: the 
situation at hand touched both the EU and the ECHR institutions, and they are in line with 
each other in reminding States about the principles and boundaries of how to handle 
immigration situations. 
Comparative reasoning played a directional role in the Vinter case, concerning life sentencing 
in relation to Article 3 (right not to be tortured or inhuman and degrading treatment).128 The 
applicants complained that their whole life orders violated Article 3. The Court began by 
accepting that the sentence could violate Article 3 if it were wholly unjustified or grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The Court found support from comparative 
sources: 
The Court notes that support for this proposition can also be found in 
the comparative materials before the Court. Those materials 
demonstrate…(see the Eight Amendment case-law…the judgments of 
the Supreme Court of Canada…).129 
 
The Court further continued about the grossly disproportionate sentence and emphasised its 
restrictions: 
However, the Court also considers that the comparative materials set 
out above demonstrate that ‘gross disproportionality’ is a strict test 
and, as the Supreme Court of Canada observed in Latimer…it will 
only be on ‘rare and unique occasions’ that the test will be met.130 
 
                                                 
127 Ibid., at para. 135. 
128 Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom (2012), supra note 13. 
129 Ibid., at para. 88. 
130 Ibid., at para. 89. 
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While the attitude on life sentences in Europe was clearly against them, the Court did not see 
that this should affect the case.131 The Court instead used Canadian case law to assess when 
such a sentence would be grossly disproportionate.132 
Having thus decided the test of gross disproportionality must be interpreted strictly, the Court 
considered the circumstances of the particular convictions. The Court pointed out that, given 
the gravity of the murders for which they were convicted, the applicants’ life orders could not 
be seen as grossly disproportionate. Secondly, the Court noted that none of the applicants had 
demonstrated that their continued incarceration served no legitimate penological purpose.133 
This was also decisive for the Court’s reasoning. The Court thus held by four votes to three 
that there has been no violation of Article 3. 
 
3.4. Decisive Function 
Comparative reasoning may play a decisive role in the Court’s reasoning. In this role, the 
comparative reasoning is the deciding factor for the chosen interpretation. Decisive argument 
is recognised by its wording and its placement immediately before the Court’s conclusion. 
This is the strongest but also the most controversial function of comparative reasoning. 
Decisive comparative arguments are often based on the Court’s findings on European 
consensus, widely accepted international treaties, or the opinions of powerful constitutional 
courts. In the decisive function the comparative reasoning and the outcome of the 
interpretation are directly connected: after the concluding comparative argument, the outcome 
is clear. 
The case of Hristozov concerned access to unauthorised medical products.134 The applicants 
complained of violations of Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (right not to be tortured or inhuman and 
degrading treatment) and 8 (right to private and family life) when the national authorities had 
prohibited their access to an experimental medical product. The judgment contains two 
comparative sections: ‘Relevant European Union Law’ and ‘Relevant Comparative Material’. 
First, the Court referred to European Union law when ruling that it was not the Court’s task to 
pass judgment on the system of rules governing access to unauthorised medical products in 
                                                 
131 Ibid., at para. 55 where it is expressed that the majority of European countries do not have irreducible life 
sentences and some do not have life sentences at all. 
132 Ibid., at para. 93. 
133 Ibid., at para. 95. 
134 Hristozov and Others v. Bulgaria, Application nos. 47039/11 and 358/12, Judgment (13 November 2012), 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2012). 
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Member States, nor to decide whether denial of access to medical products is in principle 
compatible with the Convention. The Court stressed its competence concerning EU law: it is 
not the Court’s task to review compliance with other international instruments.135 
Comparative reasoning was further present when the Court decided whether Article 2 could 
be interpreted as requiring access to unauthorised medical products for the terminally ill: ‘[I]n 
the European Union this matter remains within the competence of the Member States…and 
that the Contracting States deal differently’.136 
As this matter has been solved in the EU by giving competence to the Member States, and 
considering that there was no consensus between the Contracting States, the interpretation of 
Article 2 could not thus be extended by the Court. As a result, the Court concluded there had 
been no violation of Article 2. 
After concluding the outcome of Article 2, the interpretation of Article 8 was next. The Court 
needed to determine the breadth of the State’s margin of appreciation under Article 8, and 
reiterated that a number of factors must be taken into account. The Court pointed out that 
when there is no consensus within the Contracting States, either as to the relative importance 
of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it - particularly where the case 
raises sensitive moral or ethical issues - the margin of appreciation will be wider. 
The Court emphasised the lack of precise consensus between the Contracting States: 
As for the consensus within the Contracting States, the Court 
observers that, according to the comparative law information available 
to it, a number of those States have made provision in their laws for 
exceptions…to the rule that only authorised medicinal products may 
be used for medical treatment…Based on that, and on the manner in 
which the issue is regulated in the law of the European Union…the 
Court concludes that there is now a clear trend in the Contracting 
States…However, that emerging consensus is not based on settled 
principles in the law of the Contracting States. Nor does it appear to 
extend to the precise manner in which that use should be regulated.137 
 
After finding that there was no clear consensus amongst Contracting States on the matter at 
hand, the Court concluded that a wide margin of appreciation must be granted, and thus there 
was no violation of Article 8. The majority was, however, an extremely tight four votes to 
                                                 
135 Ibid., at para. 105. 
136 Ibid., at para. 108. 
137 Ibid., at para. 123. 
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three. Comparative argumentation had a decisive function in this case as the main point 
crystallised on the question of whether the margin of appreciation was wide or narrow. 
In the case of the Konstantin Markin the Grand Chamber needed to solve the question of 
parental leave under Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) in conjunction with Article 8 
(right to private and family life).138 The applicant, a serviceman in the Russian military, 
complained that the refusal to grant him parental le e amounted to discrimination on 
grounds of sex. The judgment contains a rather long and comprehensive section on ‘Relevant 
International and Comparative Material’ (paragraphs from 49 to 75). The Court began by 
evaluating the margin of appreciation. The Court pointed out ‘[T]he Court must however have 
regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any 
emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved’.139 
The question at hand concerned the very foundations of gender equality, and the Court 
reiterated: 
[T]hat the advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the 
member States of the Council of Europe and very weighty reasons 
would have to be put forward before such a difference of treatment 
could regarded as compatible with the Convention.140 
 
The Court observed that the question of parental leave and parental allowances came within 
the scope of Article 8, and as such Article 14 taken together with Article 8 would be 
applicable. As to whether there was a violation of the engaged rights the Court used 
comparative argumentation: 
The relevant international and comparative-law 
material…demonstrates that the evolution of society…has since 
significantly advanced. It shows that in a majority of European 
countries, including Russia itself…Even more important…in a 
significant number of the member States both servicemen and 
servicewomen are also entitled to parental leave…The Court cannot 
overlook the widespread and consistently developing views and 
associated legal changes to the domestic laws of Contracting States 
concerning the issue.141 
 
                                                 
138 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (2012), supra note 108. 
139 Ibid., at para. 126. 
140 Ibid., at para. 127. 
141 Ibid., at para. 140. 
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The comparative reasoning was straight-forward: while first finding that there was a 
significant number of Contracting States that allowed parental leave both to servicewomen 
and servicemen, the Court held Russia should follow the majority’s view. The remainder of 
the judgment consisted of responses to the Government’s arguments. As to the government’s 
argument that the army required some restrictions for the purposes of national security, the 
Court pointed out that there were means to attain this legitimate aim other than by limiting the 
entitlement to parental leave for all servicemen. The Court continued: 
Indeed, in a significant number of the member States both servicemen 
and servicewomen are entitled to parental leave…The Court 
notes…existing in such countries as the Netherlands, Germany and the 
United Kingdom…Their example illustrates that there are techniques 
which can be employed.142 
 
The Court rejected the remainder of the Government’s arguments and finally concluded that 
there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
Requirements under Article 6 (fair trial) arose in the case of Veselov. 143  The applicants 
complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences incited by the police and 
that their pleas of entrapment had not been properly examined in the domestic proceedings. 
The question concerned the guarantee of a fair trial in the context of undercover investigative 
techniques used to combat drug trafficking and corruption. The Court accepted the use of 
undercover agents as a legitimate investigative technique for combating serious crimes, but 
stated that such techniques require adequate safeguards against abuse.  
The judgment contains two sections: ‘Comparative Law’ (paragraphs 50-63) and ‘Relevant 
International Law’ (paragraphs 64-67). The ‘Comparative Law’ section assessed the practices 
of the twenty-two Contracting States of the Council of Europe. The ‘Relevant International 
Law’ section considered materials from the Council of Europe. 
In the present case the test purchase in respect of the applicant was ordered by an 
administrative decision of the body which later carried out the operation. Further, the decision 
contained very little information as to the reasons for and purposes of the planned test 
purchase, and the operation was not subject to judicial review. The Court used comparative 
reasoning: 
                                                 
142 Ibid., at para. 147. 
143 Veselov and Others v. Russia, Application nos. 23200/10, 24009/07 and 556/10, Judgment (2 October 2012). 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
30 
 
three. Comparative argumentation had a decisive function in this case as the main point 
crystallised on the question of whether the margin of appreciation was wide or narrow. 
In the case of the Konstantin Markin the Grand Chamber needed to solve the question of 
parental leave under Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) in conjunction with Article 8 
(right to private and family life).138 The applicant, a serviceman in the Russian military, 
complained that the refusal to grant him parental leave amounted to discrimination on 
grounds of sex. The judgment contains a rather long and comprehensive section on ‘Relevant 
International and Comparative Material’ (paragraphs from 49 to 75). The Court began by 
evaluating the margin of appreciation. The Court pointed out ‘[T]he Court must however have 
regard to the changing conditions in Contracting States and respond, for example, to any 
emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved’.139 
The question at hand concerned the very foundations of gender equality, and the Court 
reiterated: 
[T]hat the advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the 
member States of the Council of Europe and very weighty reasons 
would have to be put forward before such a difference of treatment 
could regarded as compatible with the Convention.140 
 
The Court observed that the question of parental leave and parental allowances came within 
the scope of Article 8, and as such Article 14 taken together with Article 8 would be 
applicable. As to whether there was a violation of the engaged rights the Court used 
comparative argumentation: 
The relevant international and comparative-law 
material…demonstrates that the evolution of society…has since 
significantly advanced. It shows that in a majority of European 
countries, including Russia itself…Even more important…in a 
significant number of the member States both servicemen and 
servicewomen are also entitled to parental leave…The Court cannot 
overlook the widespread and consistently developing views and 
associated legal changes to the domestic laws of Contracting States 
concerning the issue.141 
 
                                                 
138 Konstantin Markin v. Russia (2012), supra note 108. 
139 Ibid., at para. 126. 
140 Ibid., at para. 127. 
141 Ibid., at para. 140. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
31 
 
The comparative reasoning was straight-forward: while first finding that there was a 
significant number of Contracting States that allowed parental leave both to servicewomen 
and servicemen, the Court held Russia should follow the majority’s view. The remainder of 
the judgment consisted of responses to the Government’s arguments. As to the government’s 
argument that the army required some restrictions for the purposes of national security, the 
Court pointed out that there were means to attain this legitimate aim other than by limiting the 
entitlement to parental leave for all servicemen. The Court continued: 
Indeed, in a significant number of the member States both servicemen 
and servicewomen are entitled to parental leave…The Court 
notes…existing in such countries as the Netherlands, Germany and the 
United Kingdom…Their example illustrates that there are techniques 
which can be employed.142 
 
The Court rejected the remainder of the Government’s arguments and finally concluded that 
there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. 
Requirements under Article 6 (fair trial) arose in the case of Veselov. 143  The applicants 
complained that they had been unfairly convicted of drug offences incited by the police and 
that their pleas of entrapment had not been properly examined in the domestic proceedings. 
The question concerned the guarantee of a fair trial in the context of undercover investigative 
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The judgment contains two sections: ‘Comparative Law’ (paragraphs 50-63) and ‘Relevant 
International Law’ (paragraphs 64-67). The ‘Comparative Law’ section assessed the practices 
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142 Ibid., at para. 147. 
143 Veselov and Others v. Russia, Application nos. 23200/10, 24009/07 and 556/10, Judgment (2 October 2012). 
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The Court observes that similar investigative activities are subject to 
strict regulations in other Member States. The majority of justice 
systems require authorisation of test purchases and similar covert 
operations by a judge or a public prosecutor. In few countries where 
there is no involvement of a court or a prosecutor in the authorisation 
procedure the decision-making bodies are still separate from the 
services which carry out the operation.144 
 
The Court determinedly continued: ‘It follows that the Russian system…is out of line with the 
practice adopted by most Member States. The Court considers that this shortcoming reveals a 
structural failure’.145 
After these findings the Court concluded there had been a violation of Article 6. The Court 
pointed out that it was precisely the deficient procedure for authorising the test purchase that 
exposed the applicants to arbitrary police action and thus undermined the fairness of the 
criminal proceedings against them. The Court’s language is straight forward: the procedure 
was out of line with practice adopted by most Contracting States. Comparative reasoning 
played a decisive role: the practice adopted in most Contracting States was how it should also 
be in Russia. 
In Plesó the Court had to decide whether involuntary psychiatric treatment constituted a 
violation of Article 5(1) (unjustified deprivation of liberty). 146  The judgment has a 
comparative law section entitled ‘Relevant Law in Various European Countries’ and an 
international law section of ‘Relevant International Texts’. When evaluating the breadth of the 
margin of appreciation in the instant case, the Court stated: 
While aware that the practice in various European jurisdictions is 
divergent…the Court considers that, the core Convention right of 
personal liberty being at stake, the Contracting States’ margin of 
appreciation cannot be constructed as wide in this field.147 
 
The Court did not use the non-consensus as a basis for determining the scope of the margin of 
appreciation. Instead, the Court strongly leant on a powerful authority: ‘Largely sharing the 
views of the German Federal Constitutional Court’. 148  In addition, the Court referred to 
                                                 
144 Ibid., at para. 105. 
145 Ibid., at para. 106. 
146 Plesó v. Hungary, Application no. 41242/08, Judgment (2 October 2012). 
147 Ibid., at para. 66. 
148 Ibid. 
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United Nations Principles when it recognised ‘the United Nations Principles for the Protection 
of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care’.149 
After these findings, the Court unanimously concluded it was not persuaded that the 
applicant’s mental disorder was of the kind or degree that warranted compulsory confinement. 
His detention was therefore a violation of Article 5(1). 
The comparative reasoning played a significant role, especially the interpretation made by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court. The facts of the case were, however, also partly 
decisive: the measures made by the national authorities neglected many basic practices. For 
example, in ordering psychiatric detention of the applicant, no in-depth consideration was 
given to the rational or irrational character of his choice to refuse hospitalisation. This neglect 
by the authorities constituted the basis for the comparative reasoning to be decisive in the 
judgment. 
The long and difficult Othman case, which concerned deportation of the applicant to Jordan, 
contained much comparative material and reasoning.150 As concerned Article 6, the applicant 
complained he would be at real risk of a flagrant denial of justice if retried in Jordan. It is 
established in the Court’s case law that an issue may exceptionally be raised under Article 6 
by an expulsion or extradition decision in circumstances where a fugitive has suffered or 
risked suffering a flagrant denial of justice in the requesting country.151 A flagrant denial of 
justice goes beyond mere irregularities or lack of safeguards in the trial procedures; it requires 
a violation of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed in Article 6 so fundamental as to amount 
to a nullification or destruction of the very essence of the right itself. The Court has always 
found that, since the Soering judgment, expulsion would be in violation of a fair trial under 
Article 6. 
The question at hand concerned evidence obtained by torture. The Court relied strongly on 
international conventions, namely the United Nations Convention against Torture (UNCAT), 
when emphasising the fundamental prohibition against the use of evidence obtained by 
torture: 
Strong support for that view is found in international law. Few 
international norms relating to the right to a trial are more 
                                                 
149 Ibid., at para. 68. 
150 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (2012), supra note 39. 
151 That principle was first set out in Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application no.14038/88, Judgment (7 July 
1989), ECHR Series A (1989) no. 161. 
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fundamental than the exclusion of evidence obtained by torture. There 
are few international treaties which command as widespread support 
as UNCAT. One hundred and forty-nine States are party to its 
provisions, including all Member States of the Council of 
Europe…UNCAT reflects the clear will of the international 
community to further entrench the ius cogens prohibition on torture by 
taking a series of measures to eradicate torture and remove all 
incentive for its practice…As United Nations Committee Against 
Torture has made clear.152 
 
For these reasons the Court concluded that the admission of torture evidence was manifestly 
contrary not only to the provisions of Article 6, but to the most basic international standards 
of a fair trial.153 
Turning to the instant case at hand and determining the sufficiency of the torture evidence, the 
Court used international reports which confirmed that torture was widespread and routine in 
Jordan. Accordingly, the Court decided that it would be unfair to impose any higher burden of 
proof on the applicant.154 The Court turned to comparative arguments as to why the burden of 
proof must be at this level: 
[T]he Court does not consider that the Canadian and German case-
law, which has been submitted by the Government…provides any 
support for their position…Finally, it is clear from Düsseldorf Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning that it did not apply a balance of probabilities 
test to the requested person’s allegations.155 
 
Further, in evaluating the Jordanian State Security Court system, the ECtHR referred to 
international reports: 
In its conclusions on Article 15 of UNCAT, the Committee Against 
Torture expressed its concern at reports that the use of forced 
confessions in courts was widespread…The Special Rapporteur has 
described a system where the ‘presumption of innocence is illusory’ 
and ‘primacy is placed on obtaining confessions’…The reports of 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch support this view.156 
 
After these unequivocal international authority findings, the Court came to the conclusion that 
the applicant had discharged the burden of proof that could fairly be imposed on him. 
                                                 
152 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (2012), supra note 39, at para. 266. 
153 Ibid., at para. 267. 
154 Ibid., at paras 272-273. 
155 Ibid., at para. 275. 
156 Ibid., at para. 277. 
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Consequently, the Court unanimously held the applicant’s deportation to Jordan would be in 
violation of Article 6. 
The Genocide Convention came before the Court in Jorgic, where it had to decide whether 
States had universal jurisdiction in genocide cases.157 The applicant argued that there was a 
general rule of public international law, namely the duty of non-intervention, which in 
principle prohibited the German courts from prosecuting a foreigner living abroad for 
genocide purportedly committed by him in a foreign country against foreign victims. 
Universal jurisdiction over genocide cannot be found in the Genocide Convention. The 
ECtHR, however, reiterated that ‘pursuant to Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, the 
Contracting Parties were under an erga omnes obligation to prevent and punish genocide, the 
prohibition of which forms part of the jus cogens’.158 
The ECtHR was thus convinced by the respondent state’s reasoning and took authoritative 
sources into decisive account. The respondent state’s interpretation on universal jurisdiction 
for genocide: 
is widely confirmed by the statutory provisions and case-law of 
numerous other Contracting States to the Convention…and by the 
Statute and case-law of the ICTY. It notes, in particular, that the 
Spanish Audiencia Nacional has interpreted Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention in exactly the same way as the German 
courts…Furthermore, Article 9 § 1 of the ICTY Statute confirms the 
German courts’ view, providing for concurrent jurisdiction of the 
ICTY and national courts, without any restriction to domestic courts 
of particular countries. Indeed, the principle of universal jurisdiction 
for genocide has been expressly acknowledged by the ICTY…and 
numerous Convention States.159 
 
The ECtHR referred directly to Spanish case law and the Statute and practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and held that the German 
interpretation was exactly the same. As a result, the ECtHR unanimously concluded there had 
been no violation of either Article 6 or Article 5 § 1(a).  
 
                                                 
157 Jorgic v. Germany, Application no. 74613/01, Judgment (12 July 2007), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
(ECHR 2007-III). 
158 Ibid., at para. 68. 
159 Ibid., at para. 69. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
34 
 
fundamental than the exclusion of evidence obtained by torture. There 
are few international treaties which command as widespread support 
as UNCAT. One hundred and forty-nine States are party to its 
provisions, including all Member States of the Council of 
Europe…UNCAT reflects the clear will of the international 
community to further entrench the ius cogens prohibition on torture by 
taking a series of measures to eradicate torture and remove all 
incentive for its practice…As United Nations Committee Against 
Torture has made clear.152 
 
For these reasons the Court concluded that the admission of torture evidence was manifestly 
contrary not only to the provisions of Article 6, but to the most basic international standards 
of a fair trial.153 
Turning to the instant case at hand and determining the sufficiency of the torture evidence, the 
Court used international reports which confirmed that torture was widespread and routine in 
Jordan. Accordingly, the Court decided that it would be unfair to impose any higher burden of 
proof on the applicant.154 The Court turned to comparative arguments as to why the burden of 
proof must be at this level: 
[T]he Court does not consider that the Canadian and German case-
law, which has been submitted by the Government…provides any 
support for their position…Finally, it is clear from Düsseldorf Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning that it did not apply a balance of probabilities 
test to the requested person’s allegations.155 
 
Further, in evaluating the Jordanian State Security Court system, the ECtHR referred to 
international reports: 
In its conclusions on Article 15 of UNCAT, the Committee Against 
Torture expressed its concern at reports that the use of forced 
confessions in courts was widespread…The Special Rapporteur has 
described a system where the ‘presumption of innocence is illusory’ 
and ‘primacy is placed on obtaining confessions’…The reports of 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch support this view.156 
 
After these unequivocal international authority findings, the Court came to the conclusion that 
the applicant had discharged the burden of proof that could fairly be imposed on him. 
                                                 
152 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom (2012), supra note 39, at para. 266. 
153 Ibid., at para. 267. 
154 Ibid., at paras 272-273. 
155 Ibid., at para. 275. 
156 Ibid., at para. 277. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
35 
 
Consequently, the Court unanimously held the applicant’s deportation to Jordan would be in 
violation of Article 6. 
The Genocide Convention came before the Court in Jorgic, where it had to decide whether 
States had universal jurisdiction in genocide cases.157 The applicant argued that there was a 
general rule of public international law, namely the duty of non-intervention, which in 
principle prohibited the German courts from prosecuting a foreigner living abroad for 
genocide purportedly committed by him in a foreign country against foreign victims. 
Universal jurisdiction over genocide cannot be found in the Genocide Convention. The 
ECtHR, however, reiterated that ‘pursuant to Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, the 
Contracting Parties were under an erga omnes obligation to prevent and punish genocide, the 
prohibition of which forms part of the jus cogens’.158 
The ECtHR was thus convinced by the respondent state’s reasoning and took authoritative 
sources into decisive account. The respondent state’s interpretation on universal jurisdiction 
for genocide: 
is widely confirmed by the statutory provisions and case-law of 
numerous other Contracting States to the Convention…and by the 
Statute and case-law of the ICTY. It notes, in particular, that the 
Spanish Audiencia Nacional has interpreted Article VI of the 
Genocide Convention in exactly the same way as the German 
courts…Furthermore, Article 9 § 1 of the ICTY Statute confirms the 
German courts’ view, providing for concurrent jurisdiction of the 
ICTY and national courts, without any restriction to domestic courts 
of particular countries. Indeed, the principle of universal jurisdiction 
for genocide has been expressly acknowledged by the ICTY…and 
numerous Convention States.159 
 
The ECtHR referred directly to Spanish case law and the Statute and practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and held that the German 
interpretation was exactly the same. As a result, the ECtHR unanimously concluded there had 
been no violation of either Article 6 or Article 5 § 1(a).  
 
                                                 
157 Jorgic v. Germany, Application no. 74613/01, Judgment (12 July 2007), Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
(ECHR 2007-III). 
158 Ibid., at para. 68. 
159 Ibid., at para. 69. 
Forthcoming in the Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 23, 2012-2013 (2015) 
 
36 
 
4. Conclusions 
The Court uses comparative argumentation rather regularly when the margin of appreciation 
is in question, when the issue is new in the ECHR context, or when there is no settled case 
law by the Court. In addition, when attitudes have changed at the international and European 
level, comparative reasoning is frequently considered. Questions of human rights are quite 
similar before other human rights institutions (such as the Human Rights Committee), and so 
it should not be a surprise that the Court ‘peeks’ at their directions. 
Consensus argumentation is rather typical by the Court. It functions to make the interpretation 
more acceptable. However, as this study demonstrates, there are different possibilities to what 
is actually meant by ‘consensus’. In some cases the Court emphasises the same practices and 
principles that must be found in the Contracting States in order to establish the consensus; in 
others a clear common tendency and trend is enough for the consensus to exist, even though 
the national solutions and exceptions may differ. Considering the possible deficiencies and 
actual errors of the comparative law analysis provided to the Court, one should be careful not 
to put too much weight on the similarities or differences of the principles or practices found in 
each Contracting State.160 It may be more fruitful to search for common attitudes than to put 
too much weight on the details in national legislative solutions. The Court has emphasised 
international trends over differing practices amongst Contracting States.161 
The cognitive use of comparative material is fairly frequent in the ECHR system. The 
comparative section is always included when comparative arguments are used. However, use 
of comparative material solely for cognitive purposes does not, in my opinion, actually 
enhance the substantial legitimacy of the judgments. The informative section does not make 
the judgment clearer if this section is not openly used in the reasoning. On the contrary, the 
list of the comparative and international material presented obscures what role they in fact had 
in the interpretation. In addition, the comparative material is rarely univocal, and may give 
                                                 
160 See how the comparative law survey is provided for the Court, e.g., Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich, ‘Informed 
Decision-Making’, supra note 15, at 273–4. 
161 ‘[T]he lack of such a common approach among forty-three Contracting States with widely diverse legal 
systems and traditions is hardly surprising…The Court accordingly attaches less importance to the lack of 
evidence of a common European approach to the resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the 
clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social 
acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals.’ I v. 
The United Kingdom (2002), supra note 116, at para. 65; see also the same argumentation Christine Goodwin v. 
The United Kingdom, Application no. 28957/95, Judgment (11 July 2002), Grand Chamber, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions (ECHR 2002-VI), at para. 85. 
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arguments both for and against. In these cases it is especially confusing and unclear as to what 
role comparative information had in the judgment. 
The decorative way of using comparative argumentation is not as questionable as it may seem 
at first sight. The decorative way shows that comparative material has played a role in at least 
certain parts of the judgment, and often this is sufficient to indicate to the audience that 
comparative material has influenced this part of the interpretation. Compared to the cognitive 
function, decorative use tells more about the impact of the comparative material on the 
interpretation. From this angle, the decorative way – when leaning to comparative 
authoritative sources – actually makes the interpretation more justifiable and legitimate. 
However, when the decorative function leans towards consensus it might be more problematic 
from the justifiability point of view, since argumentation with consensus requires some 
evaluation of the existence or absence of such a consensus – the bare decorative use of 
consensus argumentation is not enough.162 Furthermore, consensus argumentation entails a 
strong legitimising power which is completely wasted if the argumentation is used only as a 
decoration. Yet from the acceptability point of view decorative reasoning leaning to 
consensus or values is not something to be seriously criticised, as it may be seen as a means 
of achieving justice by understanding questions of human dimensions.163 
The Court’s advanced interpretations of the ECHR’s provisions can sometimes be hard to 
swallow by national legal orders. The Court should pay special attention to make the 
judgment acceptable and justified, especially in cases which engage culturally sensitive 
issues.164 I would argue that comparative reasoning is at its best when it is done openly and 
transparently as this is the only way to gain legitimacy. Accordingly, this should be 
considered the only proper way to use comparative argumentation. There is no huge 
difference as to whether it is used for directional or decisive purposes. Sometimes it is only a 
question of gradation or difference in perspective when comparing the two functions. More 
                                                 
162 See decorative consensus argumentation e.g. D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (2007), supra note 65, at 
para. 181. 
163 Decorative reasoning leaning to consensus can be compared to emotional arguments used in rhetorical 
studies. It has been pointed out that even though emotional arguments shake the rational world of the scientist as 
well as the justification-oriented lawyer, the administration of justice works fairly well despite this prominent 
irrationality. Furthermore, the proper use of, and effort to evoke passion, is not necessarily a rhetorical appeal to 
irrationality, but a means of achieving justice by understanding the real human dimensions of a legal 
controversy. See Mirjami Paso, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union as a Rhetorical Actor’, 19 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 1 (2012) 12–36 at 33–4. 
164 Comparative arguments can be distinguished into two categories according to Aulis Aarnio. These two 
categories are acceptability arguments and justifiability arguments. See Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as 
Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification (D. Reidel Publishing Company: Dordrecht, 1987). 
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interesting is that in both cases comparative arguments have an unquestionably significant 
role next to other legal arguments. Comparative reasoning is not something to be afraid of; on 
the contrary, it is something to use in order for the interpretation to be justified, accepted, and 
seen as legitimate. 
In order to secure legitimacy the possibilities of comparative reasoning should be recognised 
and courageously used. Legitimacy is not, however, gained solely by using comparative 
argumentation: the whole legal argumentation of the judgment should be open and 
transparent. While emphasising comparative argumentation, the risks and weaknesses of such 
argumentation (such as ‘what is meant by consensus?’) must be kept in mind. Leaning to 
exemplary interpretations of, for example, national constitutional courts or international 
tribunals show that the ECtHR has realised the cross-institutional nature of the questions it 
regularly deals with. There is nothing wrong in following a good and well-founded route, 
even if someone else has discovered it first. 
From the national system’s point of view, the use of comparative reasoning and reliance on 
other State’s or organisation’s practices may be seen as undermining the respondent State’s 
traditions and practices.165 Supranational adjudication is often vulnerable to criticism: in the 
ECHR system there are forty-seven Contracting States, and to find a common understanding 
of interpretations, not to mention common acceptance, is challenging. It is not, however, 
always possible in human rights’ questions to settle for middle-line interpretations. It is the 
main purpose of the ECHR system to protect the rights of the individuals. Finding appropriate 
interpretations with the help of comparative law is at least worth attempting in order to 
maintain the legitimacy of the ECHR system. At its best, comparative reasoning helps bolster 
the interpretation made by the Court as both justified and acceptable. 
                                                 
165 See reactions of the British audience on the questions of prisoners’ right to vote, e.g. Nicolas Bratza,‘The 
Relationship between the UK Courts and Strasbourg’, European Human Rights Law Review 5 (2011) 505–12. 
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SHOULD SOCIAL RIGHTS BE INCLUDED IN 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONVENTION BY 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
Maija Dahlberg*
Abstract
Th e European Court of Human Rights frequently incorporates socio-economic rights 
in its applications of the Convention as a result of its broad interpretations of civil 
and political rights, while at the same time emphasising that the Convention does not 
actually entail socio-economic rights. Th is article analyses the arguments concerning 
the inclusion of social rights in the Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention. Analysis is through use of a case law study which examines how the 
Court legitimises the inclusion of social rights in its interpretations of the Convention 
despite their absence from the text of the Convention itself. Existing social rights 
arguments are categorised under the Convention rights provisions, revealing the 
extent to which including social rights within the interpretations of the Convention 
provisions has become established practice.
Keywords: argumentation; interpretation; legitimacy; social rights; the European 
Convention on Human Rights; the European Court of Human Rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinaft er, the 
Convention) was draft ed in the aft ermath of the Second World War when rights 
were considered from a rather narrow perspective. Th e Convention secures civil 
and political rights, but economic and social rights are not included within it. Th e 
Council of Europe’s legal system protects economic and social rights through the 
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other Convention, namely the European Social Charter.1 Th e European Court of 
Human Rights (hereinaft er, the Court or the ECtHR) has frequently, however, taken 
socio-economic rights into account when interpreting the Convention. Th e rights-
extending interpretation methods make this possible. For example, by applying the 
principle of eff ectiveness and the ‘living instrument’ interpretation, as well as through 
the method of positive obligations, weight may be put on socio-economic rights even 
though the text of the Convention does not include them.
But the question can be posed: Since economic and social rights were not initially 
included in the Convention, is it legitimate for the Court to include them? It has been 
argued that the development of economic and social norms and procedures should 
go hand-in-hand with legitimacy-enhancing strategies. Th is point of view stresses, 
on the one hand, the need to restrain over-anxious human rights interpretations and, 
on the other hand, that to avoid sticking to the draft ers’ intentions.2 Accordingly, 
legitimate interpretations can be found somewhere in between.
It has been claimed that the Court has gone too far with regard to incorporating 
socio-economic rights within the Convention.3 It has been taken for granted that, 
nowadays, the Court’s jurisdiction also entails socio-economic rights, even though 
there is a lack of clear defi nition of them by the Court.4 Yet, at the same time, it has 
been observed that the Court handles socio-economic rights in negative terms: the 
Court has stated several times what the Convention does not provide e.g. the right to 
housing.5
Th e Court frequently de facto incorporates socio-economic rights within the 
Convention through a broad interpretation of civil and political rights while, at the 
same time, emphasising that the Convention does not entail socio-economic rights.6 
Th e aim of this article is to analyse the arguments concerning social rights in the 
Court’s interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Th is analysis is performed 
through a case law study which includes 87 judgments of the Court. In addition, 
the article examines the question of how the Court legitimises its interpretations 
concerning social rights when the text of the Convention does not include social 
rights.
In this article socio-economic rights or social rights are understood broadly.7 
Socio-economic rights cover all the rights which are protected in the European 
1 European Social Charter (revised), CETS No. 163, came into force on 1 July 1999.
2 Shany (2011: 80).
3 Bossuyt (2007).
4 Clements and Simmons (2008: 426) (‘the Court’s starting point is now an unequivocal acceptance of 
the view that the Convention protects a core irreducible set of such rights.’). See also Gerards (2014: 
104) and Leijten (2014: 115).
5 See e.g. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, 21 January 2011, GC, para. 249; See more, Leijten 
(2014: 114).
6 Bossuyt (2013: 35).
7 In this article the concepts of ‘socio-economic rights’, ‘social rights’ and ‘economic and social rights’ 
are used interchangeably.
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Social Charter, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union8 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights9, as well as in 
several Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (the ILO).10 Cultural 
rights are, however, set aside and the focus is on economic and social rights.
If legitimacy is understood in a purely formalistic and strictly conservative sense, 
it is not legitimate to incorporate economic and social rights into the Convention.11 
But if instead, legitimacy is understood in a substantive sense, the chain of reasoning 
is no longer that simple. Substantive legitimacy emphasises that the content of the 
judgment must be justifi ed and acceptable in order to be legitimate. Especially in 
human rights cases, the emphasis should be on the content – and not merely on the 
formalistic aspects.12
In this article, substantive legitimacy is taken as a starting point, which means 
that the reasoning of the Court will be kept in focus. Legitimacy is taken to mean 
the extent to which the Court has fulfi lled the promise of its constitutive legitimacy 
through its decisions and through the interpretive principles that guide its decision-
making processes. Th e focus is on how well the Court is perceived to actually protect 
human rights. Th is view of legitimacy concentrates on the performance of the Court, 
and, consequently, the Court either contributes to or takes away from its legitimacy 
through its performance. Th is view of legitimacy is called the normative performance 
dimension.13 Th e article analyses in detail the arguments which the Court gives when 
extending its interpretation by adding economic and social rights to the Convention.
In addition to the chosen view point of normative performance legitimacy, the other 
chosen standpoint in this article is the principle of the indivisibility of human rights: 
‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’.14 
Th e principle of indivisibility stresses that the distinction between diff erent categories 
of human rights should not lead to any watertight compartmentalisation between, for 
8 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012: 391–407.
9 GA res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR sup (No. 16) at 49, UN doc A76316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3.
10 See e.g. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138); Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).
11 Formalism in the ECtHR’s praxis is understood as the necessity to ‘draw the line somewhere’ in 
order to create certainty and steadiness (de Lange 2009: 454). For more on formal legitimacy, see 
Barkhuysen and van Emmerik (2009) and Th omassen (2009). Th e more persistent argument is that 
socio-economic rights adjudication is anti-democratic. Th e role of nationally elected representatives 
is usurped when courts pass judgments on matters of social policy. Additional argument against 
social rights adjudication is based on the principle of separation of powers. See more and also 
counter-arguments, Langford (2008: 31–35).
12 Th e content is inevitably the starting point in theories of constitutional rights, see Alexy (2002); 
Dworkin (1987).
13 Çali (2011: 9).
14 Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, 14–25  June 1993, UN Doc. A/
CONF.157/24, para. 5.
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instance, civil, political or social rights.15 Th is is also the reason why the Convention 
cannot isolate itself from the infl uence of social rights.
Th is article focuses on the general method by which social rights should be read 
within the Convention through a broad interpretation of civil and political rights. 
Th e diffi  cult methodological question is how to fi nd relevant cases, i.e. what search 
terms should be used. Since interpretation of positive obligations has been the Court’s 
main method for extending the scope of Convention provisions, using the search 
term ‘obligations’ seems a well-justifi ed methodological choice.16 In addition, ‘social 
rights’ or ‘economic rights’ were indicated in the search fi eld. Th ere were no time-
limits in the search, and the outcome was eighty-seven identifi ed cases.
2. BACKGROUND FOR JUSTICIABLE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL RIGHTS: REASONS TO INCLUDE THEM
Economic and social rights have traditionally been described as rights which are not 
fulfi lled without positive actions by the state, whereas civil and political rights are seen 
as being easier for states to fulfi l. Th e view has been that social rights need money and 
resources, while civil and political rights are fulfi lled, basically, by non-interference 
by the state. Traditional arguments against justiciable social rights stress that social 
rights are ensured through a combination of fl exible terms, broad powers of discretion 
and generous limitation provisions that call for progressive implementation.17 On 
the other hand, however, some researchers have declared that the debate over the 
distinction between civil or political rights and social rights is nearly over.18
Th ere are well-known challenges to litigating and implementing vague and 
resource-dependent social rights, such as the following: a lack of adequate standing 
provisions and procedural innovations; conservative judiciaries and powerful 
opponents; a lack of fi nancial and legal sources; and the challenges of trying to 
eff ectively connect claimant communities, social movements and legally-oriented 
human rights advocates and ensure that decisions are implemented.19 However, it has 
been strongly suggested that practice has challenged the theoretical obstacles in the 
debate over the justiciability of social rights.20
15 See more on the notion of indivisibility, interdependence and interrelation of human rights, e.g. 
Eide (2001); Koch (2003) and Nickel (2008).
16 Th e Court operates frequently with obligations arguments (not only including positive obligations, 
but also obligations more generally) when determining whether to extend interpretations, see e.g. 
Shany (2011: 79).
17 See rather recent arguments against justiciable social rights, Dennis and Stewart (2004); Mapulanga-
Hulston (2002).
18 See Clements and Simmons (2008: 409); Scheinin (2005: 17).
19 See Langford (2003: 20–22).
20 Langford (2008: 43).
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Th ere are strong arguments for social rights, too. As to the vague nature of social 
rights, they are phrased no diff erently than civil and political rights. It has been 
pointed out that it is arguable that ‘open-textured framing’ of all human rights is to 
be favoured.21 Furthermore, as to the stylistic construction and resources argument, 
scholars have long noted that social rights require not only the state’s action, but 
also its restraint. And the opposite argument that civil and political rights would be 
cheaper to provide has been seriously questioned. Consequently, the enforcement of 
civil and political rights oft en needs the state’s positive actions as well.22
Th ere is undeniably a developing consensus in the existing literature that economic 
and social rights are internationally justiciable and can be meaningfully enforced by 
international courts and tribunals.23 Scholars have formulated an integrated approach 
to interpretations of human rights treaties. Th is approach is primarily based on the 
idea that civil and political rights have inherent socio-economic components.24 It has 
been stressed that the present interpretive practice undertaken by the ECtHR, and 
the other international human rights bodies, with regard to positive obligations leads 
eventually to taking into consideration economic and social rights.25
In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Court stated in 
the Airey case in 1979 that:
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political rights, many of 
them have implications of a social or economic nature. […] there is no water-tight division 
separating that sphere from the fi eld covered by the Convention.26
Since then, the Court has taken a few steps back from the Airey formulation and 
now the incorporation of socio-economic rights is more cautious and conservative.27 
Socio-economic rights have, de facto, become part of the Convention through diff erent 
routes. Firstly, the Court has determined that proceedings concerning social rights 
must be considered under the Article of fair trial (Article 6).28 Th e fair trial clause 
has been considered to be the starting point for the most important interpretations 
that give some protection to economic and social rights.29 Secondly, the general non-
21 Nolan, Porter and Langford (2009: 11).
22 Eichenhofer (2011: 635) (‘Menschenrechtsschutz gelingt nicht durch Staatliche Inaktivität, sondern 
erfordert stets und notwendig konkrete gesetzgeberische und administrative Schutzmaßnahmen.’). 
See also Langford (2008: 30–31).
23 Eide, Krause and Rosas (2001); Langford (2008: 43); Shany (2011).
24 Mantouvalou (2005: 573–575); Scheinin (2001: 32–42).
25 See Shany (2011: 79).
26 Airey v. Ireland, 6289/73, 1979, para. 26.
27 See Mantouvalou (2005: 574).
28 See more about the technique by which social rights are indirectly protected under the Convention 
through procedural guarantees, Brems (2011: 157–158); Scheinin (2001: 34–38); Koskinas v. Greece, 
47760/99, 20 June 2002.
29 Scheinin (2001: 34).
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discrimination provision (Article 14) has provided a way to ‘socialise’ the Convention 
and it has been claimed that, in the future, non-discrimination provisions will be the 
most important mechanism for protecting social rights in the Convention system.30 
Th irdly, social rights have been incorporated within the Convention through a broad 
interpretation of the scope of civil and political rights.31 For example, welfare benefi ts 
and entitlements have been interpreted as ‘possessions’ or ‘property’ under Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1.32
Th e non-discrimination clause of the Convention in Article 14 is not an independent 
provision. It forbids discrimination only in ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set forth in the Convention’ and, hence, can only be invoked in conjunction with 
another article in the Convention or its protocols. Th e Twelft h Additional Protocol 
came into force on 1st April 2005.33 Th is protocol sets forth a general, independent 
prohibition in discrimination in the law and by public authorities. Currently this 
Protocol has been ratifi ed by eighteen of the forty-seven Member States.34
Th ere was much hope that social rights would be included within the Convention 
through the provision of a general prohibition of discrimination. It was anticipated 
that it would be possible to contest restrictions on social rights before the Court, and 
that this would be the case not only for those based on the ‘typical’ discrimination 
grounds, such as gender, nationality and sexual orientation, but also for those 
grounded on the many discriminatory distinctions commonly present in social policy 
and legislation, such as age and state of health. Consequently, the Twelft h Protocol 
enables almost all violations of social rights to be framed as discrimination issues.35 
Article  1 of Protocol No. 12 has, however, been applied only three times and the 
interpretation has been rather conservative.36
30 Brems (2011: 158). Eichenhofer (2011: 629–633) has a similar main categorisation: (1) Zugang zu 
Gericht, (2) Eigentumsgarantie, (3) Diskriminierungsverbote.
31 Brems (2011: 138–157).
32 See, e.g., Gaugusuz v. Austria, 17371/90, 16  September 1996; Koua Poirrez v. France, 40892/98, 
30  September 2003. In the legal literature there have been also other ways to categorise socio-
economic rights in judicial human rights adjudication, for example, Scheinin’s categorisations: 1) 
non-discrimination Article, 2) procedural safeguards, 3) economic and social rights as limitations 
to other rights, 4) other potential instances of the integrated approach (Scheinin 2001: 34–42). 
Clements and Simmons have two groups: 1) gross socio-economic defi cits directly or indirectly 
attributable to state action, 2) gross socio-economic destitution for which the state has no direct or 
obviously indirect responsibility (Clements and Simmons 2008: 409–427). O’Cinneide has three 
‘gateways’: 1) Article 3. Destitution as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’, 2) Article 2. Destitution 
as a threat to life; 3) Destitution as threat to meaningful private, home and family life (O’Cinneide 
2008).
33 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
CETS No. 177.
34 Th is is the situation on 19 June 2014.
35 Brems (2011: 163); see also more on how anti-discrimination legislation promotes economic and 
social rights, De Witte (2013).
36 See the cases where Article  1 of Protocol No. 12 has been applied: Maktouf and Damjanović v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2312/08, 34179/08, 18 July 2013, GC (no violation of Article 1 of Protocol 
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Also an additional protocol of social rights has been proposed that would extend 
the Convention system to certain economic and social rights. Th is, however, was 
rejected by the Member States and their wish was to strengthen the mechanism of 
the European Social Charter.37 Th e Court has, interestingly, seen this as an argument 
in support of the existence of a consensus among Contracting States to promote 
economic and social rights when interpreting the Convention.38
Although the incorporation of economic and social rights into the Convention 
can be explained by the fact that there is no ‘water-tight distinction’ between socio-
economic and civil and political rights issues, and the Court, in practice, frequently 
gives weight to socio-economic rights, applicability of the economic and social rights 
in the Convention remains a sensitive issue.39 Th ere are also some discordant voices: 
it has been strongly argued that the Convention does not protect economic and social 
rights either explicitly or implicitly. Th e Convention instead protects economic and 
social aspects.40 Th is debate is, however, rather artifi cial and diff erences in views are 
more a matter of degree than constituting actual disagreement.
3. CASE LAW ANALYSIS: THE INTERPRETATIVE 
INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
In this section, arguments concerning social rights are analysed in order to fi nd 
out how social rights have been incorporated within the Convention through the 
Court’s interpretations. Th e overarching question is: how does the Court justify 
its interpretations? Th e case law data consists of eighty-seven judgments, and the 
arguments with regard to social rights and their justifi ability have been analysed 
carefully. Th e emphasis was on the reasoning of the Court, looking at how broadly 
social rights are taken into consideration and on which sources or arguments the 
Court relies when justifying its extensive interpretations.
Th e adopted categorisation follows the work of Cousins, who categorises the 
infl uence of social rights on each of the Convention provisions.41 Access to courts 
(Article 6) and the non-discrimination provision (Article 14) are, however, left  aside 
in this article. Th e case law is, on the whole, clear with regard to Article 6 and social 
rights. In Bulgakova, the Court stated: ‘[…] It is beyond doubt that pensions and 
No. 12); Sejdič and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27996/06, 34836/06, 22 December 2009, GC 
(violation of Article  1 of Protocol No. 12); Savez Crkava “Rijec Zivota” and Others v. Croatia, 
7798/08, 9 December 2010 (violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, hence, no need to 
examine the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12).
37 Recommendation 1415 (1999) Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning fundamental social rights.
38 See Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, 34503/97, 12 November 2008, GC, para. 84.
39 See likewise Leijten (2013) p. 180; Clements and Simmons (2008: 426).
40 Warbrick (2007: 241).
41 Cousins (2008).
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related benefi ts, which are purely economic in nature, are ‘civil’ rights within the 
meaning of Article  6. […].’42 Also the non-discrimination provision and its social 
rights dimensions have already been studied.43 Th is article has chosen to present the 
most representative examples of each category where social rights’ infl uence is present.
3.1. CATEGORY 1: INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT 
(ARTICLE 3)
Th e Grand Chamber case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece concerned an asylum seeker 
who claimed that his rights under Article 3 had been violated.44 Th e applicant claimed, 
inter alia, that the state of extreme poverty in which he had lived since he arrived 
in Greece amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Th e Grand Chamber 
stated that Article 3 does not cover an obligation for states to provide everyone in 
their jurisdiction with a home. Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give 
refugees fi nancial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living.45 
In the case in question, the Greek authorities were, however, bound to comply with 
their own legislation which transposes European Union law. Th e Union Directive 
2003/9 lays down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the 
Member States. Th ere is thus an obligation to provide accommodation and decent 
material conditions to impoverished asylum seekers.46
Th e Court had to determine whether, in the context of the Convention, a situation 
of extreme poverty and poor living conditions could raise an issue under Article 3. Th e 
Court emphasised that the applicant had lived for months in a state of the most extreme 
poverty: the applicant was unable to satisfy his most basic needs (for food, hygiene and 
place to live). Furthermore, his situation was not likely to improve in the near future.47
Th e Court came to the conclusion that the applicant had been the victim of 
humiliating treatment:
[…] the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability […] and 
must be held responsible […] for the situation in which [the applicant] has found himself 
for several months, living in the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, 
and without any means of providing for his essential needs. […] such a living conditions 
[…] have attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 […].48
42 Bulgakova v. Russia, 69524/01, 18 January 2007, para. 30 (emphasis added by the author). See other 
Article 6 cases, K.M.C. v. Hungary, 19554/11, 10  July 2012; Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 15764/89, 
20  February 1996; Couez v. France, 94/1997/878/1090, 24  August 1998; Annoni di Gussola and 
Others v. France, 31819/96, 33293/96, 14 November 2000; see also Cousins (2008: 107–129).
43 See Brems (2011: 158–162); Cousins (2008, 2009); and Leijten (2013).
44 M.S.S. (note 5).
45 Ibid. para. 249.
46 Ibid. para. 250.
47 Ibid. para. 254.
48 Ibid. para. 263.
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Th e majority, by sixteen judges, held that there has been a violation of Article 3. One 
dissenting judge notes the extension of Article 3: ‘[…] the Court did in fact admit 
the possibility of social welfare obligations of the State in the context of Article 3. It 
did so in the name of dignity, and relying on a theory of positive obligations of the 
State.’49
Th e Court justifi ed its extension of the interpretation of Article 3 by relying on 
the broad consensus at international and European level concerning the need for 
special protection for asylum seekers. It pointed out that, for instance, the Geneva 
Convention, the activities of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the 
commonly applied standards set out in the European Union Directive all show a 
consensus over protection of asylum seekers.50 Since the need for protection is so well-
founded and commonly shared, the Court decided to expand Article 3 to include the 
right for asylum seekers to certain living conditions.
A right to medical care in prison arose in the Güveç case.51 Th e applicant 
complained that he suff ered from psychological problems in prison and received no 
medical care. According to the applicant, this amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3.
Th e Court pointed out that the ill-treatment must meet the minimum level of 
severity in order to fall within the scope of Article 3. Th e applicant was only fi  fteen 
years old and he was detained in a prison with adult prisoners. Th e applicant was 
detained for fi ve years. Furthermore, the applicant had no adequate legal representation 
until fi ve years aft er he was fi rst detained. Th ese circumstances caused the applicant 
psychological problems which tragically led to his repeated attempts to take his own 
life.
Th e Court considered the duty to provide medical care under Article 3: ‘[…] the 
national authorities were not only directly responsible for the applicant’s problems, 
but also manifestly failed to provide adequate medical care for him. […].’52 Th e 
ECtHR continued: ‘Indeed, […] the trial court not only failed to ensure that the 
applicant received medical care, but even prevented him and his family from doing so 
by refusing to release him on bail […].’53
Th e ECtHR determined that Article  3 ‘imposes an obligation on the State to 
protect the physical well-being of persons deprived of their liberty, for example by 
providing them with the requisite medical assistance […].’54 Th e Court concluded 
unanimously that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, 
and accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 3.
49 Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó: 102.
50 M.S.S. (note 5), paras. 251, 263.
51 Güveç v. Turkey, 70337/01, 20 January 2009.
52 Ibid. para. 93.
53 Ibid. para. 95.
54 Ibid. para. 96.
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Th e Court does not have to do much in order to justify the positive obligation 
to provide medical assistance for persons deprived of their liberty: it is fairly self-
evident that such an obligation must exist in order to protect everyone’s right to life. 
Th e circumstances and negligence in the actions of the national authorities (both the 
prison authorities and the trial court) were so obvious in this case that the justifi cation 
for the Court’s decision does not require further reasoning.
3.2. CATEGORY 2: RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE 
(ARTICLE 8)
In Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, eight applicants claimed that the state had violated 
Article 8 since they had been arbitrarily deprived of the possibility of preserving their 
status as permanent residents in Slovenia.55 Permanent residents have many social 
rights, such as the right to a pension, the right to health insurance and to better work 
opportunities.
Th e background to this case was that the applicants were citizens of the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the SFRY), and aft er Slovenia became 
independent the applicants did not apply for Slovenian citizenship. Consequently they 
became aliens unlawfully residing on Slovenian territory. Th eir names were ‘erased’ 
from the Register of Permanent Residents.
Interference in this case was quite clear because the state did not contest that 
the ‘erasure’ and its repercussions had had an adverse eff ect on the applicants and 
amounted to an interference with their private and family life under Article 8. Th e 
Grand Chamber did not depart from its previous fi ndings in fi nding that the ‘erasure’ 
had interfered with their Article 8 rights and continued to do so.56
Next, the Grand Chamber had to examine whether the interference was justifi ed. 
To be justifi ed the interference had to be ‘in accordance with law’, pursue ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Th e Court found that the Slovenian 
legislation and administrative practice which resulted in the ‘erasure’ lacked the 
requisite standards of foreseeability and accessibility. Consequently, the Court came 
to the conclusion that the interference was not ‘in accordance with law’.57 Normally, 
when fi nding that the fi rst justifi cation requirement is not fulfi lled, the Court 
concludes that there is a violation and does not examine the two latter requirements 
at all. In this case, however, the Court considered it necessary to examine the latter 
two requirements (legitimate aim and necessity).58
Its analysis of legitimate aim was rather brief, and the outcome was that the Court 
ruled that the state had a legitimate aim (to protect the country’s national security).59 
55 Kurič and Others v. Slovenia, 26828/06, 26 June 2012, GC.
56 Ibid. para. 339.
57 Ibid. paras. 346, 349.
58 Ibid. para. 350.
59 Ibid. paras. 351–353.
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Social rights come into play when the Court examined the necessity requirement. Th e 
Court stated:
[…] the applicants […] enjoyed a wide range of social and political rights. Owing to the 
‘erasure’, they experienced a number of adverse consequences, such as […], loss of job 
opportunities, loss of health insurance, the impossibility of renewing identity documents 
or driving licences, and diffi  culties in regulating pension rights. […].60
Th e Court also reminded the state of its positive obligations under Article 8 including 
that of ensuring eff ective respect for private and family life.61 Aft er drawing attention 
to the positive obligations, the Court emphasised that the regularisation of the 
residence status of the former SFRY citizens was a necessary step which the state 
should have taken in order to ensure that failure to obtain Slovenian citizenship would 
not disproportionately aff ect Article 8 rights of the ‘erased’. Th e Court concluded:
Th e absence of such regulation and the prolonged impossibility of obtaining valid residence 
permits have upset the fair balance which should have been struck between the legitimate 
aim of the protection of national security and eff ective respect for the applicants’ right to 
private or family life or both.62
Th e Court was creative in its inclusion of social rights within the scope of Article 8: 
social rights belong to the eff ective respect of private and family life. Consequently, 
when evaluating whether the state has respected private and family life eff ectively, 
social rights, such as the right to health insurance and pension rights, must be taken into 
account. Furthermore, the Court unanimously emphasised the grave consequences of 
the ‘erasure’ of applicants’ Article 8 rights.63 Consequently, the interference was not 
necessary in a democratic society, and thus there was a violation of Article 8. Th is case 
is particularly representative of the incorporation of social rights within the scope of 
traditional civil and political rights: eff ective respect of private and family life also 
contains grounds for the fulfi lment of social rights.
In Fadeyeva v. Russia a social right to health and well-being under Article 8 was 
in question.64 Th e applicant’s home was located near a steel plant. Th e applicant 
complained before the ECtHR that there had been a violation of Article 8 on account 
of the state’s failure to protect her private life and home from severe environmental 
nuisance arising from the steel plant. Th e Government contested the applicability of 
Article 8 in this case. Th erefore, the Court had fi rst to decide whether the situation 
providing the subject of the applicant’s complaint fell under Article 8.
60 Ibid. para. 356 (emphasis added by the author).
61 Ibid. para. 358 (emphasis added by the author).
62 Ibid. para. 359.
63 Ibid. para. 360.
64 Fadeyeva v. Russia, 55723/00, 9 June 2005.
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Th e Court emphasised that, in order to raise an issue under Article  8, the 
interference must directly aff ect the applicant’s home, family or private life. In addition, 
the adverse eff ects of environmental pollution must attain a certain minimum level in 
order to fall within the scope of Article 8. Th e Court then pointed out that the offi  cial 
documents submitted confi rmed that the environmental pollution at the applicant’s 
place of residence had constantly exceeded safety levels. Moreover, the ECtHR paid 
special attention to the fact that the domestic courts recognised the applicant’s right 
to be resettled. Additionally, domestic legislation itself defi ned the zone in which the 
applicant’s home was situated as unfi t for habitation. Th erefore, the national courts 
had already recognised the existence of interference with the applicant’s private 
sphere.65
Th e Court evaluated the applicant’s claim that the pollution has been harmful 
to her health and well-being. Th e Court points out that, in this case, a very strong 
combination of indirect evidence and presumptions made it possible to conclude 
that the applicant’s health deteriorated as a result of her prolonged exposure to the 
industrial emissions from the steel plant. Th e Court continued:
Even assuming that the pollution did not cause any quantifi able harm to her health, it 
inevitably made the applicant more vulnerable to various illnesses. Moreover, there can 
be no doubt that it adversely aff ected her quality of life and home. Th erefore, the Court 
accepts that the actual detriment to the applicant’s health and well-being reached a level 
suffi  cient to bring it within the scope of Article 8 […].66
Th e Court analysed the complaint in terms of a positive duty on the state to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights under 
Article 8(1).67 Next, the Court formulated two positive obligations which can arise 
from the eff ective enjoyment of right to respect of home or private life in the present 
case: obligation to resettle the applicant and obligation to regulate private industry.
Th e Court unanimously concluded that the state had not fulfi lled these positive 
obligations and, therefore, had failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of 
the community and the applicant’s eff ective enjoyment of her right to respect for her 
home and private life. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 8.
Th e outcome was in favour of the right to health and well-being. Th e Court, 
however, did not directly declare any social rights within its reasoning. Th ere were no 
references to the social rights conventions or instruments which protect everyone’s 
right to health internationally. Th e Court emphasised eff ective enjoyment of the 
right to private life and home and declared that there was a positive obligation on 
the state to resettle the applicant away from the place where her health is at risk. Th e 
argumentation could have been stronger and the Court could have stated the right to 
65 Ibid. paras. 81–86.
66 Ibid. para. 88.
67 Ibid. para. 89.
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health more clearly and directly by, for example, referring to Article 11 of the Social 
Charter (right to health).
3.3. CATEGORY 3: RIGHT TO POSSESSION (ARTICLE 1 OF 
PROTOCOL No. 1)
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has been considered by the ECtHR in a very wide range 
of social security cases in which social security is seen as possession.68 Th e ECtHR 
has confi rmed that states have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to national 
social security schemes. However, when legislation regulating access to such a scheme 
exists, it must be compatible with the non-discrimination provision (Article 14). Th e 
Court stated in Luczak:
[…] even where weighty reasons have been advanced for excluding an individual from the 
scheme, such exclusion must not leave him in a situation in which he is denied any social 
insurance cover, […] thus posing a threat to his livelihood. Indeed, to leave […] person 
bereft  of any social security cover would be incompatible with current trends in social 
security legislation in Europe.69
Th e Court unanimously concluded, emphasising the social rights’ perspective, that 
even though the state clearly has a wide margin of appreciation in the area of social 
security, the Government had failed to adduce any reasonable and objective justifi cation 
for the distinction in order to meet the requirements of Article 14.70 Th erefore, there 
was a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It must, however, be pointed out that the incorporation of social rights within 
the Convention is fully dependent on the individual national legislations concerning 
social rights. Th e Court, in its interpretations of Convention provisions, de facto 
protects and gives weight to nationally provided social rights. Th us, if the state decides 
to create a benefi ts scheme, it must do so in a manner which is compatible with the 
non-discrimination provision.71
Social rights may also be involved under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as counter 
arguments to interference with property rights. In Ghigo, the case concerned balancing 
a landlord’s property rights against the tenants’ social rights.72 Th e applicant’s house 
68 See Cousins (2008: 17–45).
69 Luczak v. Poland, 77782/01, 27 November 200, para. 52.
70 Ibid. para. 59; see cases of social security as a possession and non-discrimination involved e.g. Koua 
Poirrez v. France, (note 32); Stec and Others v. Th e United Kingdom, 65731/01, 65900/01, 12 April 
2006, GC.
71 Th is similar interpretation praxis is also common to the UN Human Rights Committee, which 
interprets the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by giving weight to national 
social rights provisions, see e.g. Communication No. 182/1984, F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Th e 
Netherlands.
72 Ghigo v. Malta, 31122/05, 26 September 2006.
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was seized by the Government under a requisition order. Th e house was let to a tenant 
and the applicant was entitled to receive a requisition rent for the use of his property. 
However, no rent had ever been fi xed or off ered to the landlord. Th e applicant 
invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and complained before the ECtHR that, due to 
the requisition order, he had lost control of his property for a long period of time, 
and he had been obliged to bear the obligations of a landlord without obtaining any 
compensation.
Th e Government pointed out that the state had a general interest in controlling the 
use of property. Th e general interest aimed at ensuring a just distribution and eff ective 
use of housing resources. It was maintained that the requisition order provided a right 
to housing and certain living conditions for everyone.
Th e second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 states that Contracting States 
are entitled to control the use of property in the general interest. Next, the Court 
examines whether the state’s measures are lawful, whether it had pursued ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and whether ‘a fair balance had been struck’ between the means employed and 
the aim sought to be realised.
Th e lawfulness of the measures was quickly ascertained (the national legislation 
fulfi lled the accessible, precise and foreseeable criteria).73 Next, the Court evaluated 
whether the Maltese authorities had pursued a legitimate aim in the general interest. 
Th e Court reiterated that the notion of general interest was necessarily extensive. 
Further, the Court noted that the national authorities were, in principle, in a better 
position than an international judge to appreciate what was in the general interest. Th e 
Court accepted the Government’s argument that the requisition and the rent control 
were aimed at ensuring the just distribution and use of housing resources.74 Th e Court 
mentioned explicitly that: ‘Th ese measures, implemented with a view to securing the 
social protection of tenants […], were also aimed at preventing homelessness, as well 
as protecting the dignity of poorly-off  tenants […].’75 Consequently, the impugned 
legislation had a legitimate aim.
Finally, the Court evaluated whether a fair balance had been struck between the 
general interest of the community and the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. In other words, the Court ascertained whether the landlord had to 
bear a disproportionate and excessive burden due to the state’s interference. In this 
connection, the Court referred to the doctrine that the landlord’s property rights 
must be ‘practical and eff ective’.76 Th e Court considered that the landlord had little or 
no infl uence on the choice of tenant or the essential elements of such an agreement. 
Furthermore, the Court observed that the compensation for the loss of control over 
his property was extremely low (less than € 5 per month) and could hardly be seen as 
73 Ibid. paras. 51–53.
74 Ibid. paras. 55–57.
75 Ibid. para. 58.
76 Ibid. para. 62.
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fair. In addition, the requisition had already lasted for 22 years. Taking all these things 
into account, the Court unanimously concluded that a disproportionate and excessive 
burden had been imposed on the applicant.77 Th us, a fair balance had not been struck 
and there had been a violation of the applicant’s property rights.
Th e Court took the state’s wide margin of appreciation into account and stressed, 
when the social housing was involved, that the national authorities must have 
considerable discretion in deciding on the extent of control over the use of individual 
property. However, the Court stressed that the discretion was not unlimited and that 
its exercise cannot entail consequences at variance with Convention standards.78 
Th e Court’s reasoning with regard to prioritising the landlord’s property rights over 
the tenants’ social rights seems justifi ed. Th e Court did not underestimate the aim 
of the state in protecting the social rights of others when controlling and limiting 
the applicant’s property rights. Th e disproportionality of the interference is rather 
obvious and if the state had managed to ease the consequences of its interference, the 
violation would have probably not been judged to have occurred.
Th e interference with landlords’ property rights in order to protect housing rights 
of others has been in focus also in the Grand Chamber Hutten-Czapska case.79 Th e 
same question had been decided by the Court before, for example, in the Scalabrino80 
and Mellacher81 cases, in which the Court emphasised increasing social justice as a 
legitimate general interest justifying the limitation of landlords’ property rights, and 
consequently, found no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.82 In Hutten-Czapska 
the Court fully recognised the diffi  culty of achieving a balance between social rights 
and landlords’ property rights:
It is true that […] the Polish State […] had to balance the exceptionally diffi  cult interests of 
landlords and tenants. It had, on the one hand, to secure the protection of property rights 
of the former and, on the other, to respect the social rights of the latter, oft en vulnerable 
individuals […].83
In these cases, the state’s aim is to protect the social rights of tenants, and it therefore 
limits the protection off ered by the Convention to landlords’ property rights. From 
the point of view of social rights, the state is doing the right thing. Th is was explicitly 
admitted by the Court when it accepted the protection of the social rights of others 
77 Ibid. paras. 64–66, 69.
78 Ibid. paras.67–68.
79 Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 35014/97, 19 June 2006, GC.
80 Spadea and Scalabrino v. Italy, 12868/87, 28 September 1995.
81 Mellacher and Others v. Austria, 10522/83, 11011/84, 11070/84, 19 December 1989.
82 It is worth mentioning that in Scalabrino (note 80) and Mellacher (note 81) the Court is not directly 
arguing for social rights, but instead, for social justice. Arguments based on rights have clearly 
become more visible and explicit in the twenty-fi rst century.
83 Hutten-Czapska (note 79), para. 225.
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as a legitimate general interest for interfering with property rights.84 However, the 
principle of proportionality must be kept in mind: the interference should not impose 
a disproportionate burden on landlords. In the Court’s practice this means that the 
level of rent should be suffi  ciently near the current market value, and the landlord 
should have some right to infl uence the contractual aspects of the tenancy. Th is 
sounds fairly acceptable and justifi ed: the protection of social rights should not be 
done at any cost and by neglecting the principle of proportionality.
3.4. CATEGORY 4: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (ARTICLE 11)
In the Grand Chamber case Demir and Baykara, the incorporation of wider trade-
union rights within Article 11 was in question.85 Article 11(1) covers everyone’s right 
to form and to join trade unions. Th e applicants complained before the ECtHR that 
the domestic courts had denied them the right to form trade unions and to enter 
into collective agreements. Th e main question was whether the Convention includes 
the right for municipal civil servants to form trade unions and the right to bargain 
collectively.
Th e Court started its reasoning exceptionally by outlining how international 
instruments aff ect the interpretation of the Convention. Th is was necessary since 
the respondent Government had argued that the Court was not entitled to create, by 
way of interpretation, any new obligations not already provided in the Convention. 
Turkey was not a party to Article 5 (the right to organise) or Article 6 (the right to 
bargain collectively) of the European Social Charter. Th e Court strongly rejected the 
Government’s claim that international instruments should not aff ect the interpretation 
of the Convention. Th e Court stressed that Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention 
determine the meaning of the terms and phrases used in the Convention. Furthermore, 
the Court reiterated the practical and eff ective interpretation and living instrument 
method. In addition, the Court stated that it must also always take into account any 
relevant applicable rules and principles of international law.86
Next, the Court pointed out that, when there is a set of rules and principles that 
are accepted by the vast majority of states or in international treaties, these ‘refl ect 
a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon to clarify the scope 
of a Convention provision’.87 Furthermore, the Court reiterated that it has never 
distinguished between sources of law according to whether or not they had been 
signed or ratifi ed by the respondent state.88
84 Th is line of reasoning is similar to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(fundamental rights are a legitimate reason to limit the free movement of goods), see e.g. C-112/00, 
Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v. Republik Österreich, 12 June 2003, GC.
85 Demir and Baykara (note 38).
86 Ibid. paras. 65–68.
87 Ibid. para. 76.
88 Ibid. para. 78.
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Th e Court pointed out that the member states declined to create an additional 
protocol of social rights within the Convention in 1999. Th e argument for declining 
the additional protocol of social rights was that, instead of creating a new protocol 
within the Convention, the mechanism of the European Social Charter should be 
strengthened. In relation to this case, the Court viewed this argument as a general 
wish in support a consensus among states to promote economic and social rights. Th e 
Court continued, and there might be some sarcasm involved: ‘It is not precluded from 
taking this general wish of Contracting States into consideration when interpreting 
the provisions of the Convention.’89
Turning to the detail of the present case, according to Article  11(2), lawful 
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of these rights by members of the 
administration of the state. Th e applicants were municipal civil servants. Th e Court 
stressed that municipal civil servants, who are not engaged in the administration of 
the state as such, cannot in principle be treated as members of the administration 
of state and, accordingly, be subject on that basis to a limitation of their right to 
organise and to form trade unions. Aft er stating its interpretation under Article 11, 
the Court drew support to the right of public offi  cials to form trade unions from the 
ILO Convention of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise.90
Continuing with the ILO Committee’s considerations, the Court pointed out 
that the right of public offi  cials to join trade unions is established several times, the 
only admissible exceptions to the right to organise concerning the armed forces and 
the police.91 Th e Court added that the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
adopted the same line of reasoning as regards municipal civil servants.92 Next, the 
Court referred to the European Social Charter to support its view.93
Th e Court also referred directly to Recommendation No. R (2000) 6 of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and European Union’s Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, in which trade union rights had been recognised for civil 
servants.94 Finally, the Court observed that the right of public servants to join trade 
unions is now recognised by all Contracting States. Th e only restrictions concern 
the police, fi re service and armed forces.95 Demonstrating this consensus at the 
international and European level left  the Court no room to conclude otherwise: 
municipal civil servants cannot be excluded from the scope of Article 11. Accordingly, 
the applicants could legitimately rely on Article 11.
Aft er concluding that Article 11 included trade-union rights for civil servants, the 
rest was quite straightforward for the Court. Th ere was clear inactivity, at the national 
89 Ibid. para. 84.
90 Ibid. para. 100.
91 Ibid. para. 101.
92 Ibid. para. 102.
93 Ibid. para. 103.
94 Ibid. paras. 104–105.
95 Ibid. para. 106.
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level, to put into eff ect the international agreements concerning civil servants’ trade-
union rights. Th e Court found that neither ‘pressing social need’ nor the reasons 
for the restriction were ‘relevant and suffi  cient’.96 Accordingly, the seventeen Court 
judges found unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 11 with regard to 
the failure to recognise the right of the applicants, as municipal civil servants, to form 
a trade union.
Next, the question about the right to collective bargaining had to be solved. Th e 
right to bargain collectively is not covered by Article 11(1) and is a pure social right. 
Th e trade union in question had persuaded the authority to engage in collective 
bargaining and to enter into collective agreements. Th e Court admitted that the right 
to bargain collectively and to enter into collective agreements had not previously 
constituted an inherent element of Article 11. However, it argued that it had to take 
into account the evolution of praxis in such matters both at an international and 
domestic level. Th e Court refers to the ILO Convention where the right to collective 
bargaining is strongly protected.97
In addition, many references were made to the European Social Charter and the 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. It also recognised that there was 
an undeniable consensus within the European states in favour of securing the right to 
bargain collectively.98 In the light of these developments, the Court openly departed 
from its previous case-law and accepted that the right to bargain collectively had 
become one of the essential elements of Article 11.
Aft er fi nding that collective bargaining was one of the essential elements of trade-
union rights under Article 11, there was no longer very much for the Court to balance. 
Th e explanation that civil servants, without distinction, enjoyed a privileged position 
in relation to other workers was not, according to the Court’s unanimous opinion, 
suffi  cient reason to interfere with their rights under Article 11.99 Consequently, there 
had been a violation of Article 11 with regard to collective bargaining.
Th e Court justifi ed its dynamic interpretation openly:
While it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that 
the Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents established in previous 
cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutionary approach would risk 
rendering it a bar to reform or improvement […].100
In the Grand Chamber case of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, trade union 
rights in the Orthodox Church were in question.101 Th e priests and clerical staff  of 
96 Ibid. paras. 116, 119–126.
97 Ibid. paras. 147–148.
98 Ibid. paras. 149–151.
99 Ibid. paras. 165–169.
100 Ibid. para. 153.
101 Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” v. Romania, 2330/09, 9 July 2013, GC.
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the Romanian Orthodox Church wanted to form a trade union and the state refused, 
justifying this decision by citing the importance of maintaining the autonomy of the 
Church. Th e Court had fi rst to determine whether Article 11 was applicable in the 
present case. In doing so, the Court relied on the strong support for the right of all 
workers to form trade unions, as guaranteed in the ILO Conventions and European 
Union law.102 Consequently, the Court considered that, notwithstanding their 
special circumstances, members of the clergy fulfi lled their mission in the context 
of an employment relationship falling within the scope of Article 11. Consequently, 
Article 11 was applicable in the present case.103
Next, the Court examined whether the interference of Article 11 was ‘prescribed 
by law’, pursued ‘a legitimate aim’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. Th e 
lawfulness requirement and the legitimacy of the aim were rather briefl y confi rmed 
and the decisive question identifi ed as the necessity of the interference. Th e 
proportionality examination diff ered from the Chamber’s judgment. Th e Chamber 
found that the national court had not taken suffi  ciently relevant arguments into 
account when refusing to register the trade union. Consequently, the Chamber found 
that there had been a violation of right to form a trade union. In contrast, the Grand 
Chamber’s majority, composed of eleven judges, considered that the principle of the 
autonomy of religious communities was a relevant reason to restrict the right to form 
a trade union for clerical staff . Accordingly, there was no violation of Article 11.104
Th e Grand Chamber’s emphasis on the principle of autonomy of religious 
communities over the trade union rights was mainly based on the argument about the 
lack of a European consensus on this matter.105 Th e minority, composed of six judges, 
was not, however, convinced that the national court’s arguments were suffi  cient to 
justify identifying interference with rights under Article 11. Th e minority came to a 
diff erent conclusion on the European consensus arguing that, although constitutional 
models vary greatly in this matter, none of the European states excluded members of 
the clergy from the right to form trade unions.106
Th e Grand Chamber took national and religious sensitivities carefully into account 
in this case. Religious autonomy of the Romanian Orthodox Church was considered 
to be of greater importance than the autonomy of churches in other European states 
and trade union rights had to take a few steps backwards. Th e previous interpretations 
of trade union rights, as highlighted in Demir and Baykara, would have led one to 
expect that a violation of Article 11 would have been found to have taken place also 
in this case.107
102 Ibid. para. 142.
103 Ibid. para. 148.
104 Ibid. paras. 167–169.
105 Ibid. para. 171.
106 Joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Spielmann, Villiger, López Guerra, Bianku, Møse and 
Jäderblom, para. 10.
107 Demir and Baykara (note 38).
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3.5. CATEGORY 5: FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (ARTICLE 2 OF 
PROTOCOL No. 4)
In Tatishvili v. Russia, interference with Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 led, at the same 
time, to an interference with a number of social rights.108 Th e applicant was a citizen 
of the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). She continued to hold Soviet 
citizenship and in 2000 she became a stateless person. Th e applicant lived in Moscow, 
and her application for residence registration had been declined because she was not 
a Russian citizen. Th e applicant complained about the domestic authorities’ arbitrary 
refusal to certify her residence at the chosen address, which had substantially 
complicated her daily life and rendered uncertain her access to medical care. Th e 
Court decided to examine the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.
Th e Court referred to the applicant’s submission that residence registration is 
the proof of residence in the Russian Federation, so that its absence had prevented 
her from exercising many social rights, inter alia, access to medical assistance, social 
security, pension and the right to possess property.109 Th e Court found that the 
authorities’ refusal to certify the applicant’s residence exposed her to administrative 
penalties and fi nes. Th e Court said nothing about the consequences for the applicant’s 
social rights. However, it is clear that there had been an interference with the right to 
liberty of movement.110
Next, the Court examined whether the interference was justifi ed. Th e fi rst 
requirement was that the interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’. Th e 
Government’s justifi cation for the interference was based solely on the argument of 
the unlawfulness of the applicant’s residence in Russia. Th is argument was, however, 
strictly rejected by the Court.111 Th e Court stressed that the application was refused 
because of a failure to submit a complete set of documents. It was never specifi ed 
which of the required documents were missing.
Furthermore, the Court observed that grounds for refusing the registration 
had not been laid out. Lastly, the ECtHR paid special attention to the case law of 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Th e Constitutional Court has 
held that the registration authority had a duty to certify residence, and there was 
no discretion for reviewing the authenticity. Th e ECtHR observed that the binding 
interpretation of the Constitutional Court was disregarded by the domestic authorities 
in the present case. Accordingly, the interference was not ‘in accordance with the law’ 
and this conclusion made it unnecessary to determine whether it pursued ‘a legitimate 
aim’ and was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.112
108 Tatishvili v. Russia, 1509/02, 22 February 2007.
109 Ibid. para. 44.
110 Ibid. para. 46.
111 Ibid. paras. 39–41, 49.
112 Ibid. paras. 52–54.
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Th e Court’s remaining task, to unanimously conclude that there was a violation of 
Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, was then quite straightforward. Th e outcome was in favour 
of social rights which were also interfered with by violating the right to movement. 
Regrettably, however, the Court’s reasoning was silent on social rights. Th e Court merely 
referred to the applicant’s submission on the consequences of the interference with many 
social rights. Th e Court could have done more in its reasoning: with the help of positive 
obligations, the Court could have easily included social rights under the provision of the 
liberty of movement. Unfortunately, the reasoning of the Court remained on a rather 
traditional level and left  the arguments concerning social rights aside.
In Miażdżyk v. Poland, a restriction on the liberty of movement aff ected the 
applicant’s social rights.113 Th e applicant complained that the prohibition on leaving 
Poland for more than fi ve years constituted a disproportionate restriction on his 
liberty of movement (Article  2 of Protocol No. 4). Th e applicant was waiting for 
criminal proceedings and a restriction of movement had been imposed on him. Th e 
applicant was a French national and his life prior to his arrest in Poland had been 
based in France. His family, including three children, were located in France. He also 
had a right to medical care in France. Th e applicant had made nine requests for the 
restriction imposed on him to be lift ed. He cited, inter alia, his health problems. All 
the requests were, however, refused.
Th e Court’s balancing in this case was quite straightforward: the disproportionality 
of the limitation on movement was obvious. Th e Court concluded unanimously that ‘in 
view of the above’ the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of movement for a period of 
fi ve years and two months was disproportionate, particularly given that he was forced to 
stay for all that period in a foreign country and was not allowed to leave even for a short 
period of time. Consequently, there had been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4.114
Th e right to medical care was one aspect of the rights that were interfered with due 
to the restriction of movement.115 By no means, however, was the right to medical care 
alone decisive: the eff ects of the restriction of movement were disproportionate as a 
whole and the social right to medical care was just one element among these.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Th e analysis of case law shows that the Court has evolved a rich case law praxis in the 
fi eld of social rights. Although the Convention’s text does not cover social rights, this has 
not stopped the Court from including social rights within the Convention’s provisions. 
Th e Court has openly broadened the traditional scope of Convention provisions and 
incorporated social rights within the civil and political rights. Th is should, however, 
be done in an overt and transparent way. If the Court fails to acknowledge the true 
113 Miażdżyk v. Poland, 23592/07, 24 January 2012.
114 Ibid. paras. 41–42.
115 Ibid. para. 39.
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arguments which led it to support social rights in its decisions, then there is much to 
criticise in relation to considerations of legal certainty and justifi ability.
Th e Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinaft er, the CJEU) has likewise 
extended interpretations in relation to social rights in its case law. Social rights belong 
primarily in the fi eld of social policy, which does not belong to the Union’s exclusive 
competences as questions of social policy have been left  to the shared competences of 
the Member States and the Union (Article 4(2)(b) TFEU116). Economic policies are 
coordinated by the Member States (Article 5(1) TFEU). Furthermore, the protection 
and improvement of human health belongs to the Member States’ competences 
(Article  6(a) TFEU). Th e Charter of Fundamental Rights covers both civil and 
political and social rights. Th e implementation of the Charter provisions are, however, 
bound to the implementation of Union law (Article 51(1) Charter). It follows that the 
applicability of social rights which are provided by the Charter can only arise if it is 
linked to the implementation of Union law (e.g. to a certain Directive or Regulation).117
Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di 
Bolzano (IPES) and Others before the CJEU concerned the right to housing benefi t.118 
In this case, the national allocation of funds prevented the granting of social benefi t 
to a non-national. Th e Grand Chamber, composed of thirteen judges, had to decide 
whether such a mechanism was in conformity with the principle of equal treatment. 
Th e CJEU took social rights provided in the Charter seriously:
[W]hen determining the social security, social assistance and social protection measures 
[…] the Member States must comply with the rights and observe the principles provided 
for under the Charter, […]. Under Article 34(3) of the Charter, in order to combat social 
exclusion and poverty, the Union (and thus the Member States when they are implementing 
European Union law) ‘recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so 
as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack suffi  cient resources […]’.119
Th e CJEU further emphasised the Charter’s provision on social and housing assistance 
in the interpretation of the Directive in question and concluded that the benefi t in 
question must be considered as being part of core benefi ts within the meaning of 
Article 11(4) of Directive 2003/109.120
Th e CJEU concluded that Directive 2003/109 must be interpreted as precluding, with 
regard to the granting of housing benefi t, diff erent treatment for third-country nationals 
116 OJ C 326, 26.10.2012: 47–390.
117 For the social dimension of the European Union, see Rosas and Armati (2010: 187–192).
118 C-571/10, Servet Kamberaj v. Istituto per l’Edilizia sociale della Provincia autonoma di Bolzano 
(IPES) and Others, 24 April 2012, GC. Th e route which takes social rights into consideration in the 
Union law comes mainly through the fundamental freedoms (the free movement of people, goods, 
services and capital).
119 Ibid. para. 80.
120 Ibid. para. 92. Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents (OJ L 16, 23.1.2004: 44).
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enjoying the status of long-term resident.121 Th e line of interpretation taken by the CJEU 
and the ECtHR was interestingly similar in that both emphasise the prohibition of any 
diff erence in treatment on grounds of nationality in access to social benefi ts.122
Case law, both from the CJEU and the ECtHR, illustrates a consistent trend 
in relation to social rights: social rights are increasingly included within the 
interpretation of applicable law.123 Th is leads us to the question presented at the 
beginning of this article, namely whether it is legitimate for the ECtHR to read social 
rights into interpretations of the Convention. Th e answer is two-fold. Firstly, in order 
for the incorporation of social rights to be legitimate, the reasoning must be overt 
and transparent and the arguments, both for and against, must be stated. Secondly, 
justifi cation of the extended interpretations should be based on widely adopted 
international instruments. Furthermore, additional weight should be placed on the 
matter of whether the majority of the Contracting States have approved that line of 
interpretation. Similarities in case law praxis concerning social rights’ protection 
across the European Union is one way in which the legitimacy of the incorporation 
of social rights into the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights is 
increased. When both of the European courts are on the same side, it is hard to argue 
to the contrary.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European legal system, in which the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘the Court’) is situated, rests on the principle of subsidiarity to 
a great extent. This means that the Contracting States are responsible 
for enforcing the rights and freedoms protected under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’). The fourth instance 
doctrine constitutes the principle of subsidiarity1 and adheres to it on 
the basis that the Contracting States are the main actors under the 
Convention. Under the fourth instance doctrine the Court does not 
address errors of fact or law allegedly made by a national court, unless 
and insofar as such errors infringe the rights and freedoms protected 
by the Convention.2 
 
The Court regularly invokes the principle of subsidiarity and its 
doctrinal corollary, the margin of appreciation doctrine.3 The latter 
means that States are allowed a certain margin for discretion in order 
to take into account the special circumstances of each State. It has 
been stated that in order to maintain its institutional credibility, the 
Court must refrain from interfering with the margin of appreciation 
granted to Contracting States. 4  One might assume that the fourth 
                                                            
1  See Herbert Petzold, ‘The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity’, in 
Ronald St J Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European 
System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), 41-62. 
2 Jonas Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), 257-76.  
3 These principles also form part of the Convention, and are not only based on the 
case law of the Court. See Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 213) which 
adds the principle of subsidiarity to the Preamble of the Convention (‘Affirming 
that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this 
Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Human Rights established by this Convention.’). Protocol No. 15 was opened for 
signature on 24 June 2013 and will enter into force as soon as all State Parties to the 
Convention have signed and ratified it. On the margin of appreciation doctrine, see, 
eg Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of 
Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia 2001). 
4 Magdalena Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of 
Human Rights (OUP 2010), 3-4. Furthermore, the margin of appreciation has been 
seen as a method that hinders the reception of international law in the ECHR 
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instance principle, the margin of appreciation and the principle of 
subsidiarity reflect different aspects of the Court’s competence, as 
there would otherwise be no need for the three different principles. It 
has, however, been argued that they are essentially synonymous. 
Christoffersen stresses that the different concepts are generally 
confined to separate areas of case law, but it would be a mistake to 
assume that this makes any substantive difference.5 
 
That said, I contend that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
these three principles. The principle of subsidiarity, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the fourth instance doctrine represent 
different aspects of national sovereignty. 6  In other words, national 
sovereignty lies at the heart of these principles, but the approach 
differs in each case. The fourth instance doctrine relates to the 
question of whether it is possible to appeal a national court’s decision, 
while the subsidiarity principle has a broader meaning.7 As Carozza 
states, the principle of subsidiarity needs a broad formulation and 
there are several layers within the principle.8 Consequently, I argue 
that the fourth instance doctrine belongs to the first layer of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
system (ibid, 7-9). 
5 Christoffersen (n 2), 239-40; see also Petzold (n 1) and Paul Mahoney, ‘Universality 
Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some 
Recent Judgments’ (1997) EHRLR 364-79. Cf. Sweeney sees the margin of 
appreciation doctrine as separate but closely connected to the principle of 
subsidiarity (James A. Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold 
Era: Universality in Transition (Routledge 2013), 33); Breitenmoser also makes a 
distinction between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle, 
Stephan Breitenmoser, ‘Subsidiarität und Intressenabwägung im Rahmen der 
EGMR-Rechtsprechung’, in Stephan Breitenmoser and others (eds), Human Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Dike Verlag 2007) 
119-42. 
6 See, also, Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international 
human rights law’ ((2003) 97 AJIL 38-79, at 69-70) who describes several important 
differences between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle. 
Carozza also points out that many use the term subsidiarity principle to refer 
generally to the idea of deferring decisions to local authorities. 
7 The admissibility criteria concretise the subsidiarity principle: Article 35(1) of the 
Convention provides that the Court can only hear cases when the applicant has 
exhausted all available national remedies. The subsidiarity principle is also known 
in EU law, but its content differs from that applied in the Convention system. See 
on the subsidiarity principle in EU law, Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU 
Law (2nd edn; OUP 2006), 183-8. 
8 Carozza (n 6), 57-8. 
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that the fourth instance doctrine belongs to the first layer of the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
system (ibid, 7-9). 
5 Christoffersen (n 2), 239-40; see also Petzold (n 1) and Paul Mahoney, ‘Universality 
Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some 
Recent Judgments’ (1997) EHRLR 364-79. Cf. Sweeney sees the margin of 
appreciation doctrine as separate but closely connected to the principle of 
subsidiarity (James A. Sweeney, The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold 
Era: Universality in Transition (Routledge 2013), 33); Breitenmoser also makes a 
distinction between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle, 
Stephan Breitenmoser, ‘Subsidiarität und Intressenabwägung im Rahmen der 
EGMR-Rechtsprechung’, in Stephan Breitenmoser and others (eds), Human Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Dike Verlag 2007) 
119-42. 
6 See, also, Paolo Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international 
human rights law’ ((2003) 97 AJIL 38-79, at 69-70) who describes several important 
differences between the margin of appreciation doctrine and subsidiarity principle. 
Carozza also points out that many use the term subsidiarity principle to refer 
generally to the idea of deferring decisions to local authorities. 
7 The admissibility criteria concretise the subsidiarity principle: Article 35(1) of the 
Convention provides that the Court can only hear cases when the applicant has 
exhausted all available national remedies. The subsidiarity principle is also known 
in EU law, but its content differs from that applied in the Convention system. See 
on the subsidiarity principle in EU law, Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU 
Law (2nd edn; OUP 2006), 183-8. 
8 Carozza (n 6), 57-8. 
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subsidiarity principle. In this layer local communities are left to protect 
and respect human rights, provided they are capable of achieving those 
ends themselves. Also the margin of appreciation doctrine belongs to 
the first layer. In this case, the subsidiarity principle gives the national 
authorities a degree of discretion over the interpretation and 
implementation of Convention rights and freedoms.9 
 
The difference between the fourth instance doctrine and the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is rather complex. In practice, the difference is 
often a matter of degree; both doctrines allow considerable discretion 
to the national authorities.10 The discernable difference that sets them 
apart is that the argumentation in cases concerning the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is more extensive than the argumentation in 
fourth instance cases. 11  For this reason, compared to the fourth 
instance doctrine, the margin of appreciation doctrine has a more 
developed body of case law and is more often used in the Court’s 
praxis. 
 
The central difference is that the margin of appreciation doctrine is 
linked to argumentation by consensus. In short, the margin of 
appreciation is concerned with whether there is a consensus between 
the states, or not. If there is consensus, then the margin will be 
narrower and when there is no consensus, then the margin afforded to 
the states is wider. By contrast, there is no such tool to measure the 
scope of application of the fourth instance doctrine.12 Furthermore, the 
                                                            
9  The second layer of subsidiarity supports the integration of local and 
supranational interpretation and implementation into a single community of 
discourse. The third and final layer of subsidiarity is founded on the idea that to the 
extent that local bodies are unable to accomplish the ends of human rights, the 
larger branches of international community have a responsibility to intervene, ibid 
58. 
10 David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd edn; 
OUP 2014), 16. 
11 See the Court’s argumentation of the margin of appreciation doctrine eg S.A.S v. 
France, 43835/11, 1 July 2014, GC, paras 123-59 and compare it to the argumentation 
with the fourth instance doctrine eg Tautkus v Lithuania, 29474/09, 27 November 2012, 
para 57. 
12 The existence of consensus will, however, not automatically restrict the margin of 
appreciation of the state concerned. Much depends on the circumstances of the case 
and especially on the question of whether a particularly important facet of an 
individual’s existence or identity is at stake. See more e.g. Egbert Myjer, ‘Pieter van 
Dijk and His Favourite Strasbourg Judgment. Some Remarks on Consensus in the 
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application of the margin of appreciation doctrine is more detailed and 
precise in the Court’s case law. The extent of the margin is closely 
evaluated, whereas the fourth-instance nature of the case is evaluated 
in a rather rough and brief manner. The fourth instance doctrine 
focuses its evaluation on whether the complaint, which concerns the 
national proceedings, contains elements that are of a fourth-instance 
nature. In other words, it evaluates if the claim that the decision of the 
national proceedings was erroneous. The fourth instance doctrine 
usually concerns Article 6 cases, while the margin of appreciation 
doctrine concerns every Article in the Convention, especially Articles 8, 
9, 10 and 11.13 
 
The fourth instance doctrine is also applied by other quasi-judicial and 
judicial bodies, which employ human rights to determine the 
admissibility of a complaint. Phrases such as ‘this commission/court 
will not sit as a court of fourth instance over domestic legal decisions’ 
are typically seen in such situations.14 These phrases mean that the 
international forum is not to act as a quasi-appellate court as to the 
correctness of a national court’s judgment under its national law. This 
fourth-instance formula states briefly that the international forum will 
not second-guess the national court’s findings of fact or whether the 
national court has applied national law properly.15 
 
The Court has proved itself to be a dynamic and far-reaching 
interpreter of the provisions of the Convention. It has adopted several 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Marjolein van Roosmalen and 
others (eds), Fundamental Rights and Principles, Liber amicorum Pieter van Dijk 
(Intersentia 2013) 49-71, at 65; see also Harris and others (n 10), 11. 
13 Harris and others (n 10), 14-6. 
14 See, eg Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1763/2008, Pillai v Canada, 
Views adopted on 25 March 2011, para 11.2; Communication No. 1881/2009, Masih v 
Canada, Views adopted on 24 July 2013, dissenting opinion of Committee member 
Mr Shany, joined by Committee members Mr Flinterman, Mr Kälin, Sir Rodley, Ms 
Seibert-Fohr and Mr Vardezelashvili, para 2; Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (I/A Court H.R.) Case No. 12.683, Melba del Carmen Suárez Peralta v Ecuador, 
26 January 2012, para 83; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court H.R.) 
Case No. 12.004, Marco Bienvenido Palma Mendoza et al. v Ecuador, 24 February 2011, 
para 53. 
15 See H. Victor Condé, A Handbook of International Human Rights Terminology (2nd 
edn; University of Nebraska Press 2004), 91-2; Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and Commentary 
(3rd edn; OUP 2013), 20-1. 
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methods of interpretation, which emphasise the Convention’s 
objectives, as well as its ‘living’ nature and responsiveness to social 
change.16 However, it regularly reminds states that it does not possess 
de jure power to revise the Convention, although it increasingly appears 
to consider that it has an important oracular, rights-creating function.17 
This often gives rise to a contradiction between the Court’s 
interpretations and the fourth instance doctrine, since it has been 
argued that its far-reaching interpretations encroach on the sphere of 
national authorities.18 
 
In sum, it has been argued that the Court must, on the one hand, 
protect fundamental rights to the highest degree possible and must do 
so in a dynamic and progressive way. On the other hand, it must take 
due account of its position as a supranational court for 47 different 
States, whose opinions on fundamental issues may vary dramatically.19 
The Court’s interpretation of the Convention provides a basis to 
evaluate its role in general and, consequently, to evaluate questions of 
legitimacy in particular, and whether its jurisdiction in relation to 
national courts is justified.20 I argue that the Court’s reasoning takes 
centre stage and that it either gains or loses its legitimacy on the basis 
of its judicial interpretations. 
 
                                                            
16 See Franz Matscher, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’, in Ronald St J 
Macdonald, Franz Matscher and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for the 
Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), 63-81; Ed Bates, The 
Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation 
of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (OUP 2010), 319-58; George Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2009). 
17 See Alex Stone Sweet and Helen Keller, A Europe of Rights (OUP 2008), 6. 
18 For more on this tension, see eg Wilhelmina Thomassen, ‘Judicial Legitimacy in 
an Internationalized World’, in Nick Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff (eds), 
The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 399-406, 402. 
19 It must be noted that there will be 48 Contracting Parties after the European 
Union accedes to the European Convention on Human Rights. The accession 
became a legal obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon, see Article 6(2) of the 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C326/1. Janneke 
Gerards, ‘Judicial Deliberations in the European Court of Human Rights’, in Nick 
Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff (eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ 
Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009) 407-36, 429. 
20 Marc Bossuyt, ‘Should the Strasbourg Court Exercise More Self-Restraint? On the 
extension of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to social 
security regulations’, 28 HRLJ (2007) 321; Luzius Wildhaber, ‘A Constitutional 
Future for the European Court of Human Rights?’ 23 HRLJ (2002) 161. 
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This article surveys the case law on fair trial cases with specific 
reference to Article 6 of the Convention, which directly requires the 
Court to evaluate fourth instance questions in the context of 
procedural human rights interpretations, an approach not taken 
elsewhere in the Convention. The focus is on the tensions and 
problems involved in balancing the fourth instance doctrine against an 
expansive interpretative approach of the right to a fair trial. This article 
has two aims. Firstly, it endeavours to systematise the role of the fourth 
instance doctrine in fair trial cases. Secondly, it conducts a critical 
evaluation of the justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine in these 
cases. 
 
The evaluation of the justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine leads 
to an analysis of the Court’s argumentation. The justification of a legal 
decision has been divided according to the internal justification and 
external justification. The internal justification relates to the 
consistency of the deliberation and the judicial reasoning but does not 
address why one fact is considered relevant, while another is deemed 
irrelevant and is therefore ignored.21 The external justification means 
that the judge must justify the chosen norm and the substance given to 
that norm. He or she must also decide which facts are taken into 
account—in other words, which facts are legally relevant—and justify 
their choice.22 Justifiability implies that a person faced with a practical 
statement can ask ‘why’ there was an Article 6 violation in the first 
place, and therefore demand reasons that support such a finding.23 
This article concentrates on the external justification, which has been 
characterised as an attempt to achieve comprehensive, general 
legitimacy for a judgment.24 In context of the Convention, justification 
means that the reasoning must be transparent and that all competing 
interests must be taken into account, thereby incorporating pro and 
contra types of argumentation. Moreover, since it is a human rights 
Convention, the focus should be on the content of the rights in dispute 
and not only procedural aspects. This also applies when evaluating the 
                                                            
21 On internal justification, see Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation, The 
Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal Justification (trs by Ruth Adler and Neil 
MacCormick, Clarendon Press 1989), 220-30; Alexander Peczenik, On Law and 
Reason (2nd ed; Springer 2009), 158-9.   
22 On external justification, see Alexy (n 21), 228-30; Peczenik (n 21), 158-60. 
23 Peczenik (n 21), 44-5, 166. 
24 Mirjami Paso, ‘Rhetoric Meets Rational Argumentation Theory’ 2 Ratio Juris 27 
(2014) 236, 239. 
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justifiability of the fourth instance doctrine in the Court’s case law. 
 
Methods borrowed from the theory of rational argumentation are used 
in analysing the relevant case law, and reveal a clear tension owing to 
the Court’s inconsistency in its decisions on the breadth of domestic 
obligations and the extensiveness of fair trial rights. The Court usually 
takes either the fourth instance doctrine or the right to a fair trial into 
account in its judicial reasoning, while leaving all other considerations 
aside. The question of legitimacy is involved in both instances. The 
fourth instance doctrine refers to formal legitimacy.25 It acts as a brake 
on the Court’s interpretations of the Convention by ensuring that it 
bears in mind the constitutional limits on its competence. From the 
fourth instance viewpoint, legitimacy is assessed in terms of formality, 
focusing on procedural steps as opposed to substance. If all the 
required procedural steps are taken at the national level, then no 
criticism is required. Consequently, the Court guarantees its own 
legitimacy through a formalistic approach in which it pays attention to 
procedural requirements only. By contrast, the legitimacy question 
manifests itself differently when it comes to the interpretation of rights, 
in which the Court’s legitimacy is viewed from the opposite position. 
As Letsas has recently argued the living instrument interpretation does 
not threaten the legitimacy of the Court. On the contrary, the Court 
loses legitimacy without it.26 Legitimacy in this sense stresses substance, 
which means that the Court gains legitimacy by evaluating issues of 
content as opposed to purely procedural matters. It is not enough for 
the national authorities to take all necessary procedural steps, since the 
focus in this approach is on the content of these procedures. The 
Court’s reasoning in respect of the fourth instance doctrine is viewed 
from a substantive legitimacy viewpoint. 
 
Section 2 of this contribution outlines the scope and interpretation of 
Article 6 and the fourth instance doctrine in the Court’s practice. 
Section 3 surveys the case law and categorises the judgments relating 
                                                            
25 For more on formal legitimacy, see Thomassen, (n 18), 402-3; Tom Barkhuysen 
and Michiel van Emmerik, ‘Legitimacy of European Court of Human Rights 
Judgments: Procedural Aspects’, in Nick Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff 
(eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009), 437-49. 
26 George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: its Meaning and Legitimacy’ 
in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe, The 
European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context 
(Cambridge University Press 2013), 126, 141. 
2014]  The ECtHR as a Court of Fourth Instance               92 
to the fourth instance doctrine in fair trial cases into four groups. This 
categorisation reveals that a strict approach to the fourth instance 
doctrine could threaten the effective protection of the right to a fair 
trial. Therefore, in Section 4, a more flexible and practical approach to 
the fourth instance doctrine is suggested. 
 
II. ARTICLE 6 AND THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Interpretation of Article 6 1.
While Article 6(2) and 6(3) contain specific provisions setting out 
minimum rights applicable in respect of those charged with a criminal 
offence, Article 6(1) applies both to civil and criminal proceedings. The 
core of Article 6(1) is the following passage:  
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. 
 
Article 6 is the provision of the Convention most frequently invoked by 
applicants.27 Many of the terms used in Article 6(1) bear autonomous 
meaning and require interpretation. There is consequently substantial 
case law on the provision’s application and the Court has identified 
separate requirements and positive obligations that derive from it. This 
contribution restricts itself to presenting only the main requirements 
derived from the provision.  
 
From the early 1970s, the Court has held that Article 6(1) includes a 
universal right to access to justice, even though this is not expressly 
stated in the Article.28 The Court also made it clear that ‘civil rights 
and obligations’ have an autonomous meaning under the Convention 
and this concept may also extend to administrative and executive 
decision-making.29 Furthermore, the requirement of a fair trial ‘by an 
                                                            
27 In 2000, almost 70 per cent of all new applications included at least one complaint 
under Article 6. The Court no longer keeps these kinds of statistics but it is likely 
that the proportion is still broadly the same. Some indicators provide that in 2012 
there were in total 480 violations of Article 6 (there were 1,093 violations in total). 
See statistics from the Court’s website: www.echr.coe.int. 
28 Golder v the United Kingdom, 4451/70, 21 February 1975; Posti and Rahko v Finland, 
27824/95, 24 September 2002. 
29 Pellegrin v France, 28541/95, 8 December 1999, GC; Vilho Eskelinen and Others v 
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and Michiel van Emmerik, ‘Legitimacy of European Court of Human Rights 
Judgments: Procedural Aspects’, in Nick Huls, Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff 
(eds), The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings (T.M.C. Asser Press 2009), 437-49. 
26 George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: its Meaning and Legitimacy’ 
in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe, The 
European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context 
(Cambridge University Press 2013), 126, 141. 
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to the fourth instance doctrine in fair trial cases into four groups. This 
categorisation reveals that a strict approach to the fourth instance 
doctrine could threaten the effective protection of the right to a fair 
trial. Therefore, in Section 4, a more flexible and practical approach to 
the fourth instance doctrine is suggested. 
 
II. ARTICLE 6 AND THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Interpretation of Article 6 1.
While Article 6(2) and 6(3) contain specific provisions setting out 
minimum rights applicable in respect of those charged with a criminal 
offence, Article 6(1) applies both to civil and criminal proceedings. The 
core of Article 6(1) is the following passage:  
 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. 
 
Article 6 is the provision of the Convention most frequently invoked by 
applicants.27 Many of the terms used in Article 6(1) bear autonomous 
meaning and require interpretation. There is consequently substantial 
case law on the provision’s application and the Court has identified 
separate requirements and positive obligations that derive from it. This 
contribution restricts itself to presenting only the main requirements 
derived from the provision.  
 
From the early 1970s, the Court has held that Article 6(1) includes a 
universal right to access to justice, even though this is not expressly 
stated in the Article.28 The Court also made it clear that ‘civil rights 
and obligations’ have an autonomous meaning under the Convention 
and this concept may also extend to administrative and executive 
decision-making.29 Furthermore, the requirement of a fair trial ‘by an 
                                                            
27 In 2000, almost 70 per cent of all new applications included at least one complaint 
under Article 6. The Court no longer keeps these kinds of statistics but it is likely 
that the proportion is still broadly the same. Some indicators provide that in 2012 
there were in total 480 violations of Article 6 (there were 1,093 violations in total). 
See statistics from the Court’s website: www.echr.coe.int. 
28 Golder v the United Kingdom, 4451/70, 21 February 1975; Posti and Rahko v Finland, 
27824/95, 24 September 2002. 
29 Pellegrin v France, 28541/95, 8 December 1999, GC; Vilho Eskelinen and Others v 
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independent and impartial tribunal established by law’ is the Court’s 
definition of the meaning of impartiality (the prior involvement of a 
judge, objective impartiality),30 independence (administrative agencies 
and disciplinary bodies)31 and the term ‘established by law’.32 Article 6(1) 
also requires that such determinations must be made in a ‘fair and 
public hearing’. Publicity is seen as one of the guarantees of a fair 
trial.33 In addition to this, while absent from the Convention, fairness 
has been held to require ‘equality of arms’.34  
 
The Court has also held that a ‘fair and public hearing’ includes the 
right to examine witnesses,35 the right to legal representation,36 the 
right not to incriminate oneself37, and the requirement that national 
courts must give sufficient reasons for their decisions.38 Article 6(1) also 
provides that everyone is entitled to a hearing ‘within a reasonable 
time’. There have been numerous cases on the promptness of 
proceedings.39 It is possible to waive some, but probably not all, of 
these rights under Article 6(1).40 The scope of the rights guaranteed 
under Article 6 is therefore rather wide and is constantly being refined 
and redefined within the Convention system. It is impossible to 
provide an exhaustive list of the rights contained in Article 6 since the 
Court’s decisions constantly create new rights and shape old ones. Its 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Finland, 63235/00, 19 April 2007, GC.  
30 Fey v Austria, 14396/88, 24 February 1993; AB Kurt Kellermann v Sweden, 41579/98, 
26 October 2004. 
31 Belilos v Switzerland, 10328/83, 29 April 1988; Incal v. Turkey, 22678/93, 9 June 1998, 
GC. 
32 Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine, 21722/11, 9 January 2013. 
33 Pretto and Others v Italy, 7984/77, 8 December 1983. See also on the sub-rights 
derived from the right to a fair hearing, Eva Brems, ‘Conflicting Human Rights: An 
Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 1 Human Rights 
Quarterly 27 (2005) 294, 295-8. 
34 Dombo Beheer B.V. v the Netherlands, 14448/88, 27 October 1993. 
35  Van Mechelen and Others v the Netherlands, 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 
22056/93, 23 April 1997. 
36 Granger v the United Kingdom, 11932/86, 28 March 1990. 
37 Saunders v the United Kingdom, 19187/91, 17 December 1996, GC. 
38  Hadjianastassiou v Greece, 12945/87, 16 December 1992; Van de Hurk v the 
Netherlands, 16034/90, 19 April 1994. 
39 Zimmermann and Steiner v Switzerland, 8737/79, 13 July 1983; König v Germany, 
6232/73, 28 June 1978; Bottazzi v Italy, 34884/97, 28 July 1999. 
40  Zumtobel v Austria, 12235/86, 21 September 1993; Jones v the United Kingdom, 
30900/02, 9 September 2003. 
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interpretations have, arguably, moved away from the original text of 
the fair trial provision. 
 
As this brief overview of the progressive content of Article 6 
demonstrates, the Court has developed several tools and techniques to 
underpin its extension of rights and freedoms provided for in the 
Convention. The most frequently cited methods of interpretation are 
as follows: (1) the living-instrument approach; (2) the theory of 
autonomous concepts; (3) the practical and effective approach; and (4) 
the common ground method.41 All these interpretative methods were 
created by the Court’s case law. Furthermore, all the decisions reached 
in these cases reject the idea that the rights enshrined in the 
Convention must be interpreted like they were in the 1950s. Article 1 of 
the Convention is the starting point for the Court’s interpretation, and 
states the following: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
Section 1 of this Convention.’  
 
It is noteworthy that the Court’s approach to interpretation, taken as a 
whole, can be described as creative and dynamic. It abandoned the 
strict textual approach to interpretation some time ago and advanced 
special methods of interpretation.42   
 
 The Fourth Instance Doctrine 2.
The fourth instance doctrine was developed in the Convention system 
in the late 1950s and 1960s.43 In the Belgian Linguistic case, the Court 
held that: 
 
It […] cannot assume the role of the competent national authorities, 
                                                            
41 See Letsas (n 16); Harris and others (n 10), 7-21; Clara Ovey and Robin CA White, 
in Jacobs & White, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn; OUP 2010), 
73-8; Christoffersen (n 2), 54-63; Gerards (n 19), 428-35; Alistair Mowbray, ‘Between 
the Will of the Contracting Parties and the Needs of Today: Extending the Scope of 
Convention Rights and Freedoms beyond Could Have Been Foreseen by the 
Drafters of the ECHR’, in Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in 
the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013), 17-37. 
42 Christoffersen (n 2), 49-50; Alex Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: 
Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe’ (2012) 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 53, 73. 
43 See eg X v Belgium, 458/59, 29 March 1960. See more Christoffersen (n 2), 238-9, 
274.  
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41 See Letsas (n 16); Harris and others (n 10), 7-21; Clara Ovey and Robin CA White, 
in Jacobs & White, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th edn; OUP 2010), 
73-8; Christoffersen (n 2), 54-63; Gerards (n 19), 428-35; Alistair Mowbray, ‘Between 
the Will of the Contracting Parties and the Needs of Today: Extending the Scope of 
Convention Rights and Freedoms beyond Could Have Been Foreseen by the 
Drafters of the ECHR’, in Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards (eds), Shaping Rights in 
the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2013), 17-37. 
42 Christoffersen (n 2), 49-50; Alex Stone Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: 
Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe’ (2012) 1 Global 
Constitutionalism 53, 73. 
43 See eg X v Belgium, 458/59, 29 March 1960. See more Christoffersen (n 2), 238-9, 
274.  
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for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiarity nature of the 
international machinery […] The national authorities remain free to 
choose the measures which they consider appropriate […] Review by 
the Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the 
requirements of the Convention.44  
 
The Court adopted the Commission’s approach in the 1970s, and in its 
leading case Schenk,45 the Court stated the following: 
 
According to Article 19 of the Convention, the Court’s duty is to 
ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the 
Contracting States in the Convention. In particular, it is not its 
function to deal with errors of fact or of law allegedly committed by a 
national court unless and insofar as they may have infringed rights 
and freedoms protected by the Convention.46 
 
The fourth instance doctrine stems from two main sources. Firstly, it is 
a simple matter of efficiency in the use of resources. Secondly, at the 
level of legitimacy, it is recognised that democratically non-accountable 
judges in Strasbourg should not use their jurisdiction to override 
national authorities.47  The main rule is clear: the facts of the case 
brought before the Court will not be questioned. This means in 
practice that the Court accepts that the national authorities investigate 
the facts of the case. However, if the national court’s decision violates 
the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention then it is 
necessary for the Court to step in.48 
 
In addition to upholding national sovereignty, the fourth instance 
                                                            
44 Case ‘Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in 
Belgium’ v Belgium (Merits) (Belgium Linguistic case), 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 
1994/63, 2126/64, 23 July 1968, para 10. 
45 Schenk v Switzerland, 10862/84, 12 July 1988. 
46 ibid, para 45. For more recent case law, see, eg Tautkus v Lithuania (n 11), in which 
the Court emphasised that it is not the task of the Court to assess the facts which 
led a national court to adopt one decision over another. The application of the 
fourth instance doctrine also means that an applicant’s argument that was not 
accepted by the national court cannot be upheld by the Court (para 57). 
47 Arai-Takahashi (n 3), 235-6. 
48 Ben Emmerson, Andrew Ashworth and Alison Macdonald (eds), Human Rights and 
Criminal Justice (3rd edn; Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 129, 134, 645; Andreas Føllesdal, 
Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Introduction’, in Andreas Føllesdal, Birgit Peters 
and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe, The European Court of Human Rights in a 
National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press 2013), 15-7. 
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doctrine also respects the principle of democracy. Respecting the 
choices and evaluations made by the national authorities reflects 
respect for the democratically elected members of the parliament and 
the people who have democratically voted for their representatives.49 
The Preamble to the Convention states that on the one hand, 
fundamental rights and freedoms are best maintained by an effective 
political democracy and, on the other, by a common understanding 
and observance of the human rights upon which they depend.50 
 
The Court frequently reiterates that it is not its role to act as quasi-
appellate court as to the correctness of a national court’s judgment 
under its national law.51 Unlike a national court of appeal, it is not 
concerned about whether the conviction was safe, whether the 
sentence was appropriate, or whether the level of damages awarded 
was in accordance with national law, and so forth. 52  However, 
questions relating to the fairness of the domestic proceedings under 
Article 6 of the Convention blur the lines. 
The Court has considered that insofar as the remaining ‘fairness’ 
complaints under Article 6 have been substantiated, this raises issues 
that are of no more than a fourth instance nature, and which the Court 
has limited power to review under Article 6.53 For example, if the 
Court considers the domestic court failed to consider certain factors 
when assessing the legal nature of the case, it risks going beyond its 
                                                            
49  Judicial minimalism has the same aim and affect: judging narrowly and 
superficially leaves things open for further decision in the future. This also 
promotes democracy: by saying no more than is strictly necessary, minimalism 
leaves issues open for political discussion. For further discussion of the Court’s 
judicial minimalism, see Aagje Ieven, ‘Privacy Rights in Conflict: In Search of the 
Theoretical Framework behind the European Court of Human Rights’ Balancing of 
Private Life against Other Rights’ in Eva Brems (ed), Conflicts Between Fundamental 
Rights (Intersentia 2008), 55-60. 
50 See more Alistair Mowbray, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Promotion of Democracy’, (1999) 51 PL 703; Susan Marks, ‘The European 
Convention on Human Rights and its “Democratic Society”’, (1995) 66 BYIL 209. 
51 See eg Pelipenko v Russia, 69037/10, 1 October 2012, para 65: ‘the Court reiterates 
that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to 
interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention 
“incorporates” the rules of that law, since the national authorities are, by their very 
nature, particularly qualified to settle issues arising in this connection […]’; see also 
Wildhaber (n 20), 162. 
52 For more on this subject, see Ovey and White (n 41), 243. 
53 See García Ruiz v Spain, 30544/96, 12 January 1999, GC, para 28; Fruni v Slovakia, 
8014/07, 21 June 2011, para 128. 
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50 See more Alistair Mowbray, ‘The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in 
the Promotion of Democracy’, (1999) 51 PL 703; Susan Marks, ‘The European 
Convention on Human Rights and its “Democratic Society”’, (1995) 66 BYIL 209. 
51 See eg Pelipenko v Russia, 69037/10, 1 October 2012, para 65: ‘the Court reiterates 
that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to 
interpret and apply domestic law, even in those fields where the Convention 
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53 See García Ruiz v Spain, 30544/96, 12 January 1999, GC, para 28; Fruni v Slovakia, 
8014/07, 21 June 2011, para 128. 
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competence and acting as a court of fourth instance.54 But how can the 
Court evaluate fairness in the first place without, in fact, acting as a 
court of fourth instance? Evaluating the overall fairness of national 
procedure leads the Court to make a concrete assessment of the 
arguments and the application of national laws and their interpretation 
by national authorities. 55  This creates an unclear and confusing 
situation. On the one hand, the starting point is obvious, the national 
authorities play the lead role in investigating and interpreting national 
law. On the other hand, the fact that the Court steps in if the national 
interpretation violates provisions of the Convention muddies the 
waters. In such cases, who is the arbitrator that decides when the line 
is crossed? Questions about the fairness of the proceedings and its 
outcome can be easily assessed by reference to the facts of the case at 
hand. Arguments concerning, for example, the appropriateness of the 
imposed punishment are open to criticism as instances of fourth-
instance assessments. 56  It seems that the fourth instance doctrine 
draws a fine line, whose precise position must be decided by the Court 
on a case-by-case basis. I argue that the doctrine defines the limits 
within which the human rights interpretation can be made. In other 
words, it provides a point of departure for subsequent interpretation. I 
also argue that the Court in some cases acts as a fourth instance 
court.57 
 
III. CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Case Categories 1.
The forty-four cases chosen for the purposes of this study were found 
                                                            
54 See, eg the concurring opinion of judge Dedov in the case of Brežec v Croatia, 
7177/10, 18 July 2013. 
55 It has been pointed out that a question of law and a question of fact are hard to 
distinguish. See the dissenting opinion of judge Zupančič (Hermi v Italy, 18114/02, 18 
October 2006): ‘Here at the European Court of Human Rights we continue to make 
the point that we are not a fourth-instance court and that we do not wish to deal 
with any facts which are subject to the guiding principle of immediacy in a trial. 
Nevertheless, a new major premise in legal terms will always call for new elements 
making up the minor premise, that is, some kind of facts.’  
56 See the concurring opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Maktouf and 
Damjanović v Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2312/08, 34179/08, 18 July 2012, GC. 
57 Costa considers the fourth instance doctrine to be one of the devices that delimit 
the Court’s domain vis-á-vis national authorities. See Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2011) 7 EuConst 
173, 179.  
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in the HUDOC database by using the search terms ‘fourth instance’ 
and ‘effective.’ No time limits were applied.58 Based on a close reading 
of the cases, four categories were identified in order to systematically 
categorise the role of the fourth instance doctrine under Article 6. This 
categorisation was carried out by applying the methods of rational 
argumentation theory, which offers a deeper insight into the 
substantive reasons given by the Court. 59  Argument analysis is a 
method that focuses on the Court’s reasoning, which results in the 
researcher moving to the level of legal culture. This allows more 
general remarks to be made about the use of the fourth instance 
doctrine in the Court’s practice.60 
 
The first category is ‘clear fourth instance nature’. Here the Court’s 
task is easy, since one can easily observe that questions before the 
Court are purely fourth-instance-related so the Court is prohibited 
from looking at them. The second category is ‘length of proceedings’. 
Here the Court’s task is relatively straightforward and the Court must 
assess whether the length of the proceedings at national level was 
unreasonable. The third category is ‘balancing approach’. In these 
cases the Court takes the view that it has no grounds to interfere 
because the assessment of the evidence or establishment of the facts 
made by the national courts is not manifestly unreasonable or in any 
way arbitrary. The threshold for interference is relatively high. Here, 
the Court tends to place an emphasis on the fourth instance doctrine 
                                                            
58  The search terms ‘fourth instance’ and ‘effective’ were chosen because they 
helped locate the relevant cases. The word ‘effective’ is widely used by the Court 
both in the practical and effective interpretations as well as in other interpretations, 
such as in positive obligations and living instrument argumentation. See, eg the 
dissenting opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Dimitar Shopov v Bulgaria, 
17253/07, 16 April 2013, 16. The search terms, however, clearly omit some relevant 
cases, since it would be impossible to apply search terms that would cover all 
potential relevant cases. The task of searching for cases was conducted from 1 
August 2013 until 1 November 2013. 
59 Paso (n 24), 240; Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal 
Justification (D Reidel Publishing Co 1987). See also Alan McKee, Textual Analysis: A 
Beginner’s Guide (SAGE Publications 2003); see also on discursive analytic research, 
Alexa Hepburn and Jonathan Potter, ‘Discourse Analytic Practice’, in Clive Seale 
and others (eds), Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 168-84; 
Ruth Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in Clive Seale and others (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 185-201.  
60 In respect of the levels of the law, especially on the level of legal culture, see 
Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002), 161-83. 
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competence and acting as a court of fourth instance.54 But how can the 
Court evaluate fairness in the first place without, in fact, acting as a 
court of fourth instance? Evaluating the overall fairness of national 
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III. CASE STUDY: THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH INSTANCE DOCTRINE  
 
 Case Categories 1.
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54 See, eg the concurring opinion of judge Dedov in the case of Brežec v Croatia, 
7177/10, 18 July 2013. 
55 It has been pointed out that a question of law and a question of fact are hard to 
distinguish. See the dissenting opinion of judge Zupančič (Hermi v Italy, 18114/02, 18 
October 2006): ‘Here at the European Court of Human Rights we continue to make 
the point that we are not a fourth-instance court and that we do not wish to deal 
with any facts which are subject to the guiding principle of immediacy in a trial. 
Nevertheless, a new major premise in legal terms will always call for new elements 
making up the minor premise, that is, some kind of facts.’  
56 See the concurring opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Maktouf and 
Damjanović v Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2312/08, 34179/08, 18 July 2012, GC. 
57 Costa considers the fourth instance doctrine to be one of the devices that delimit 
the Court’s domain vis-á-vis national authorities. See Jean-Paul Costa, ‘On the 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments’ (2011) 7 EuConst 
173, 179.  
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in the HUDOC database by using the search terms ‘fourth instance’ 
and ‘effective.’ No time limits were applied.58 Based on a close reading 
of the cases, four categories were identified in order to systematically 
categorise the role of the fourth instance doctrine under Article 6. This 
categorisation was carried out by applying the methods of rational 
argumentation theory, which offers a deeper insight into the 
substantive reasons given by the Court. 59  Argument analysis is a 
method that focuses on the Court’s reasoning, which results in the 
researcher moving to the level of legal culture. This allows more 
general remarks to be made about the use of the fourth instance 
doctrine in the Court’s practice.60 
 
The first category is ‘clear fourth instance nature’. Here the Court’s 
task is easy, since one can easily observe that questions before the 
Court are purely fourth-instance-related so the Court is prohibited 
from looking at them. The second category is ‘length of proceedings’. 
Here the Court’s task is relatively straightforward and the Court must 
assess whether the length of the proceedings at national level was 
unreasonable. The third category is ‘balancing approach’. In these 
cases the Court takes the view that it has no grounds to interfere 
because the assessment of the evidence or establishment of the facts 
made by the national courts is not manifestly unreasonable or in any 
way arbitrary. The threshold for interference is relatively high. Here, 
the Court tends to place an emphasis on the fourth instance doctrine 
                                                            
58  The search terms ‘fourth instance’ and ‘effective’ were chosen because they 
helped locate the relevant cases. The word ‘effective’ is widely used by the Court 
both in the practical and effective interpretations as well as in other interpretations, 
such as in positive obligations and living instrument argumentation. See, eg the 
dissenting opinion of judge Kalaydjieva in the case of Dimitar Shopov v Bulgaria, 
17253/07, 16 April 2013, 16. The search terms, however, clearly omit some relevant 
cases, since it would be impossible to apply search terms that would cover all 
potential relevant cases. The task of searching for cases was conducted from 1 
August 2013 until 1 November 2013. 
59 Paso (n 24), 240; Aulis Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal 
Justification (D Reidel Publishing Co 1987). See also Alan McKee, Textual Analysis: A 
Beginner’s Guide (SAGE Publications 2003); see also on discursive analytic research, 
Alexa Hepburn and Jonathan Potter, ‘Discourse Analytic Practice’, in Clive Seale 
and others (eds), Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 168-84; 
Ruth Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, in Clive Seale and others (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice (SAGE Publications 2007), 185-201.  
60 In respect of the levels of the law, especially on the level of legal culture, see 
Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Ashgate 2002), 161-83. 
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over the right to a fair trial. The fourth category is ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’. In the cases belonging to this category, the Court 
emphasises the fair trial provision over the fourth instance doctrine by 
finding positive obligations under Article 6. In these two latter 
categories one can find arguments both for and against the fourth 
instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. 
 
Based on the results of my search, I have decided to present the most 
representative examples of the role of the fourth instance doctrine in 
each particular category. In other words, these examples are chosen on 
the basis that they best demonstrate the character of the particular 
category at hand. 
 
 Category one: Clear fourth instance nature 2.
These cases almost immediately reveal themselves as falling squarely 
within the fourth instance doctrine and the Court will consider them 
no further. Claims, which are clearly of a fourth instance nature, 
include general claims where there is no suggestion that the national 
court has misinterpreted the domestic legislation or balanced the 
evidence incorrectly. 
  
In Tomić, twelve applicants complained about the decision of the 
domestic court proceedings. 61  The Montenegrin Government 
maintained that these complaints were of a fourth-instance nature and 
therefore inadmissible before the Court. The Court agreed with the 
assessment,62 and it was, therefore, not necessary to justify its decision. 
It sufficed to refer to the fourth instance formula as follows: ‘it is not 
its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a 
national court unless and in so far as they may infringed rights and 
freedoms protected by the Convention’.63 This is a classic example of 
an issue that is clearly a case of the fourth instance doctrine so the 
Court cannot investigate the decision of the national proceedings. 
 
The complex Karpenko case involved several complaints under Article 
                                                            
61 Tomić and Others v Montenegro, 18650/09, 18676/09, 18679/09, 38855/09, 38859/09, 
38883/09, 39589/09, 39592/09, 65365/09, 7316/10, 17 April 2012. 
62 ibid, paras 62-3. 
63 ibid, para 62. In respect of the alleged violation of Article 6 as regards the 
outcome of the proceedings, see also FC Mretebi v Georgia, 38736/04, 31 July 2007, 
paras 31-33. 
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6.64 The applicant alleged that the criminal proceedings, in which he 
was accused of murder, the possession of firearms and forgery charges, 
were unfair as the courts had erred in their assessment of the facts and 
evidence and had incorrectly applied domestic law. The Court 
reiterated that under the fourth instance doctrine its task was not to act 
as a court of appeal or a fourth instance court, and pointed out that it 
is for the domestic courts to exclude evidence it considers irrelevant.65 
It then assessed the evidence on which the charges were based, noting 
that there were multiple documents, witnesses and expert testimonies 
and that the national judgment was well-reasoned. The Court also 
noted that the applicant was present throughout the proceedings and 
was able to cross-examine witnesses and challenge the evidence.66 On 
the basis of these facts, the Court considered that: ‘in so far as the 
remainder of the “fairness” complaints under Article 6... has been 
substantiated, it raises issues which are no more than a fourth-instance 
nature, and which the Court has a limited power to review [...]’67 It 
concluded that this part of the application must be rejected.  
 
Fruni dealt with the impartiality and independence of the courts.68 The 
applicant complained that he was not granted a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law, as provided for 
in Article 6(1). More precisely, he complained, inter alia, that his trial 
and conviction was politically motivated, and that the court had taken 
inadmissible evidence into account. The Court went through the 
points of the complaint with reference to the facts of the case, and held 
as follows with respect to the fourth instance doctrine: ‘[T]he 
admission of evidence is a matter for domestic courts. It is also for 
domestic courts to decide what evidence is relevant […]’69  
 
The Court observed that the applicant’s conviction was based on 
extensive documentary, witness and expert evidence, and found 
nothing that undermined the fairness of the procedure. Consequently, 
it rejected the application and observed: ‘in so far as the remainder of 
the “fairness” complaints under Article 6 […] has been substantiated, it 
                                                            
64 Karpenko v Russia, 5605/04, 13 March 2012. Other complaints under Article 6 are 
discussed below. 
65 ibid, para 80. 
66 ibid, para 81. 
67 ibid, para 82. 
68 Fruni v Slovakia (n 53). 
69 ibid, para 126. 
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raises issues which are of no more than a fourth-instance nature’.70 
 
Fair trial provisions were widely invoked in Shalimov.71 The applicant 
complained that the proceedings were unfair, that the domestic courts 
were not impartial and independent, and that they had falsified the 
case materials against him and misinterpreted the evidence. The Court 
reiterated the fourth-instance formula—that it is not its task to act as a 
court of fourth instance—and also noted that the domestic courts are 
best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of 
evidence.72 The applicant had not substantiated any of the allegations. 
The Court held that the mere fact that the court had decided against 
the applicant was not sufficient to conclude that it was not impartial 
and not independent.73 There was consequently no balancing issue and 
the case was clear and undisputed. Complaints about the domestic 
court’s interpretations of the evidence provide a fitting example of an 
issue, which, according to the fourth instance doctrine, do not fall 
under the Court’s jurisdiction. 
 
 Category two: Length of proceedings 3.
The length of proceedings amounts to a category of its own in fair trial 
cases. In cases where the national authority has delayed the 
proceedings beyond a reasonable length of time, the Court can, 
irrespective of the doctrine of fourth instance, conclude that the 
national trial has been unfair due to the unreasonableness. In the 
Court evaluation of the length of the proceedings, the heart of the 
fourth instance doctrine remains untouched. The Court’s analysis in 
this regard is rather straightforward: if the length of the proceedings 
was unreasonable, then there is a violation of Article 6(1). There are 
very few problems with this interpretation, and thus these questions 
are rather easy and quick to resolve. 
 
In Sebahattin Evcimen the proceedings before the domestic courts had 
lasted nine years and eight months and took place at two levels of the 
court system.74 The Court’s approach to evaluating the reasonableness 
of the length of the proceedings involved taking into account the 
                                                            
70 ibid, para 128. 
71 Shalimov v Ukraine, 20808/02, 4 March 2010. 
72 ibid, para 67. 
73 ibid, paras 68-9. 
74 Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey, 31792/06, 23 February 2010. 
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circumstances of the case, its complexity, the conduct of the applicant 
and the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in 
the dispute.75 The Court pointed out the obligations of the state: ‘it is 
the role of the domestic courts to manage their proceedings so that 
they are expeditious and effective.’76 Consequently, it concluded that 
the national courts had not acted with due diligence overall, and that 
the Turkish Government had not put forward any facts or arguments 
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion. Consequently, 
the Court unanimously ruled that the length of the proceedings was 
excessive and failed to meet the reasonable time requirement. 
 
In Shalimov the applicant’s complaint was based on several grounds 
under Article 6, including, inter alia, that the criminal proceedings 
against him had taken an unreasonably long period of time. The 
Court’s evaluation started by reiterating that the reasonableness of the 
length of the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the 
circumstances of the particular case and with reference to the criteria 
as laid down in the Court’s case law.77 The Court then turned to the 
facts of the case, which amounted to criminal proceedings against the 
applicant that took four years, eleven months and three days to 
complete, and included multiple periods during which little or no 
action was taken. It appeared that it had taken more than a year for the 
domestic authorities to conduct additional medical and ballistic 
examinations in the case. Furthermore, no action had been taken 
between the preparatory hearing of 15th of April 2002 and the hearing 
on the merits on 9th of September 2002; a period of almost five months. 
The Court emphatically stressed that:  
 
[S]uch delays are attributed to the domestic authorities and are not 
justified by the complexity of the case or the by the applicant’s 
behaviour. Furthermore, special diligence was required […] given that 
the applicant was in detention during the period in question.78  
 
The Court emphasised that the State was obliged to provide a fair trial 
within reasonable time. I consider this to be purely a fair trial issue and 
questions relating to the fourth instance doctrine are irrelevant. The 
Court concluded that ‘[t]he foregoing considerations are sufficient to 
                                                            
75 ibid, para 30. 
76 ibid, para 32 (emphasis added). 
77 Shalimov v Ukraine (n 71), para 76. 
78 ibid, para 77. 
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72 ibid, para 67. 
73 ibid, paras 68-9. 
74 Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey, 31792/06, 23 February 2010. 
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75 ibid, para 30. 
76 ibid, para 32 (emphasis added). 
77 Shalimov v Ukraine (n 71), para 76. 
78 ibid, para 77. 
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enable the Court to conclude that the proceedings… were excessively 
long’.79 
 
 Category three: Balancing approach 4.
This category of cases requires the Court to balance the effectiveness 
of the fair trial provision with the limits imposed by the fourth instance 
doctrine. This is not an easy task to accomplish, since it is possible to 
frame the arguments according to the fourth instance doctrine or the 
practical and effective right to a fair trial. However, the Court 
maintains a relatively high threshold for interference in respect of 
these cases, requiring that the assessment of the evidence or 
establishment of the facts by the national courts may not be ‘manifestly 
unreasonable or in any other way arbitrary’.80 
 
In Tomić, the applicants claimed that the domestic courts violated 
Article 6 in rejecting their claims while at the same time permitting 
identical claims by other applicants.81 They submitted copies of the 
domestic courts’ rulings in six other cases to support their claim. The 
Court’s assessment commenced with the following statement:  
 
[I]t is not its role to question the interpretation of domestic law by the 
national courts. Similarly, it is not [...] its function to compare 
different decisions of national courts, even if given in apparently 
similar proceedings; it must respect the independence of those 
courts.82  
 
The Court indicated the relevant threshold is as follows: 
 
[C]ertain divergences in interpretation could be accepted as an 
inherent trait of any judicial system which […] is based on a network 
of trial and appeal courts […] However, profound and longstanding 
differences in the practice of the highest domestic court may in itself 
be contrary to the principle of legal certainty […]83 
 
                                                            
79 ibid, para 78; see similarly Štavbe v Slovenia, 20526/02, 30 November 2006, paras 
43-44; Josephides v Cyprus, 33761/02, 6 December 2007, paras 71, 76; Christodoulou v 
Cyprus, 30282/06, 16 July 2009, para 59; Richard Anderson v the United Kingdom, 
19859/04, 9 February 2010, para 29. 
80 See eg Ebanks v the United Kingdom, 36822/06, 26 January 2010, para 74. 
81 Tomić and Others v Montenegro (n 61).  
82 ibid, para 53. 
83 ibid, para 53. 
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The Court laid down certain criteria to be followed in order to assess 
whether inconsistent decisions of domestic Supreme Courts violated 
the fair trial requirement under Article 6(1). These criteria comprised 
in establishing whether ‘profound and long-standing differences’ 
existed in the Supreme Court’s case law, whether the domestic 
legislation provided measures to overcome these inconsistencies, and 
whether these measures had been applied and, if appropriate, to what 
effect.84 Next, the Court examined the six national cases, which the 
applicants referred to, and concluded that only three decisions ruled in 
favour of claimants, whose situation was similar to that of the 
applicants. It also noted that the Supreme Court never examined these 
decisions. The Court also examined the case law of the national High 
Court and observed that it had heard a total of eighty-eight appeals, of 
which eighty-four decisions were against the claimants and only four in 
favour. The Court concluded that: ‘It would appear that these four 
favourable decisions could be considered an exception and 
inconsistent in comparison with the other eighty-four, rather than the 
other way round’.85 
 
The Court found some inconsistencies in the national case law, which 
it held could not be seen as ‘profound and long-standing differences’. 
On this basis, it concluded that there was no violation of Article 6(1). 
This case illustrates that the threshold under which inconsistencies in 
national case law may violate the fair trial provision, which I argue has 
been raised relatively high. 
 
The Grand Chamber’s votes were finely balanced in Şahin, in which 
ten judges, with seven dissenting, supported the majority vote.86 The 
key issue in this case was whether the fourth instance doctrine took 
precedence over the  ‘practical and effective’ requirements of Article 
6(1). The majority voted in favour of the fourth instance doctrine, with 
the dissenting opinion favouring the effectiveness of rights approach. 
The applicants claimed that the proceedings before the domestic 
courts were unfair and argued that it was possible that the same facts 
could give rise to different legal assessments that varied from one court 
to another, which amounted to a violation of Article 6(1). 
The facts of the case were that there had been a military plane crash 
                                                            
84 ibid, para 54. 
85 ibid, para 57. 
86 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey, 13279/05, 20 October 2011, GC. 
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other way round’.85 
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On this basis, it concluded that there was no violation of Article 6(1). 
This case illustrates that the threshold under which inconsistencies in 
national case law may violate the fair trial provision, which I argue has 
been raised relatively high. 
 
The Grand Chamber’s votes were finely balanced in Şahin, in which 
ten judges, with seven dissenting, supported the majority vote.86 The 
key issue in this case was whether the fourth instance doctrine took 
precedence over the  ‘practical and effective’ requirements of Article 
6(1). The majority voted in favour of the fourth instance doctrine, with 
the dissenting opinion favouring the effectiveness of rights approach. 
The applicants claimed that the proceedings before the domestic 
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and the courts awarded some, but not all, of the victims’ families a 
pension. The majority of the judges of the Court held that the fourth 
instance doctrine was the decisive principle,87 and the Court reiterated 
on several occasions that a conflict in national case law does not 
automatically result in a violation of Article 6(1).88 It emphasised that it 
had found no evidence of arbitrariness, stating that: 
 
[E]xamining the existence and the impact of such conflicting decisions 
does not mean examining the wisdom of the approach the domestic 
courts have chosen to take […] its role […] is limited to cases where 
the impugned decision is manifestly arbitrary.89  
 
The Court concluded that the ‘interpretation made by the Supreme 
Military Administrative Court […] cannot be said to have been arbitrary, 
unreasonable or capable of affecting the fairness of the proceedings, 
but was simply a case of application of the domestic law’.90 Finally it 
stressed its role: ‘it must avoid any unjustified interference in the 
exercise by the States of their judicial functions or in the organisation 
of the judicial systems’.91 The majority held that there had been no 
violation of Article 6(1).  
 
The dissenting opinion stressed that different interpretations must not 
place the public in a situation of legal uncertainty, where the outcome 
of a case is dependent on a mechanism incapable of guaranteeing 
consistency in court decisions.92 It prioritised the requirement of a fair 
trial and had little to say about the question of subsidiarity in the 
case.93 By contrast, the majority view emphasised the formal aspects of 
the fourth instance doctrine. However, the dissenting opinion 
neglected to address how the fair trial provision must be interpreted in 
light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law 
is part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the 
fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal 
                                                            
87 ibid, paras 49-50, 68-70, 88. 
88 ibid, paras 51, 88. 
89 ibid, para 89. 
90 ibid, para 93. 
91 ibid, para 94. 
92 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Bratza, Casadevall, Vajić, Spielmann, Rozakis, 
Kovler and Mijović in Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey (2011), para 6. 
93 ibid, para 5. See the similarly dissenting opinion of judge Šikuta joined by judge 
Myjer in Popivčák v Slovakia, 13665/07, 6 December 2011, para 12: ‘[T]his is not a 
fourth-instance case but rather a case of lack of access to a court […]’. 
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certainty. 94  The Preamble to the Convention also recognises the 
democracy principle, which means that respecting the evaluation made 
by the national authorities entails respect for the democratically 
elected members of parliament. The fourth instance doctrine, among 
other things, ultimately serves this democracy principle.  
 
Based on my reading of the majority’s decision, the judges were 
determined to uphold the independence of the national court at all 
costs. Even taking into account the constitutive principles of the fourth 
instance doctrine, I argue that the decision was unacceptable because 
it essentially pronounces that the national court’s decision on the same 
matter may differ from chamber to chamber of the same court. The 
majority was of the view was that this was neither arbitrary nor likely to 
affect public confidence. 
 
In Sebahattin Evcimen questions about the fairness of the hearing 
arose.95 Fairness entails giving each party a reasonable opportunity to 
present his or her case and to have knowledge of and the right to 
comment on all evidence adduced or observations submitted. The 
applicant complained that he had not received a fair hearing, arguing 
that the domestic courts had erred in the establishment of the facts 
and in their interpretation of the law. More precisely, the applicant 
claimed that the national decision was based on insufficient evidence. 
The Court reiterated the fourth instance formula:  
 
[I]t is not its task to act as a court of appeal or, as is sometimes said, as 
a court of fourth instance, for the decisions of domestic courts [...] the 
latter are best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses and the 
relevance of evidence to the issues in the case.96  
 
Taking a strict approach to the fourth instance doctrine, the Court, 
after examining the facts of the case, decided as follows:  
 
Following a thorough examination of the case file, the Court finds no 
element which might lead it to conclude that the domestic court acted 
in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner in establishing the facts or 
interpreting the domestic law.97 
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The complaint was manifestly ill-founded and was accordingly rejected. 
The Court’s wording indicates that the Court was critical of the 
domestic proceedings; otherwise, the Court would have referred to the 
clear fourth-instance formula. A strict approach to the fourth instance 
doctrine sets a relatively high threshold: there must be something so 
manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable in the domestic proceedings for 
the Court to interfere. This required further elucidation, which was 
not forthcoming in this decision. The judgment remained at a general 
level and made no evaluation on the questions of arbitrariness and 
unreasonableness.98 
 
The quality of the evidence used in criminal proceedings was at issue 
in Bykov. 99  The problematic question here was whether the 
proceedings as a whole were fair, taking into account the manner in 
which the evidence was obtained. In this case the Grand Chamber had 
already found a violation of Article 8 (right to private life) in the State 
agents’ covert operation. Evidence against the applicant was obtained 
in a covert operation and was subsequently used in the criminal 
proceedings. The Grand Chamber had to decide whether the evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 8 can be used in the criminal 
proceedings and fulfils the requirements of fairness under Article 6. Its 
decision was not unanimous. The majority, by eleven to six, 
emphasised that the proceedings must be taken as a whole and that 
there had been no violation of Article 6. 100  The Court’s evaluation 
commenced with the reminder that: 
 
its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations […] it is not 
competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or 
fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it 
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of 
any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.101 
 
 The Court made the fourth instance doctrine clear by continuing:  
 
It is therefore not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of 
                                                            
98  Cf. Ebanks v the United Kingdom (n 80) where the arbitrariness and 
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principle, whether particular types of evidence […] may be admissible 
or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question […] 
is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the 
evidence was obtained, were fair […]102 
 
After outlining the main principles the Court turned to the facts of the 
case. It addressed the applicant’s claim that the evidence obtained 
from the covert operation breached his defence rights and thus gave 
rise to a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6. It also 
noted that the evidence obtained as a result of the covert operation was 
not the sole basis for the applicant’s conviction, and concluded that: 
‘nothing has been shown to support the conclusion that the applicant’s 
defence rights were not properly complied with in respect of the 
evidence adduced or that its evaluation by the domestic courts was 
arbitrary’.103 
 
This case demonstrates the difficulties inherent in evaluating the 
evidence in the domestic proceedings, whilst remaining within the 
limits of the fourth instance doctrine. Furthermore, the way in which 
the Court formulated its decision was, in my opinion, rather 
pretentious. The pretentiousness is revealed when the Court 
underlines that ‘nothing’ has been shown to support the conclusion 
that the applicant’s defence rights were not properly complied with in 
relation to the fair trial standards. Rather than undermining the 
specific circumstances, a violation of Article 8 in such covert 
operations should be evaluated properly in order to assess a possible 
violation of Article 6. The Court remains silent on the issue that the 
covert operation had in itself violated other Convention articles. 104 
Evaluating this argumentation from the fair trial view leads one to 
conclude that the right to a fair trial remains theoretical or merely 
illusory, since the Court certainly had grounds to interfere. 
 
 Category Four: Disregard of Fourth Instance Approach 5.
The cases in this category prioritise the provision of a fair trial over 
fourth instance questions. In Lalmahomed the applicant claimed in the 
domestic proceedings that he should have been acquitted on the 
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grounds of mistaken identity.105 The national court dismissed this claim 
as implausible without further investigation and refused leave to 
appeal. The Court reiterated that under Article 6, ‘for the requirements 
of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and indeed the public, must 
be able to understand the judgment or decision that has been given’.106 
It used rather strong language: 
 
[t]he Court cannot overlook the fact that the single-judge chamber of 
the Court of Appeal [...] refused the applicant leave to appeal on the 
ground that he ‘[did] not consider plausible the applicant’s statement 
that his identity details [were] systemically misused by someone else’107 
 
The Court, for its part, considered it more appropriate to deal with the 
matter, having previously highlighted the fourth instance doctrine: ‘as 
long as the resulting decision is based on a full and thorough 
evaluation of the relevant factors […] it will escape the scrutiny of the 
Court’.108 
 
The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the applicant’s 
claim that his identity had been misused ought not to have been 
discounted without further examination. The national court’s 
judgment violated the fair trial provision as a whole because it failed to 
fully investigate the case. Consequently, there was a violation of Article 
6(1) taken together with Article 6(3)(c).109 This case can be seen as a 
harsh and unfortunate example of a national court’s failure to base its 
judgment on a full and thorough evaluation. Due to neglect at national 
level the Court had no choice but to assume de facto the role of a 
domestic court. 
 
Jovanović dealt with the right to access the courts.110 The applicant 
complained that his national Supreme Court had arbitrarily refused to 
consider his appeal when he had the right to use this remedy. The 
Court reiterated that Article 6 does not compel states to establish 
courts of appeal. However, if such courts exist the guarantees 
contained in Article 6 must be upheld, inter alia, by ensuring effective 
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2014]  The ECtHR as a Court of Fourth Instance               110 
access to them. This right is, however, not absolute. Certain limitations 
are permissible, but these must not restrict or reduce a person’s access 
in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is 
impaired. The Court therefore emphasised proportionality.111  
 
The facts of this case were that the national Supreme Court barred the 
applicant from filing an appeal. It ruled without further clarification 
that the assessment of the value of the dispute showed it was clearly 
below the applicable statutory threshold. The Court held that there 
had been an interference with the applicant’s right to access a court 
and proceeded to assess whether this interference had been 
proportionate.112 It placed weight on the fact that the national Supreme 
Court had not held a preliminary hearing. Furthermore, regarding the 
applicant’s alleged procedural errors, the Court emphasised that it was 
the plaintiff and not the applicant who had set an unrealistic value in 
respect of the dispute, which the applicant apparently challenged 
before he had concluded his own response to the claim. The value of 
the dispute was decisive, as there was a certain threshold required for 
the lodging of an appeal on points of law. The applicant was therefore 
entitled to believe that an appeal on points of law would be available to 
him in due course and if necessary. 113  At this juncture, the Court 
showed that it was fully aware of the fourth instance requirements by 
stating as follows: 
 
It is, of course, primarily for the national authorities, notably the 
courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. 
The Court’s role is not, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, to 
question it.114  
 
The Court then diverged from the strict fourth instance limits by 
giving guidance to the national court on how to interpret domestic law:  
 
The authorities should respect and apply domestic legislation in a 
foreseeable and consistent manner and the prescribed elements 
                                                            
111 ibid, para 46. 
112 The Court solved the legitimate aim question relatively quickly: the statutory 
threshold for appeals to the Supreme Court is a legitimate procedural requirement 
having regard to the very essence of the Supreme Court’s role to deal only with 
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should be sufficiently developed and transparent in practice in order 
to provide legal and procedural certainty […]115  
 
Since there had clearly been shortcomings in terms of transparency 
and legal certainty in the national proceedings, the Court unanimously 
held that there had been a violation of Article 6(1). It is noteworthy that 
the last paragraph of the Court’s judgment stated, while finding a 
violation, that ‘it being understood that it is not this Court’s task to 
determine what the actual outcome of the applicant’s appeal on points 
of law would have been had the Supreme Court accepted to consider it 
on its merits’. 116  While emphatically trying to avoid being a fourth 
instance court, the Court acted to the contrary. It also used rather 
contradictory language in making its decision under Article 41 with 
regard to it not being a court of fourth instance:  
 
The Court reiterates that the most appropriate form of redress for a 
violation of Article 6(1) would be to ensure that the applicant […] is 
put in the position in which he would have been had this provision 
not been disregarded. Consequently, it considers that the most 
appropriate form of redress would be to reconsider the applicant’s 
appeal […]117 
 
The Court’s language here undeniably resembles that of a 
constitutional court: it gives instruction to the national court to 
reconsider the case. As result, this particular case amounts to a 
revelation because it reveals the difficulties involved in interpreting 
procedural rights while staying within the limits of the fourth instance 
doctrine. One or the other must yield, and in this case it was the fourth 
instance doctrine that triumphed. 
 
A positive obligation to put in place a system for enforcement of 
judgments under Article 6 arose in Pelipenko.118 Here, the applicant 
complained that because the bailiffs failed to take any necessary steps 
to enforce the execution of the final judgment against the applicants. 
The Court commenced by reiterating that execution of a judgment 
given by any court must be regarded as an integral part of the ‘trial’ for 
the purpose of Article 6. It then noted that the state has a positive 
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obligation to put in place a system for enforcement of judgments that 
is effective both in law and in practice and ensures their enforcement 
without undue delay. It also stated that: 
 
[W]hen final judgments are issued against ‘private’ defendants, the 
State’s positive obligation consists of providing legal arsenal allowing 
individuals to obtain, from their evading debtors, payment of sums 
awarded by those judgments.119  
 
The Court emphasised that the State’s positive measures must be 
adequate and sufficient. Consequently, when it is established that 
measures taken by the national authorities were adequate and 
sufficient, the state cannot be held responsible for a ‘private’ 
defendant’s failure to pay the judgment debt. The Court also took the 
fourth instance doctrine into account and stated: 
 
The Court […] is not called upon to examine whether the internal 
legal order of the States is capable of guaranteeing the execution of 
judgments given by courts. Indeed, it is for each State to equip itself 
with legal instruments which are adequate and sufficient to ensure the 
fulfilment of positive obligations imposed upon the State […] The 
Court’s only task is to examine whether the measures applied […] were 
adequate and sufficient.120 
 
Considering the facts of the case at hand, the Court unanimously held 
that by refraining from taking such adequate and effective measures for 
several years, as required in order to secure compliance with the 
enforceable judicial decision, the national authorities had violated 
Article 6(1) by depriving its provisions of all useful effect.121 The fourth 
instance formula takes a different form in this case, and highlights one 
of the positive obligations as stipulated in Article 6(1). In essence, the 
Court’s threshold for interference permits the state to choose the 
measures required in order to secure adequate and effective 
enforcement of judicial decisions. This also serves the democracy 
principle.122 
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the purpose of Article 6. It then noted that the state has a positive 
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In Karpenko the applicant complained that he had been denied a fair 
trial. He had not been given an opportunity to publically cross-examine 
the four co-accused, who were alleged accomplices in the robberies for 
which he was charged, because none of four attended the trial or 
testified before the court. 123  The Court first went over the general 
principles relating to the rights of the defendant deriving from the fair 
trial provision, noting that these require that the defendant be given an 
adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness 
testifying against him.124 It then conducted an in-depth assessment of 
all the statements given in the pre-trial stage by ten witnesses, in a 
relatively similar manner to that of the appellate court. 125  The 
applicant’s conviction was based, to a decisive extent, on two of the 
witness statements given at the pre-trial stage. The Court remained 
unconvinced by the Russian Government’s arguments as to why the 
witnesses were not present at trial.126 It considered the national court’s 
reasons to be superficial and uncritical, thereby alluding to a positive 
obligation under Article 6:  
 
[T]o take positive steps, in particular, to enable the accused to examine 
or have examined witnesses against him. Such measures form a part of 
the diligence which the Contracting States must exercise in order to 
ensure that the rights guaranteed by Article 6 are enjoyed in an 
effective manner […]127 
  
The choice of words by the Court was robust and unambiguous. After 
framing the positive obligation under the effectiveness principle, it 
ruled that the national court’s decision to justify the witnesses’ absence 
was not sufficiently convincing and that the authorities had failed to 
take reasonable measures to secure their attendance at trial.128 It ruled 
that the applicant had not been granted a fair trial and that as a result, 
there was a violation of Article 6(1) when read with Article 6(3)(d). 
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The applicant had also complained under Article 6 that the national 
courts refused to ensure his attendance in proceedings concerning his 
parental rights. The Court paid particular attention to the nature of the 
dispute in this particular case, which concerned the termination of 
parental rights that required assessment of the very special legal and 
factual relationship existing between a parent and a child.129 The Court 
commenced by reiterating that the principles of adversarial 
proceedings and equality of arms, which are elements of a fair hearing, 
require that each party be given a reasonable opportunity to have 
knowledge of and comment on the observations made or evidence 
adduced by the other party.130 However, it pointed out that in non-
criminal matters there is no absolute right for a parent to be present at 
trial, except with respect to a limited category of cases, such as trials 
where the character and lifestyle of the person concerned are directly 
relevant to the substance of the case, or where the decision involves 
the person’s conduct.131 The Court referred to effectiveness, stating that 
it was ‘not convinced that the representative’s appearance before the 
courts secures an effective, proper and satisfactory presentation of the 
applicant’s case’. 132 Finally, it held, again emphasising effectiveness, 
that ‘the domestic courts deprived the applicant of the opportunity to 
present his case effectively’.133 Consequently, there had been a violation 
of Article 6(1). The Court refrained from ruling on the fourth instance 
doctrine. 
 
In FC Mretebi, the applicant’s complaint to the Court was that its 
national Supreme Court had refused to waive the excessive court fees, 
thus denying him access to justice, which, in turn, violated Article 6.134 
The Court handed down a judgment, following a close vote of four to 
three. The majority took the view that the applicant was obliged, in 
effect, to abandon its appeal before the Court of Cassation because he 
was unable to pay the court fees. The question was whether these court 
fees restricted the right to access to justice disproportionately. The 
Court noted that the national Supreme Court had given no reason as 
to why it could not waive the fees, and ruled that: 
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[A]ssessing the facts of the case as a whole, the Court concludes that 
the Supreme Court failed to secure a proper balance between, on the 
one hand, the interests of the State in securing reasonable court fees 
and, on the other hand, the interests of the applicant in vindicating its 
claim through the courts.135  
 
The dissenting opinion stressed the Court’s role and criticised the 
majority’s reasoning: 
 
It is not for our Court to impose on national jurisdictions ‘to request 
parties more information’ or ‘to try to obtain, either from the 
applicant or the competent authorities, any supplementary proof’ in 
the examination of a civil case.136  
 
The dissenting opinion viewed the case from the fourth instance 
perspective and therefore came to the opposite conclusion. This case 
clearly demonstrates the way in which the Court acts de facto as a court 
of fourth instance. It imposes obligations on national jurisdictions to 
request parties to provide more information and to obtain 
supplementary proof in the trial of civil cases. However, the dissenting 
opinion also proceeded to evaluate questions of a fourth-instance 
nature, asking whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the 
applicant’s insolvency.137 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
 
The Court’s argumentation concerning the fourth instance doctrine in 
the first two categories – ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of 
proceedings’ – is well-defined and unproblematic from the justifiability 
position. Issues which are clearly of a fourth instance nature should be 
ruled inadmissible. In these cases, arguments concerning the fair trial 
provision have little weight. Issues concerning the length of the 
proceedings are also clear. There is little to weigh up in order to 
determine that the length of the proceedings was unreasonable, since a 
decision by the Court that proceedings took too long does not go to the 
heart of the fourth instance doctrine.  
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136 Joint dissenting opinion of judges Türmen, Mularoni and Popović in FC Mretebi v 
Georgia (2007) (emphasis added). 
137 ibid. 
2014]  The ECtHR as a Court of Fourth Instance               116 
 
The next two categories – ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of 
fourth instance approach’ – reveal the tensions and problems involved 
in balancing the fourth instance doctrine against an expansive 
approach to the interpretation of the right to a fair trial. In these cases, 
in particular, the judicial reasoning given must be transparent and take 
account of both sides in order for the judgment to be justifiable and 
convincing. 138 Cases in the category of ‘balancing approach’ can be 
criticised on the basis that rights should be practical and effective and 
that the provision under Article 6 should be interpreted more 
dynamically. In contrast, cases in the category of ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ can be criticised from the fourth instance doctrine 
and formal legitimacy perspectives. The fourth category also 
demonstrates how the Court occasionally acts de facto as a court of 
fourth instance. On the one hand, the Court is very strict in the way it 
articulates its role, according to which it is not a fourth instance court 
and it is not its task to evaluate the national court’s findings or 
interpretations. On the other hand, its case law shows that the Court 
has been rather active and bold in investigating and broadening the 
obligations and rights laid down in Article 6. For example, it has stated 
that as long as the national decision is based on a full and thorough 
evaluation, it will not interfere.139  
 
Article 6 is a relatively sensitive provision because it requires legal 
proceedings to be fair in the broadest sense of the word but it is the 
national authorities themselves that are responsible for these 
proceedings. In the same way as other Convention articles, Article 6 is 
interpreted dynamically and effectively. The tension lies in the fact that 
in evaluating the fairness of proceedings, the Court cannot avoid 
evaluating the acts and interpretations of the national authorities. In so 
doing, the Court may inevitably find itself fulfilling the role of a fourth 
instance or even a constitutional court. For example, its ruling in 
Jovanović, in which it reiterated that the most appropriate form of 
redress for violation of Article 6 is to ensure that the national court 
                                                            
138 The third and fourth categories deal with cases that are considered to be hard 
cases and must be well justified. See eg Peczenik (n 21), 15, 305, Alexy (n 21) 228-30. 
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reconsiders the applicant’s appeal, the Court used language typical of a 
constitutional court.140 
 
Karpenko and Pelipenko are interesting examples as they demonstrate 
the way in which the Court has unanimously interpreted the fair trial 
provision by emphasising the effectiveness principle as well as the 
positive obligations derived from it.141 There are no explicit signs in the 
Court’s reasoning that it took the fourth instance doctrine into account. 
Its consideration of the statements given by the ten witnesses in 
Karpenko, in particular, show the Court acting in a role similar to that 
of a fourth instance court. 
 
The Court has acknowledged this problem, for instance in the Grand 
Chamber’s approach in Şahin,142 which divided the judges into two blocs. 
The majority emphasised a strict approach to the fourth-instance formula, 
while the minority stressed public confidence and the effective 
interpretation of the right to a fair trial. Bykov was another Grand 
Chamber case in which the judges’ decision was not unanimous.143 In this 
case the majority placed greater weight on a strict approach to the fourth-
instance formula, and the minority argued that the right to a fair trial 
must be interpreted in such a way as to give effect to this right.144 
 
In my opinion, it is obvious that the Court cannot both strictly avoid 
acting as a fourth instance court and at the same time interpret the right 
to a fair trial provision effectively. Either it should apply a lower 
threshold in cases concerning the fourth instance doctrine and continue 
to interpret Article 6 in an effective manner, or it should stick with its 
strict fourth-instance formula and refrain from interpreting Article 6 in 
an effective way. The latter is by no means desirable or probable as far as 
the protection of human rights is concerned.  
 
Legitimacy arguments can be used to support both possible positions. In 
                                                            
140 Jovanović v Serbia (n 110), para 59. See also Evert A Alkema, ‘The European 
Convention as a constitution and its Court as a constitutional court’ in Paul 
Mahoney and others (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective (Carl 
Haymanns Verlag KG 2000), 61-2. 
141 Karpenko v Russia (n 64); Pelipenko v Russia (n 51). 
142 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey (n 86). 
143 Bykov v Russia (n 99). 
144 See the partly dissenting opinion of judge Spielmann, joined by judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Casedevall and Mijović, in Bykov v Russia (2009), GC, paras 10-5. 
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the context of the fourth instance doctrine, legitimacy stresses formality 
and the limits placed on the Court’s competence, while the rights 
perspective emphasises substantive legitimacy. From the perspective of 
the latter, legitimacy is gained through the effective protection of human 
rights. It would be more appropriate to consider first how the line should 
be drawn in each case and then openly and transparently give reasons for 
choosing between the fourth instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. 
One should not forget that the bedrock of the fourth instance doctrine is 
the principle of democracy and national sovereignty. These core 
principles are not articulated by the Court per se but are of fundamental 
importance. For the fourth instance doctrine and its application in the 
Court’s case law to be justified, it requires that all competing interests 
must be taken into account, including pro and contra types of 
argumentation, and are balanced carefully. Furthermore, the underlying 
values should be stated transparently. Owing to the strict and declaratory-
nature of fourth instance doctrine, it does not fulfil these requirements. 
 
Pelipenko indicates a step towards a more flexible and practical approach 
to the fourth instance doctrine, in which the Court interpreted it to mean 
that the state has authority to choose the measures needed to secure 
adequate and effective enforcement of judicial decisions. 145  A strict 
approach to the fourth instance doctrine threatens, in my opinion, the 
effective protection of human rights. If the starting point of legal 
interpretation is dominated by an extremely strict approach to the fourth 
instance doctrine, then it is on the wrong track from the outset.  The 
Court should continue using the fourth instance doctrine in the first two 
approaches: ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of proceedings’. 
The last two categories, ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ are more critical and complex: the application of the 
fourth instance doctrine is a matter of balancing as well as transparent 
reasoning of the scope of the fourth instance doctrine in relation to the 
effective application of the right at issue. The strict fourth instance 
doctrine, which simply emphasises that there must be ‘something 
arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ in the domestic proceedings in 
order the Court to interfere, should not be used at all by the Court.146 
Finally, words such as ‘arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ should be 
openly explained and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                            
145 Pelipenko v Russia (n 51), para 51. 
146 See Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey (n 74), para 26; Rybczyńscy v Poland, 3501/02, 3 
October 2006, para 37. 
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Legitimacy arguments can be used to support both possible positions. In 
                                                            
140 Jovanović v Serbia (n 110), para 59. See also Evert A Alkema, ‘The European 
Convention as a constitution and its Court as a constitutional court’ in Paul 
Mahoney and others (eds), Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective (Carl 
Haymanns Verlag KG 2000), 61-2. 
141 Karpenko v Russia (n 64); Pelipenko v Russia (n 51). 
142 Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v Turkey (n 86). 
143 Bykov v Russia (n 99). 
144 See the partly dissenting opinion of judge Spielmann, joined by judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Casedevall and Mijović, in Bykov v Russia (2009), GC, paras 10-5. 
2014]  The ECtHR as a Court of Fourth Instance               118 
the context of the fourth instance doctrine, legitimacy stresses formality 
and the limits placed on the Court’s competence, while the rights 
perspective emphasises substantive legitimacy. From the perspective of 
the latter, legitimacy is gained through the effective protection of human 
rights. It would be more appropriate to consider first how the line should 
be drawn in each case and then openly and transparently give reasons for 
choosing between the fourth instance doctrine and the right to a fair trial. 
One should not forget that the bedrock of the fourth instance doctrine is 
the principle of democracy and national sovereignty. These core 
principles are not articulated by the Court per se but are of fundamental 
importance. For the fourth instance doctrine and its application in the 
Court’s case law to be justified, it requires that all competing interests 
must be taken into account, including pro and contra types of 
argumentation, and are balanced carefully. Furthermore, the underlying 
values should be stated transparently. Owing to the strict and declaratory-
nature of fourth instance doctrine, it does not fulfil these requirements. 
 
Pelipenko indicates a step towards a more flexible and practical approach 
to the fourth instance doctrine, in which the Court interpreted it to mean 
that the state has authority to choose the measures needed to secure 
adequate and effective enforcement of judicial decisions. 145  A strict 
approach to the fourth instance doctrine threatens, in my opinion, the 
effective protection of human rights. If the starting point of legal 
interpretation is dominated by an extremely strict approach to the fourth 
instance doctrine, then it is on the wrong track from the outset.  The 
Court should continue using the fourth instance doctrine in the first two 
approaches: ‘clear fourth instance nature’ and ‘length of proceedings’. 
The last two categories, ‘balancing approach’ and ‘disregard of fourth 
instance approach’ are more critical and complex: the application of the 
fourth instance doctrine is a matter of balancing as well as transparent 
reasoning of the scope of the fourth instance doctrine in relation to the 
effective application of the right at issue. The strict fourth instance 
doctrine, which simply emphasises that there must be ‘something 
arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ in the domestic proceedings in 
order the Court to interfere, should not be used at all by the Court.146 
Finally, words such as ‘arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable’ should be 
openly explained and evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
                                                            
145 Pelipenko v Russia (n 51), para 51. 
146 See Sebahattin Evcimen v Turkey (n 74), para 26; Rybczyńscy v Poland, 3501/02, 3 
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